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[Pleople can aspire not simply to minimal participation in American society,
but to equal dignity and maximum service.'
-Harold Hongju Koh
INTRODUCTION
The long legacy of racial inequality endures in United States
society and institutions. While the existence of racism adversely af-
fects the entire society, African Americans, Native Americans, Asian
Americans, and Latina/o Americans bear the brunt of direct and
indirect assaults of racism. Members of these groups often share
similar experiences of racism based, as they are, on theories and
practices of dehumanization, devaluation and exclusion. However,
examining the impact of race in the United States requires viewing
these experiences through the lenses of the particular communities
of people of color. As Robert Blauner writes:
Each third world people has undergone distinctive, indeed
cataclysmic, experiences on the American continent that
separate its history from the others, as well as from whites.
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword, in ASIAN AMERIcANS AND THE SUPREME COURT:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at i, xi (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992).
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Only Native Americans waged a 300-year war against
white encroachment; only they were subject to genocide
and removal. Only Chicanos were severed from an ongo-
ing modern nation; only they remained concentrated in the
area of their original land base, close to Mexico. Only
blacks went through a 250-year period of slavery. The Chi-
nese were the first people whose presence was interdicted
by exclusion acts. The Japanese were the one group de-
clared an internal enemy and rounded up in concentration
camps. Though the notion of colonized minorities points to
a similarity of situation, it should not imply that black, red,
yellow, and brown America are all in the same bag. Colo-
nization has taken different forms in the histories of the
individual groups. Each people is strikingly heterogene-
ous, and the variables of time, place, and manner have
affected the forms of colonialism, the character of racial
domination, and the responses of the group.
Thus, examination of constructions of "otherness" and the role
of law in American society requires investigation into the distinct
and shared experiences of racial disparity. Such an expanded scope
is necessary to better understand and analyze the phenomenon of
racism itself by identifying its various guises and manifestations.
This understanding is necessary between White Americans and
peoples of color, as well as between communities of peoples of
color.4 As the demographics of society and law schools become
2. Robert Blauner, Colonized and Immigrant Minorities, in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES:
PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICrrY IN AMERICA 149, 158 (Ronald Takaki ed., 2d
ed. 1994). As Professor Ronald Takaki also states, "[W]ho we are and how we are
perceived and treated in terms of race and ethnicity are conditioned by where we
came from originally." Ronald Takaki, Introduction: Different Shores, in FROM
DIFFERENT SHORES, supra, at 3, 8.
3. See, e.g., David Theo Goldberg, Introduction, to THE ANATOMY OF RACISM at xiii
(David Theo Goldberg ed., 1990) ("[The presumption of a single monolithic racism
is being displaced by a mapping of the multifarious historical formulations of
racisms.").
4. Increasingly, racial conflicts are occurring between different groups of people
of color, as well as between Whites and people of color, as recent incidents of African
American and Asian American clashes in California, New York, and Massachusetts
reveal. See infra notes 209-20.
The patterns of inter-racial bias crimes vary. In Miami, Florida, for instance,
tensions are greatest between Latino and African American residents. See Daniel
Goleman, As Bias Crime Seems to Rise, Scientists Study the Roots of Racism, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1990, at C1, C5. In a recent article, Professor Pat Chew recalled the racial
taunting that she experienced during childhood in El Paso, Texas, in which she was
greeted with "Chinita, Chinita" by Mexican American children; and later, as an adult
in El Paso, being called "Chi-na Chi-na," followed by kissing and hissing sounds. Pat
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increasingly diverse, it is important that all law students analyze
these issues throughout legal curricula.'
However, despite its importance, engaging in multifaceted,
multicultural discourse in law school curricula often is approached
with great reticence by educators and students. The reasons for such
reticence are complex and varied; much of it may stem from the
general difficulty that our society has in addressing matters of di-
versity. As Audre Lorde explained:
K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 18 (1994).
While these examples are not meant to suggest that any group or groups of
people of color are more inclined to commit racially assaultive acts against any other
group of people of color, they do indicate a need for greater knowledge about the
impact of racist assaults by the "other" against the "other," whomever the "other"
may be. See id. at 18 n.62; see also Reginald L. Robinson, 'The Other Against Itself":
Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL.
L. REV. 15, 19-35 (1993) (discussing the "violent discourse" between African and Ko-
rean Americans as represented actually and symbolically by People v. Superior
Court (Soon Ja Du), 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (Ct. App. 1992)). In this case, Korean Ameri-
can store owner Soon Ja Du shot and killed Latasha Harlins, an African American
woman, who allegedly was taking a bottle of orange juice from the store. See id. at 51
n.146; see also Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles, " 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1581 (1993) (analyzing the 1992 Los Angeles uprising in the context of "our so-
ciety's system of white-over-colored supremacy").
5. Seeking to determine law students' knowledge about their own and others'
cultures, Professors Richard Vance and Robert Prichard administered a "cultural
literacy" test for professional students that was adapted from E.D. Hirsch's contro-
versial cultural literacy project. See Richard P. Vance & Robert W. Prichard,
Measuring Cultural Knowledge of Law Students, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 233 (1992) (citing
E.D. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LITERACY (1987); Charles King, Cultural Literacy of Fourth-
Year Medical Students, 63 J. MED. EDUC. 919 (1988); and E.D. Hirsch, Cultural Literacy,
52 AM. SCHOLAR 159 (1983)). The study group comprised the 1989 entering class at
Wake Forest University School of Law (as well as the Graduate School of Manage-
ment and the School of Medicine at Wake Forest University, and the School of
Medicine at the University of Kansas). Criticisms of Hirsch notwithstanding, the vast
majority of students across gender, racial and class lines were unable to identify sig-
nificant cultural events or individuals related to their own or others' identities. The
law students answered roughly 25% of questions correctly. There were no significant
differences among students taking the exam based on age, sex, race, country of birth,
religious affiliation, type of college attended, class rank or grade point average, plans
for specializing, previous doctoral degree, number or type of extracurricular activi-
ties, or the number or type of books read in the previous year. Id. at 233-39.
The results of the study prompted the authors to conclude that "continual ex-
posure to interdisciplinary perspectives [in law school] appears to be more crucial
than ever, given the apparent lack of such exposure in students' earlier experience."
Id. at 239. They further identified the need for law students' cultural literacy for their
continued independent learning; for their ability to "fit cases into the historical and
social context that created an atmosphere for changes in the law"; and because "[the
students] will practice in a pluralistic environment in which clients and co-workers
from varied cultural backgrounds will create challenges to effective communication."
Id. at 237-38.
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[W]e have all been programmed to respond to the human
differences between us with fear and loathing and to han-
dle that difference in one of three ways: ignore it, and if
that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, or
destroy it if we think it is subordinate. But we have no pat-
terns for relating across our human differences as equals.
As a result, those differences have been misnamed and
misused in the service of separation and confusion.6
Overcoming silence or frustration or confusion, then, suggests
the need to recognize the importance of the undertaking and to de-
velop creative pedagogical methods in order to foster necessary
discussion and debate. Professor Dorothy Roberts describes the im-
portance of this project within the area of criminal law, asserting that
6. AuDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER
OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES BY AUDRE LORDE 114, 115 (1983).
More recently, another explanation has gained increasing currency as es-
poused by Dinesh D'Souza. D'Souza challenges a number of premises about racism,
in a rhetorical dialogue with himself:
Are you saying that racial discrimination no longer exists? On the contrary. Evi-
dence for the old discrimination has declined, but there are many indications
that black cultural pathology has contributed to a new form of discrimination:
rational discrimination. High crime rates of young black males, for example,
make taxi drivers more reluctant to pick them up, storekeepers more likely to
follow them in stores, and employers less willing to hire them. Rational dis-
crimination is based on accurate group generalizations that may nevertheless
be unfair to particular members of a group.
If racism is not the main problem for blacks, what is? Liberal antiracism. By assert-
ing the equality of all cultures, cultural relativism prevents liberals from
dealing with the nation's contemporary crisis-a civilizational breakdown
that affects all groups, but is especially concentrated among the black under-
class. Many liberals continue to blame African American pathologies on
white racism and oppose all measures that impose civilizational standards on
the grounds that they are nothing more than "blaming the victim." Mean-
while, the pathologies persist unchecked.
DINESH D'SOuzA, THE END OF RACISM 24 (1995) (emphasis added).
Thus, introducing a new term, "rational discrimination," D'Souza legitimizes a
host of individual and societal decisions which, while often conscious, are based on
gross generalizations and deeply imbedded racial stereotypes. See, e.g., Jody D. Ar-
mour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994). This sort of legitimization is compounded
by the very "Moynihanesque" insistence upon describing the condition of the African
American underclass as "pathological," rather than institutionally inspired.
While these assertions refer to the African American experience, they also
would seem to apply to other peoples of color whenever the claim is made that dis-
parities in treatment result from institutionalized racial and/or class biases. While
not discounting the importance of individual responsibility, this author finds that
institutional policies and barriers, more than individual choices, are the loci of much
despair in communities of color, as discussed further in this article.
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"[n]ot only is race used to identify criminals, it is embedded in the
very foundation of our criminal law. Race helps to determine who
the criminals are, what conduct constitutes a crime, and which
crimes society treats most seriously."7 In this vein, Who Killed Vincent
Chin?, the documentary film from which this article derives its title,
provides a valuable opportunity to explore the ways in which the
doctrine and application of law, particularly criminal law, are in-
formed by social constructions of identity which often influence the
administration and outcomes of criminal cases.
Who Killed Vincent Chin?8 examines the homicide of a Chinese
American man, Vincent Chin, by unemployed White auto workers,
Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz. The killing occurred in Detroit,
Michigan, in 1982, during the height of the domestic auto industry's
decline, worker layoffs and the importation of Japanese automobiles
to the United States. The auto workers initially received minimal
sentences after the killing.9 The Detroit-area Asian American com-
munities' outrage at the leniency of the sentences extended
nationally and internationally. ° A galvanized community response
demanded reexamination of the case, which resulted in subsequent
federal civil rights charges." After conviction, then appeal by the de-
fendants, another federal civil rights trial was held approximately
four years after the killing, in Cleveland, Ohio. 2 Defendants Ebens
and Nitz were acquitted in the final trial stemming from the events
of Vincent Chin's death. 3 The film, produced by Asian American
women filmmakers, Christine Choy and Renee Tajima, explores the
human, factual, legal, and societal dimensions surrounding Vincent
Chin's death.
7. Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1945
(1993). As Professor Frances Ansley states, "If the history of the United States Consti-
tution and the American legal system teaches us anything, surely one of its core
messages is that race has played a key role at many critical and formative junctures
of our development." Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Educa-
tion, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1991). See generally Developments in the Law-Race and
the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1988) (examining the constitutional
problem of race discrimination in criminal justice institutions).
8. WHO KILLED VINCENT CHIN? (Filmmakers Library 1988).
9. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1425 (6th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 236-37
and accompanying text.
10. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1425, 1438-39 (noting the extensive national and interna-
tional coverage of the case, and the almost universal condemnation of the
defendants).
11. See Mary Thornton, U.S. Probes Beating Death in Detroit: Two Men Sentenced to
Probation in Killing of Chinese American, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1983, at 1. These charges
were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(F) (1988).
12. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1422, 1425.
13. See Penelope McMillan, Killing that Galvanized Asian-Americans Remembered,
L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at B3; see also infra Part II.B (scenes from Vincent Chin).
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This article will discuss the use of the film, Who Killed Vincent
Chin?, as a method: (1) to analyze the relationship of social construc-
tions of identity, particularly race, on the rules and discretionary
application of criminal jurisprudence; (2) to provide an interactive
pedagogical tool for law teachers, especially criminal law teachers,
to examine the social contexts of criminal jurisprudence from mul-
tiple perspectives; and (3) to examine the ability of criminal law
doctrine to address issues of race.
Part I of the article provides an overview of the major theories
of racial identity. This section also examines the historical and con-
temporary social constructions of Asian Americans in the United
States.14 Part II examines the events surrounding Vincent Chin's
14. Although I frequently use the term "Asian American" throughout this article,
it is important to state that this is not meant to suggest a homogeneous group with an
essentialist identity. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). Indeed, there is great diversity between and
within Asian American communities, including diversity in language, religion, im-
migration history, social norms and other cultural practices. See Chew, supra note 4,
at 25 (discussing diversity of Asian American communities). The 1990 U.S. Census
records report that the Asian and Pacific Islander population totals 7,226,986. The
Asian American group totals 6,876,394; the Pacific Islander American group totals
350,592. See id. at 25 & n.106. The 1990 Census lists the Asian American population as
primarily comprising Chinese (24%), Filipino (21%), Japanese (13%), Asian Indian
(13%), Korean (12%), Vietnamese (9%), Cambodian (2%), Laotian (2%), Hmong (1%),
Thai (1%), and other groups that are not separately identified but categorized under
"Other Asian" (4%). The Census lists Pacific Islander Americans as Polynesian, Mi-
cronesian, and Melanesian. See id.
Yet, as Professor Robert Chang notes, "Regardless of its origins ... 'Asian
American' can serve as a unifying identity based on the common experiences of
Asian Americans because of the inability of most non-Asian Americans to distin-
guish between different Asian groups." Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American
Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 1241, 1245 n.7 (1993) [hereinafter Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship].
Thus because of the dynamics of socially constructed Asian American identity and
chosen Asian identity, my use of "Asian American" only partly relies on official cen-
sus categories and also includes persons of Asian descent who live in the United
States regardless of citizenship status. See id. at 1245. Writer and filmmaker Richard
Fung expounds on this point, stating that:
"Asian" consciousness only begins to eclipse national consciousness in the
context of white racism, and particularly as experienced here in the diaspora.
It is premised on a shared sense of visibility, and less on any common cul-
tural, aesthetic, or religious roots.... [Alt the same time, we draw strength
from using our socially constructed identities.., as a lever for organizing and
challenging racism..... It's in this way that I choose to work within a
"yellow" experience of race. This I call "Asian," but with the full recognition
that Asian is not only this experience.
Richard Fung, Seeing Yellow: Asian Identities in Film and Video, in THE STATE OF ASIAN
AMERICA: NATIVISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE 1990S, at 161, 162 (Karin Aguilar-San
Juan ed., 1994). For a discussion of how "race" in the context of Asian Americans
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death and provides a contextualized analysis of the events and of
criminal law doctrine and decision making. This section also ex-
plores the pedagogical value of the film as a medium through which
to gain awareness and analysis of the impact of race in the criminal
law. It compares the production of knowledge in a documentary
film with the production of knowledge in law school or during
criminal proceedings. In urging the serious consideration of peda-
gogical scholarship, it insists upon the imperative to value non-
textual information. Part III critiques whether bias crime legislation
can effectively address the prevalence of such harms as resulted in
Vincent Chin's death. The efficacy of any schemes which attempt to
criminalize harms motivated by racial animus will necessitate an
appreciation from a multiracial viewpoint, which largely has re-
mained lacking throughout criminal law theory and
implementation. Part IV concludes that identifying, deterring, and
punishing hate crimes is required throughout the criminal justice
system, not simply through the narrow class of offenses that are
designated as "hate crimes." Moreover, the effectiveness of existing
criminal jurisprudence and hate crime schemes depends upon the
rejection of social constructions that identify Asian Americans as less
visible and less valuable "others" within American society.
Thus this article argues for a multidimensional approach to le-
gal analysis and pedagogy and approaches racial identification and
racial construction from a multiracial, rather than a commonly ap-
plied biracial, viewpoint. In ultimately calling for a
"multidimensional approach" to these concerns, the above-
mentioned priorities, methodologies and lessons must embody the
commitment throughout the legal profession to secure the equal
dignity of all citizens in law and society."5
disrupts concepts of nationality, see Robert Chang, A Meditation on Borders, in THE
NEW NATIVISM (Juan Perea ed., forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter Chang, Meditation].
Also, with respect to terminology, I want to note that I refer to the "Vincent
Chin" case throughout this article, although ordinarily one would refer to a criminal
case by the name of the defendant rather that the victim. In this instance, however, it
seems more appropriate to regard this as the "Vincent Chin" case because his lived
and constructed Asian identity is central to understanding the fatal attack against
him. This does not imply that only Asian Americans (and other peoples of color)
should be concerned with the dynamics of racism; instead it is hoped that, by focus-
ing on a perspective that is rarely highlighted-Vincent Chin's-and Ronald Ebens'
racist response to him, the totality of racist violence can be understood. See, e.g., Law-
rence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of
Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (1993) (discussing the
"Rodney King Case" for similar reasons).
15. The embrace of "multidimensional approaches" in the critiques of hidden,
biased and/or ignored assumptions in legal doctrine, legal education and legal insti-
tutions, goes beyond the mere call for "inclusiveness," which suggests an
unproblematic co-existence of diverse peoples and perspectives. Rather, as Professor
Angela Harris has captured this sentiment:
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I. THE ENIGMA OF RACE
In this country as elsewhere, the importance of race as a social
marker derives from the meanings all of us assign to race. With
only a small exaggeration, we can say that race "is" the sum of
its representations. Among the myriad forms of expression that
shape the meanings of race, none have been more influential than
the messages communicated by politics, government, and law.6
-Kenneth Karst
A. Theories of Racial Identity
1. Biological Race
For centuries, theorists have propounded genetic determinism
as the justification for ranking people on the basis of class, race, eth-
nicity, and gender, and for providing differential access to societal
resources. Rather than biologically predetermined, however, such
structural arrangements are socially determined by a given society.
17
Eighteenth and nineteenth century biological definitions of race
subdivided people into three basic classifications: Negroid (Black),
Caucasian (White), and Mongoloid (Yellow).'8 Membership in each
[T]he task should not be to try to somehow resolve the philosophical tension
between modernism and postmodernism, but rather consciously to inhabit
that very tension. This work requires both a commitment to modernism and a
willingness to acknowledge its limits. At its best, it inspires a jurisprudence of
reconstruction-the attempt to reconstruct political modernism itself in light of the
difference "race" makes.
Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741,
760 (1994) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). To Professor Harris' articulation, I
would add the imperative to inhabit these tensions inherent within the goals to
eliminate oppression and to celebrate difference by gaining fuller insight into the
difference that different differences make. This article seeks to contribute to this for-
ward movement. Exemplified by the multi-layered Latina/o experience, Professor
Berta Hern rdez Truyol describes this goal as movement towards a "true universal-
ist" approach, defined as a multiple perspective approach that asks many questions,
rather than perpetuate the reductionism and anomalies produced by single-issue,
single-trait inquiries in law and society. Berta E. Herndmdez Truyol, Building
Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 369,375 & n.16 (1994).
16. KENNETH L. KARST, LAw's PROMISE, LAw's EXPRESSION 67-68 (1993) (quotation
marks added).
17. See Leith Mullings, Notes on Women, Work and Society, in ANTHROPOLOGY FOR
THE NNETIES 312,312-13 (Johnetta B. Cole ed., 1988).
18. ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE 4-5
(5th ed. 1974); see also D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the
Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 479-87 (1993) (and sources cited) (noting that Bernier, as
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biological classification was based on such hereditarily shared
physical characteristics as skin color, hair texture, facial structure,
and other morphological features.19 The postulate of biological de-
terminism equated racial differences with innate inferiority.
Consequently, the biological system of ranking the races institu-
tionalized the bases upon which societal benefits and burdens were
to be distributed.2°
The absurdity of relying upon physical characteristics as the
sole determinant of "racial identity" was most apparent in antebel-
lum America. For example, in 1806, three generations of enslaved
women sued for freedom in Virginia asserting that they descended
from a free maternal ancestor.' Under Virginia law, which dictated
that Blacks were presumably slaves, and Whites and Native Ameri-
cans were presumably free, slaves bore the burden of proving a free
ancestor.2 The court applied a racial test to determine the plaintiffs'
(Wright's) presumptive slave or free status, stating:
Nature has stampt upon the African and his descendants
two characteristic marks, besides the difference of complex-
ion, which often remain visible long after the characteristic
distinction of colour either disappears or becomes doubt-
ful; a flat nose and wooly head of hair. The latter of these
disappears the last of all: and so strong an ingredient in the
African constitution is this latter character, that it pre-
dominates uniformly where the party is in equal degree
descended from parents of different complexions, whether
white or Indians.... So pointed is this distinction between
the natives of Africa and the aborigines of America, that a
man might as easily mistake the glossy, jetty clothing of an
American bear for the wool of a black sheep, as the hair of
an American Indian for that of an African, or the
early as 1684, and Linnaeus, more definitively in 1758, divided humans into hierar-
chical categories of "man," thereby forming the foundation for later adoption of
racial hierarchies by scholars in various scientific and pseudo-scientific fields).
19. MONTAGU, supra note 18, at 4-5.
20. As biologist and historian Stephen Jay Gould recognized: "Biological deter-
minism is, in its essence, a theory of limits. It takes the current status of groups as a
measure of where they should and must be (even while it allows some rare indi-
viduals to rise as a consequence of their fortunate biology)." STEPHEN JAY GOULD,
THE M6IMEASURE OF MAN 28 (1981).
21. See Ian Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illu-
sion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 & nn.1-4 (1994)
(discussing Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 133 (1806)).
22. Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 134.
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descendant of an African. Upon these distinctions as con-
nected with our laws, the burden of proof depends.2'
Thus, as Professor Lopez notes, the women's fate hinged upon
"the complexion of their face, the texture of their hair, and the. width
of their nose."24 In finding for freedom, the court ruled that "the wit-
nesses concur in assigning to the hair of Hannah . . . the long,
straight, black hair of the native aborigines of this country.
'21
Similarly, Professor Cheryl Harris' work has been illuminating
on the concept of "whiteness" as a proprietary interest from which
societal status and benefits flow. As her work indicates, the combi-
nation of physical appearance and lineage dictated one's legal
status:
In adjudicating who was "white," courts sometimes noted
that, by physical characteristics, the individual whose ra-
cial identity was at issue appeared to be white and, in fact,
had been regarded as white in the community. Yet if an
individual's blood was tainted, she could not claim to be
"white" as the law understood, regardless of the fact that
phenotypically she may have been completely indistin-
guishable from a white person, may have lived as a white
person, and have descended from a family that lived as
whites. Although socially accepted as white, she could not
legally be white.26
Since the 1970s, most physical anthropologists have agreed that
race in general is not a valid taxonomic device. 7 In fact, there is no
subgroup that is sufficiently isolated genetically to remain distinct.
28
Because of the intermixing of humanity's genetic inheritances and
23. Id. at 139.
24. L6pez, supra note 21, at 2.
25. Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 139-40.
26. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1739 (1993); see
also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (instituting "separate but equal" doctrine
and applying to person of mixed descent who was phenotypically indistinguishable
from a White person); infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing Ozawa
v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)).
27. See Alice Littlefield et al., Redefining Race: The Potential Demise of a Concept in
Physical Anthropology, 23 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 641 (1982) (citing a 1978 survey
conducted by anthropologist Leonard Lieberman, which revealed that approximately
70% of cultural anthropologists and half of physical anthropologists reject race as a
biological category); see also Sharon Begley, "Three Is Not Enough ": Surprising New
Lessons from the Controversial Science of Race, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 67-68
(discussing the work of biologist Jared Diamond and the variety of traits upon which
"racial" classifications can be based).
28. Ashley Montagu, The Concept of Race, in THE CONCEPT OF RAcE 12, 16-17
(Ashley Montagu ed., 1964).
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the resulting overlap of physical traits among groups, attempts at
racial classification are considered to be entirely futile.2
2. Socially Constructed Race
As a basis for social rank, race is always a socially defined phe-
nomenon which, at most, only very imperfectly corresponds to
genetically transmitted traits and then, as Professor Gerald Berre-
man notes, relating only to phenotypes rather than genotypes.'
Professor Berreman, an anthropologist, states:
Systems of "racial" stratification are social phenomena
based on social rather than biological facts. To be sure cer-
tain conspicuous characteristics which are genetically
determined or influenced (skin color, hair form, facial con-
formation, stature, etc.) are widely used as convenient
indicators by which ancestry and hence "racial" identity is
recognized.
Thus, what are perceived as distinct "races" are not objective,
biological differences, but socially constructed differences. As the
loci for contesting social power, such socially prescribed "racial" dif-
ferences can serve a number of purposes, including devaluation of a
group by relegating members to a cheap source of labor, entrench-
ment of existing power and class arrangements, and elevation of the
cultures of racial oppressors.32 These generalizations affect how
people from different "races" are regarded by the society. Since so-
cial distinctions based on race are learned, it follows that like race
itself, racism also is a social concept; racist ideology becomes reified
in social and institutional structures. According to Professor Berre-
man, "A society is socially stratified when its members are divided
into cateAories which are differently powerful, esteemed, and re-
warded.' Among societal institutions, the law may be the most
pervasive in constructing and legitimizing social hierarchies, as race-
based thinking permeates our law, policy, and politics."
29. See MONTAGU, supra note 18, at 4-5.
30. Gerald Berreman, Race, Caste, and Other Invidious Distinctions in Social Stratifi-
cation, in ANTHROPOLOGY FOR THE NINETIES, supra note 17, at 485,491-92.
31. Id. at 492-93.
32. Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson, Introduction to RACE AND CRIMINAL
JusTICE 5-6 (Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson eds., 1991) (citing A. SYMANSIC &
T.G. GOERTZEL, SOCIOL.OGY 268-69 (1979)).
33. Berreman, supra note 30, at 485.
34. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that a "color-blind interpretation of the Constitution
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However, even as informed judgment leads to the conclusion
that biological race is devoid of scientific support, it is premature to
dismiss all notions of "race" as merely superficial classifications of
physical traits. Professor Anthony Appiah, for example, argues that
all notions of race should be abandoned, including those based on
biology. He suggests that notions of culture should be substituted
for concepts of race.3" Complex though it may be, however, race con-
sciousness does exist, largely in symbiotic relationships between
inherited traits, recognizable physical characteristics, shared history,
and embraced and/or imposed identity. 6 As Michael Omi and
Howard Winant have indicated, for example, theories that reduce
racial identities to ethnic ones fail to account for the centrality of race
in the histories of oppressed groups. Such theories also underesti-
mate the degree to which traditional notions of race have shaped,
and continue to shape, the societies in which we live.37 Binary defi-
nitions of race as biologically based or as falsely based
generalizations, stereotypes, and myths, then, do not acknowledge
the complex dynamics of racial identities and constructions. As
scholar Jayne Chong-Soon Lee states, "[R]ace is defined not by its
inherent content, but by the social relations that construct it."M
B. Constructions of Asian Americans
1. Historical Constructions of Asian Identities
Vincent Chin's death in 1982 was pivotal in reawakening
awareness within Asian American communities and the rest of
American society about dissonance in the social perceptions of
legitimates, and therefore maintains, the... advantages that whites hold over other
Americans")..
35. See Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: DuBois and the Illusion of Race,
in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., 1986).
36. Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747,
765 (1994) (reviewing KWAME ANTHONY AFPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA iN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF CuLTuRE (1992)).
37. Id. at 771 & n.128 (citing MICHAEL OMI & HOwARD WINANT, RACIAL FOR-
MATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s, at 10, 21-24 (1986)).
38. Id. at 772; see also L6pez, supra note 21, at 46 (stating that "[c]ontext superim-
posed on chance largely shapes races in the United States" (footnote omitted));
Richard Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 586 (1977) (stating that "[riace is... one of the domi-
nant characteristics that affects both the way the individual looks at the world and
the way the world looks at the individual"). See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION N THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s, at
3-4 (1986) (discussing the political nature of racial classification).
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citizens of Asian descent in the United States.39 Racially motivated
violence against Asian Americans has much historical precedence,
however. ° The particular experiences of Asian Americans provide
important perspectives regarding the role of race in American
society and institutions, including in the law. This section reviews
the foundations underlying the social construction and stereotyping
of Asian Americans, particularly Chinese and Japanese immigrants.
One scholar has noted that "Asians .. .at certain times and
places in the past, have been a pariah group at the very bottom of
the ethnic escalation of American society., 4' United States immigra-
tion laws have been particularly instrumental in depicting Asian
Americans as non-citizens and thereby rationalizing their depriva-
tion of the rights thereof.42 Beginning with the First Congress'
enactment of the 1790 Naturalization Law that restricted naturaliza-
39. Asian Americans across ethnic, generational, economic and gender lines re-
sponded to the nationwide effort by American Citizens for Justice and Mrs. Lily
Chin, Vincent Chin's mother, to publicize Vincent Chin's killing. Attorney Alan Yee,
a member of a Bay Area support group, recalled the Vincent Chin case as a turning
point for Asian Americans:
People started to work together for the first time. Anti-Asian violence and the
scapegoating of Asians had been building up but no one had spoken up
against it. The Chin case made people see that racism cut across economic
barriers. Asians who would have never touched politics became active
around this issue. And that awareness and support has continued. People are
more active now. The feel they have a social responsibility to fight racism.
Serena Chen, Vincent Chin Lives on in Documentary of His Murder, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar.
18, 1988, at D8 (quoting Alan Yee); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing
the Enemy: Legal Theory out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189-90 (1991)
(discussing Who Killed Vincent Chin? in terms of intersectional consciousness-raising
within the Asian American community); McMillan, supra note 13, at B3.
40. See Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in 19th-Century
America: The Unusual Case of Baldwin v. Franks, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 349, 352 & nn.17-
21 (1985); see also GARY Y. OKIHIRO, Perils of the Body and Mind, in MARGINS AND
MAINSTREAMS: ASIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 118-47 (Gary Y. Okihiro
ed., 1994) (discussing the origins and continuing vitality of "yellow perilism" as a
basis for the repression of Asian peoples in ancient and newer worlds).
41. ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICAN: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE 1850, at 4 (1988).
42. See BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850-1990 (1993). For excellent overviews and analyses of laws
discriminating against Asian Americans, see generally ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 1; SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY (1991); Margaret Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law:
Ethnic Specimens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
(forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 7-8, on file with author) (discussing the historic
panoply of anti-Asian laws promulgated by state and national legislatures, including
laws governing immigration, naturalization, employment, property ownership,
marriage partnership, education, housing, national service and loyalty).
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tion to "free white persons,"' race remained a criterion for citizen-
ship well into the twentieth century." With respect to immigration,
Asians were the only groups to be totally excluded, beginning with
the Chinese in 1882, until 1965.4' Also, from a legal and legislative
43. Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan.
29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (granting naturalized citizenship to alien Whites).
44. See GARY Y. OKIHIRO, When and Where I Enter, in MARGINS AND MAINSTREAMS,
supra note 40, at 6-7 (noting that despite the fact that the 1790 Act was modified to
include persons of African descent in 1870 and Chinese nationals in 1943, race was
not eliminated as completely as a criterion for citizenship until 1952); see also
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 67. Similarly, a complete ban on Japanese immigration was
instituted years later in 1924. See infra note 45. Citizenship was conferred upon Mexi-
can-Americans largely as a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ratified
American annexations after the Mexican-American War. Neil Gotanda, Asian Ameri-
can Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 1, at 1087, 1093 & n.18.
The 1790 Naturalization Law also excluded Native Americans from citizen-
ship after the conversion of their homeland. Although they were born in the United
States, they were regarded as members of tribes, or as domestic subjects or nationals.
As "foreigners," they could not seek naturalized citizenship because they were not
"white." Even the Fourteenth Amendment, which defined federal citizenship, did not
initially apply to Native Americans. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. While Native
Americans could become U.S. citizens through treaties with specific tribes or through
allotment programs such as the Dawes Act of 1887 (also known as the Indian Allot-
ment Act), general citizenship for Native Americans was not granted until 1924.
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 29 & n.16.
Early determinations of Latina citizenship was derived from the annexation of
formerly Mexican territory after the Mexican-American War, which officially ended
with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Treaty of Peace with the Republic of Mexico,
Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922. Upon extending U.S. borders to encompass land
that later became the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado, the
75,000 Mexican inhabitants of those areas were given the choice to remain and auto-
matically become U.S. citizens, or move south to Mexico. Herndndez Truyol, supra
note 15, at 387 & nn.67-70. For discussion of other Latina migrations to the United
States, see id. at 389-93.
The Chinese were the first Asian immigrants to arrive in the United States,
arriving in the 19th century to work on the railroads and in the mines. See HYUNG-
CHAN KIM, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS, 1790-1990, at 45-47 (1994). Japa-
nese immigration began early in the 20th century. See HING, supra note 42, at 54, 61.
Most Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Hmong, and Laotians have immigrated
since 1965. See id. at 124-32.
45. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. In 1965, the Immigration and National-
ity Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1994)), was signed into law. The new immigration law
amended the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66
Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1994)). Section 2 of the 1965
Act provided: "No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigration visa because of his race, sex, nationality,
place of birth, or place of residence." This section removed the Asiatic Pacific Trian-
gle proviso of the 1952 law, which had discriminated against natives of Asian
countries since 1924. See KIM, supra note 44, at 162.
The Immigration Act of 1924 was officially known as "[a]n Act to limit the
immigration of aliens into the United States, and for other purposes"; however it was
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standpoint, Asian Americans shared a status as "aliens ineligible for
citizenship."' Yet, as Professor Charles McClain states, "the at-best
obscure niche which the Chinese occupy in the historical conscious-
ness of the average educated American," points to the larger
phenomenon of lack of knowledge about the history of Chinese
immigration to the United States.47
a. Constructions of Early Chinese Immigrants
Chinese immigrants began to arrive in America during the
nineteenth century." Many sought sanctuary from the British
Opium Wars, others fled peasant rebellions and land ownership dis-
putes, while others sought relief from harsh economic conditions. 49
By 1870, there were 63,000 Chinese in the United States, located
largely in California where they constituted nine percent of the
population
Chinese immigrants participated in the 1849 California Gold
Rush. Seven hundred fifteen Chinese arrived in the United States in
1849 after the discovery of gold in California." During the 1860s,
unofficially known as the "Quota Immigration Law," the "Nationality Origins Act,"
or the "Japanese Exclusion Act." The 1924 Act restricted the immigration of Asians
on two primary bases. First, "Congress adopted the 1890 census data as the basis for
determining the number of aliens to be admitted," which of course included very few
Asians. Second, the Act effectively stated that "no alien ineligible to citizenship shall
be admitted to the United States." This excluded Japanese nationals since the Su-
preme Court had ruled in 1922 that Japanese could not become eligible for
citizenship, thereby precluding their admission as immigrants. See KIM, supra note
44, at 114.
46. For first-hand narratives, see JOANN FAUNG JEAN LEE, ASIAN AMERICAN
EXPERIENcES IN THE UNITED STATES: ORAL HISTORIES OF FIRST TO FOURTH GEN-
ERATION AMERICANS FROM CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES, JAPAN, INDIA, THE PACIFIC
ISLANDS, VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA (1991).
47. Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Cen-
tury America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529,531 (1984).
48. The precise arrival of Asian Americans to America is uncertain, although ar-
chaeologists have recently suggested that Chinese may have come to America in the
fifth century. However, there is scant evidence of the presence of Asians in America
prior to the discovery of gold in California. See Hyung-Chan Kim, An Overview, in
ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 1; see also GARY Y. OKIHIRO,
Family Album History, in MARGINS AND MAINSTREAMS, supra note 40, at 93.
49. RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL
AMERICA 192 (1993); see also KIM, supra note 44, at 44-46 (discussing the causes of
Chinese immigration, including the rapid expansion of industrial and commercial
capitalism in Europe and America which created great demands for cheap labor and
a world market for the sale of Western-manufactured goods).
50. See TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 194. Although most Chinese migrants lived in
California, they also lived elsewhere in the West, as well as in the Southwest, New
England, and the South. In the West, Chinese migrants constituted sizable popula-
tions in other areas: 29% in Idaho, 10% in Montana. See id.
51. See KIM, supra note 44, at 47.
[VOL. 1:2
Pedagogy of Vincent Chin
24,000 Chinese, two-thirds of the Chinese population in the United
States, were working in California mines. Most were independent
prospectors and many organized into small groups and formed their
own companies."2 However, because of discriminatory miners' taxes
and anti-Asian violence, many Chinese were forced from mining.53
Furthermore, as mining profits began to decrease, thousands of Chi-
nese miners joined other Chinese migrants to work on the railroad.
However, unlike White ethnic immigrants such as Italians, Poles,
and Irish, the Chinese were a politically proscribed labor force.
Consigned to the permanent foreigner status of migrant workers,
they were located in a racially segmented labor market.'M While in-
dustrialists enlisted low-wage Chinese labor to build railroads,"
operate factories,56 and develop agriculture,57 Chinese workers were
52. See TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 195.
53. See KIM, supra note 44, at 47. Labeled as "unfair competitors," Chinese miners
were subjected to mob violence by White miners. The riot in Tuolumne County, Cali-
fornia, was the first of many anti-Chinese riots in California. In addition, the
California legislature enacted a series of tax measures that discriminated against
Chinese miners. First, a Foreign Miners' Tax in 1850 required all foreign miners in-
eligible for U.S. citizenship to pay a monthly tax of $20; however, because of its
devastating economic effects, it was later repealed in 1851. In 1852, the legislature
passed the Foreign Miners' License Tax, which required foreigners who were not
U.S. citizens to obtain a license for $3.00 a month. Another Foreign Miners' Tax was
passed in 1853, raising the tax to $4.00 and adding $2.00 per month for each year
after 1855. In 1862, the California legislature enacted, "The California Police Tax,"
that was a head tax levied on all Chinese who were 18 years or older, requiring that
they pay $2.50 per month if they were not engaged in the production of rice, sugar,
tea, or coffee, or if they had not paid the California Foreign Miners' Tax. In 1863, this
law was found to violate the state's constitution in Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534
(1862). See KIM, supra note 44, at 47-49. For further discussion of the various dis-
criminatory tax laws, the federal responses, and the perceived social realities, see
infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
54. See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 67.
55. The Central Pacific Railroad, for example, depended heavily on Chinese labor.
In February 1865, 50 Chinese workers were hired by the Central Pacific Railroad.
Within two years, with 12,000 Chinese workers, Central Pacific had a work force that
was 90% Chinese. They completed the physical labor required to lay the tracks and
technical labor such as operating power drills and handling explosives for boring
tunnels. See id.; TAAKI, supra note 49, at 196-97.
56. Chinese workers were extensively involved in manufacturing, constituting
50% of the San Francisco work force in four key industries: boots and shoes, woolens,
cigar and tobacco, and sewing. TAXAKI, supra note 49, at 198.
57. In 1880, the Chinese represented 86% of the agricultural work force in Sacra-
mento City, 85% in Yuba, and 67% in Solano. See id. at 198-200. Southern plantation
owners imported Chinese laborers to replace emancipated African American slave
laborers. See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative
Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 230-31 & nn.9-10.
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"urged to return to their homeland" upon completing their service,
"while others came to replace them."58
The employment of Chinese laborers provided White business
owners with a weapon against White workers as a means to break
their labor strikes. Factory owners in the American West and in the
East imported Chinese laborers for the purpose of breaking strikes.
When Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, it was in
reaction to fears about Asian workers exacerbating the conflict be-
tween White labor and capital. Legislators claimed that White
workers had been "forced to the wall" by corporations employing
the Chinese. In the aftermath of the violent Railroad Strike of 1877,
Congress insisted that "the gate must be closed." 9
Racist underpinnings ensured the passage of the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act, not simply fear of continued violence from labor
disputes. This is clear from the strong support for the Act in the
West, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and South-often, "in
states where there were no Chinese and where competition between
White workers and Chinese laborers did not exist."' As Professor
58. Ronald Takaki, Reflections on Racial Patterns in America, in FROM DIFFERENT
SHORES, supra note 2, at 24, 26. For example, Charles Crocker, an employer for the
Central Pacific Railroad, told a legislative committee: "I do not believe [the Chinese]
are going to remain here long enough to become good citizens, and I would not
admit them to citizenship." Id. at 28 & n.14 (citing Charles Crocker's testimony in a
report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration, S. Rep. No.
689, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 667, 679, 680 (1876-77)); see also STUART CREIGHTON MILLER,
THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE AMERICAN IMAGE OF THE CHINESE, 1785-1882
(1969).
59. Ronald Takaki, Class, in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES, supra note 58, at 103, 107-08.
Initially, the Exclusion Act prohibited the entry of Chinese laborers into the United
States and denied naturalized citizenship to the Chinese already here; however, six
years later, the prohibition was broadened to include "all persons of the Chinese
race." Exemptions were provided for Chinese officials, teachers, tourists and mer-
chants. After renewal in 1892, the Chinese Exclusion Act was extended indefinitely in
1902. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 207 & n.43 (citing CHENG-Tsu Wu, "CHINK!": A
DOCuMENTARY HISTORY OF ANTI-CHINESE PREJUDICE IN AMERICA 82-83 (1972)).
In 1943, after almost 100 years, Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Laws
and allowed a quota for Chinese immigration. This new policy permitted only 105
Chinese immigrants annually. The law also extended the rights of naturalized citi-
zenship to Chinese immigrants; however, immigrants were required to present
evidence of legal entry and to pass tests in English composition, American history
and U.S. Constitution. Between 1944 and 1952, only 1428 Chinese were naturalized.
See TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 387; see also C. Hays, Archive Yields Rich Details of Era
when Chinese Were Barred, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, at 25. See generally E. SANDMEYER,
THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1939); A. SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE
ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971).
60. Takaki, supra note 59, at 105. In The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image
of the Chinese, 1785-1882, for example, author Stuart Miller repudiated the conven-
tional belief that anti-Chinese animus was confined to California. See MILLER, supra
note 58. Instead, Miller found that anti-Chinese sentiments existed in New England
and in other parts of the country based on the extensive negative portrayals of, and
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Takaki observes, this fact suggests that the Act "may have been.., a
response to the increasing and violent class conflicts developing
within White society. To prohibit Chinese immigration would be to
eliminate an issue the labor movement was using to organize White
workers."'" Thus, the situation highlights the complex conjunctions
of race and class.
In the context of American racialism, the Chinese were initially
defined in terms of Black and White. As Professor Okihiro states, the
ambiguous situation of the Chinese was reflected in the Louisiana
census:
In 1860, Chinese were classified as whites; in 1870, they
were listed as Chinese; in 1880, children of Chinese men
and non-Chinese women were classed as Chinese; but in
1900, all of those children were reclassified as blacks or
whites and only those born in China or with two Chinese
parents were listed as Chinese.62
More pervasively, however, the Chinese were assigned racial
inferiority status within American society much like Native Ameri-
cans and African Americans before them. Thus, while lauding the
work of Chinese laborers,6 the new industrialists simultaneously
prejudices against, the Chinese. See KIM, supra note 44, at 2-3, 41-42 (comparing
MILLER, supra note 58, with other theses asserting that anti-Chinese sentiment was
localized to California).
61. Takaki, supra note 59, at 105-06.
62. GARY Y. OKIHIRO, Is Yellow Black or White?, in MARGINS AND MAINSTREAMS,
supra note 40, at 53 & n.56 (citing LUcY M. COHEN, CHINESE IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR
SOUTH: A PEOPLE WITHOUT A HISTORY 167-68 (1984)).
63. The plantation owners of the West and South and the industrialists of the
North and East almost uniformly lavished praise upon the Chinese laborers for their
industriousness. The praise was steeped in biological and social constructions of
race. Ironically, as Professor Ronald Takaki states, "Chinese were persecuted, not for
their vices, but for their virtues." RONALD TAXAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT
SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS (1989), cited in Wu, supra note 57, at 230-31
n.12. More malevolently, however, the praise for Chinese workers was devised to
drive wedges between newly freed workers of African descent and European ethnic
immigrants, as reflected in the following accounts.
Comparing Chinese laborers to former slave laborers, one plantation owner
wrote that "[t]hey work much more steady, without the loss of half-Saturday; and
second, they do not run over their work, what they do is done well." Wu, supra note
57, at 230-31 n.12 (citing COHEN, supra note 62, at 109).
A Baton Rouge, Louisiana, newspaper stated, "[Chinese] are more obedient
and industrious than the negro, work as well without as with an overseer, and at the
same time are more clearly in their habits and persons than the freedmen." Id. at 231
n.13 (citing COHEN, supra note 62, at 124).
In the North, Chinese factory workers were praised in comparison to Irish
immigrants. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 186-87. The New York Times wrote, " 'John
Chinaman' was a better addition to [American] society than was 'Paddy.' "Id. at 186.
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developed a caste/class ideology which located Asians beneath
Whites. Chinese migrants were described as "heathen, morally infe-
rior, savage, childlike, and lustful." Concerns about threats to racial
purity also prompted anti-miscegenation laws directed at the Chi-
nese." Likened to Native Americans, the Chinese were accused of
impeding civilization and it was suggested that they be removed to
reservations. Defined as "aliens ineligible to citizenship," Chinese
and other Asian immigrants were also denied, by state legislation,
the right to own property in many states.6s In 1879, President Ru-
therford B. Hayes warned that the "present Chinese invasion was
pernicious and should be discouraged. Our experience in dealing
with the weaker races-the Negroes and Indians.. .- is not encour-
aging .... I would consider with favor any suitable measures to
discourage the Chinese from coming to our shores." Of course,
three years later Congress responded by prohibiting Chinese immi-
gration.
Early legal constructions of Chinese Americans as less than full
citizens were epitomized by immigration statutes, discriminatory tax
laws, and testimonial limitation laws. The influence of arrant testi-
monial incapacity laws was reflected in two criminal cases involving
the killings of Chinese Americans. In what Chinese American legal
historian Charles McClain called "a disgraceful decision,"67 People v.
Hall parallels the Vincent Chin case for the degree of ignominy and
outrage that it evoked in the Chinese American community. In Oc-
tober 1853, George W. Hall and two co-defendants were tried for the
murder of Ling Sing. During the trial, three Chinese and one Cauca-
sian witness testified on behalf of the State." Hall, a White
defendant, was sentenced to be hanged upon the jury's verdict of
guilty.6 Appealing the verdict, counsel for the defendant argued,
The newspaper further commented that the Chinese men did not drink whiskey, stab
one another, or beat their wives. See id. at 186-87.
64. In 1880, for example, California prohibited marriage between a White person
and a "Negro, mulatto, or Mongolian." CAL. CIV. CODE § 60 (Deering Supp. 1905); see
also Megumi Dick Osumi, Asians and California's Anti-Miscegenation Laws, in ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AMERICAN EXPERIENCES: WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES 1, 6 (Nobuya Tsuchida
ed., 1982); OKIHIRO, supra note 62, at 51-52.
65. State legislation in California, Washington, Arizona, Oregon, Idaho, Nebraska,
Texas, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington,
Utah, Wyoming, and Arkansas prohibited Asian property ownership. See Takaki,
supra note 58, at 26; see also Dudley 0. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of
California and Ten Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7,7-8 (1947).
66. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 206 n.40 (citing MILLER, supra note 58, at 190); see also
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
67. McClain, supra note 47, at 548 (referring to Hall, 4 Cal. 399).
68. See id. at 549 & nn.109-10 (citing Indictment at 1, Hall, 4 Cal. 399; Trial Tran-
script at 1, Hall, 4 Cal. 399).
69. See id.
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inter alia, that the Chinese witnesses did not have testimonial capac-
ity upon which the jury's verdict of guilt could be based. This was
the first time that the issue of testimonial capacity of Chinese immi-
grants was presented for adjudication by the highest court in
California.7
Chief Justice Hugh C. Murray reversed the conviction and held
that the Chinese immigrants' testimony had been improperly admit-
ted.7' The decision was based on three grounds, described by
Professor McClain as: "canons of statutory construction, as the court
purported to understand them; an amateur foray into history and
ethnography; and on what the court called public policy considera-
tions." Each strand of the court's rationale was odious in its own
right; however, the combined effect of the opinion was to legally in-
culcate the gross devaluation of Asian American lives. First, was the
court's exercise of statutory interpretation, construing a California
criminal statute which provided, "No black or mulatto person, or
Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor of, or against,
any White person." The court proceeded along the path of tortured
legal-historical analysis to find that from Columbus' fundamental
mistaken belief that he had found an island in the Chinese Sea near
India, he had thereupon named the inhabitants "Indians," and that
"the American Indians and the Mongolian, or Asiatic, were regarded
as the same type of the human species."74 Although acknowledging
that scientists no longer believed that North America had originally
been populated by Asian immigrants, the court felt constrained to
construe the statute based on the early scientific and legislative as-
sumptions of the period that regarded North American Indians and
Chinese as being one race7 More pointedly, the court reasoned that
even if Asians were not the same as Indians, the word "black" in the
statute required a generic understanding that all races other than
Caucasians were excluded.76 The public policy rationale was spurred
by Chief Justice Murray's belief in the "proverbial mendacity" of the
Chinese; a race whom "nature has marked as inferior, and-
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. McClain, supra note 47, at 549.
73. Id. at 549 & n.113; see also GUNTHER BARTH, BrrrER STRENGTH: A HISTORY OF
THE CHINESE IN THE UNrrED STATEs, 1850-1870 (1964); MILLER, supra note 58.
74. McClain, supra note 47, at 549 (citing People v. Hall, 4 Cal. at 400); see also KIM,
supra note 44, at 48; cf. Oiu-mo, supra note 44, at 16-20 (providing an in-depth dis-
cussion of Columbus' travels and mistaken conclusions and stating that his reports
and others like it helped to justify a "Christian imperialism" and control over the
"new world").
75. McClain, supra note 47, at 549-50 (citing Hall, 4 Cal. at 402).
76. See id. at 550 (citing Hall, 4 Cal. at 404).
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incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain
point.... "7
The same California court decided People v. Brady78 on similar
grounds. In this case, the California Supreme Court ruled that for-
bidding Chinese witnesses to testify for or against Whites did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.7
As Professor Neil Gotanda notes, the Chinese protested the Hall
decision,80 yet one of the Chinese community's most prominent ad-
vocates further advanced the racist underpinnings at the heart of the
Hall opinion in objecting to the court's decision to bar Chinese testi-
mony by equating them with Blacks and Native Americans. 8'
Prominent Chinese merchant Lai Chun-Chuen objected to Hall,
stating: "[Coming] to the conclusion that we Chinese are the same as
Indians and Negroes, and your courts will not allow us to bear wit-
ness. And yet these Indians know nothing about the relations of
society; they know no mutual respect; they wear neither clothes nor
shoes; they live in wild places and [in] caves."82
Two cases involving Chinese American citizens' testimonial ca-
pacity reached conflicting results after Hall and Brady were decided
in 1854. In People v. Awa,3 the appellant's manslaughter conviction
was reversed because the testimony of his Chinese witness had been
improperly excluded under the 1863 statute banning Chinese testi-
mony against White persons. Strictly construing the statute, the
California Supreme Court reasoned that the statute prohibited a
Chinese person from testifying against a "white person." Since the
opposing party, the State, was not a "white person" within the
meaning of the statute, the court reversed and remanded for a new
trial .
The court's stricter statutory construction of the prohibition on
Chinese testimony in Awa seemed to signal an improvement in the
legal and social status of Chinese citizens. However, in People v.
77. Id. (citing Hall, 4 Cal. at 404-05).
78. 4 Cal. 198 (1854).
79. Kim, supra note 48, at 7. The California legislature, apparently embarrassed by
the outrageous Hall and Brady decisions, repealed the laws forbidding the Chinese
from testifying against Whites. Act of Apr. 16, 1850, ch. 99, § 14, 1850 Cal. Stat. 229,
230, repealed by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 18 (1872); see also KIM, supra note 44, at 49.
80. Gotanda, supra note 44, at 1092 (noting that Asian Americans resisted dis-
criminatory measures from their earliest days in the United States).
81. McClain, supra note 47, at 550-51 & nn.122-25.
82. Id. at 550 & n.122 (citing LAi CHUN-CHEUN, REMARKS OF THE CHINESE
MERCHANTS OF SAN FRANCISCO UPON GOVERNOR BIGLER'S MESSAGE 5 (W. Speer
trans., 1855) (available in Bancroft Library, University of California Library, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley)).
83. 27 Cal. 638 (1865).
84. Id. at 638. For a discussion of this case, see McClain, supra note 47, at 560.
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Washington, this improvement in status flagged. The defendant in
Washington was indicted solely on the testimony of Chinese wit-
nesses. The defendant, a "mulatto," successfully moved to set aside
the indictment. On appeal, the California Supreme Court upheld the
set-aside based on the recent Civil Rights Act of 1866,6 under which
all U.S.-born citizens were entitled to equal treatment under the law.
Accordingly, the court reasoned, Black citizens who were born in the
United States could exclude Chinese testimony if White citizens en-
joyed this privilege under California law.7
Next to testimonial incapacity laws, discriminating tax laws es-
pecially undermined Chinese immigrants' access to full citizenship.
Rejecting the 1862 recommendations of a joint select committee to
remove discriminatory anti-Chinese tax laws from the California law
books, the California legislature and Governor Leland Stanford in-
stead enacted more anti-Chinese legislation." This legislation,
entitled "An Act to protect Free White Labor against competition
with Chinese Coolie Labor, and to Discourage the Immigration of
the Chinese into the State of California,"89 imposed a capitation tax of
$2.50 per month on all Chinese residents, except those who operated
businesses, had licenses to work in the mines, or were engaged in the
production or manufacture of sugar, rice, coffee, or tea.'
The "Chinese Police Tax," as the legislation was known, was
immediately challenged. In Ling Sing v. Washburn,9' a Chinese
resident who was not a member of the exempt categories challenged
the tax assessment. The state law was invalidated on the ground that
it violated the U.S. Constitution. The case underscored the need for
federal protection for Chinese residents' civil rights. Thus,
deliberations on the 1868 Burlingame Treaty92 to encourage trade
between China and the United States involved Chinese American
merchants' insistence on federal protection of Chinese lives and
property. The resultant Treaty recognized the "free migration and
emigration" of the Chinese to the United States as visitors, traders, or
"permanent residents," and the rights of Chinese in the United States
to "enjoy the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions in respect
85. 36 Cal. 658 (1869), overruled by People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198 (1870).
86. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
87. Washington, 36 Cal. at 666-67; see also McClain, supra note 47, at 560.
88. See McClain, supra note 47, at 554-55.
89. Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 339, 1862 Cal. Stat. 462 (repealed by Act of May 16,
1939, ch. 154, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1274, 1376), cited in McClain, supra note 47, at 555 &
n.152.
90. McClain, supra note 47, at 555 & n.154; see also KIM, supra note 44, at 49.
91. 20 Cal. 534 (1862).
92. Additional Articles to the Treaty Between the United States and China of June
18, 1858, July 28, 1868, U.S.-China, 16 Stat. 739.
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to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or
subjects of the most favored nation."93
Building on the success of the Burlingame Treaty, Chinese mer-
chants sought federal legislation to abolish discriminatory state laws.
They successfully lobbied Congress to include protections for them
in the 1870 Civil Rights Act, which declared that "all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States... shall have the same right...
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens."
Furthermore, "[n]o tax" shall be levied "by any State upon any per-
son emigrating thereto from a foreign country which is not equally
imposed and enforced upon every person emigrating to such State
from any other foreign country, and any law of any State in conflict
with this is hereby declared null and void."''
Despite guarantees of equal protection by treaty and federal
law, such measures had little effect on what actually happened in
society. The Chinese continued to be vulnerable and were victims of
racial violence, particularly in the California mining districts.9
93. Id. at 740, cited in McClain, supra note 47, at 563.
94. S. 365, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. GLOBE 323, 1536 (1869-70), cited in McClain,
supra note 47, at 564-67. In addition to the successful challenge of the "Chinese Police
Tax," two other significant but largely unknown cases challenging anti-Chinese taxes
were successful. Ex parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal. 106 (1861), and Ah Hee v. Crippen, 19 Cal.
491 (1861), grudgingly held for the Chinese plaintiffs in actions against the foreign
Miners' License Tax. Ah Pong brought a habeas corpus action after his imprisonment
for refusing to pay the tax. In ordering his release, the court held that the mere fact
that he was Chinese and living in the mining district did not subject him to the for-
eign miners' tax. Ah Pong, 19 Cal. at 107 (discussed in McClain, supra note 47, at 558).
In Ah Hee, a Chinese miner brought a replevin action to recover a horse that
had been attached by the county tax collector for failure to pay the tax. The plaintiff
argued on equal protection grounds that foreigners who were bona fide residents
had the same rights of possession and enjoyment of property as U.S. citizens; if na-
tive-born citizens had the right to mine lands.for gold without paying a license fee or
tax, foreigners who were bona fide residents had the same rights. Second, he argued
that the legislation only applied to mining on federal or state owned public lands, not
mining on privately owned property. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff
based on the constitutional argument; however, the supreme court affirmed the
lower court's ruling on statutory interpretation grounds, that is, that the legislature
had intended the tax to apply only to public lands. The court avoided the constitu-
tional issues. Ah Hee, 19 Cal. at 491-98 (reviewed by McClain, supra note 47, at 558-
59).
95. See Teresa L. Amott & Julie A. Matthaei, Climbing Gold Mountain: Asian Ameri-
can Women, in RACE, GENDER, AND WORK: A MULTICULTURAL HISTORY OF WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 193, 203 & n.49 (Teresa L. Amott & Julie A. Matthaei eds., 1991)
("Political and labor leaders incited violence against Chinese immigrants. White
mobs attacked Chinese in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, Rock Springs, Ta-
coma, and Seattle. In 1871, a mob attacked the residents of the Los Angeles
Chinatown, lynching 19 and stealing $40,000 in cash.").
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Blamed as "the source of the troubles" of White working men, Chi-
nese accounts during the period recalled being taunted and
physically assaulted: "We were simply terrified; we kept indoors
after dark for fear of being shot in the back. Children spit on us as
we passed by and called us rats. '6
b. Constructions of Early Japanese Immigrants
Like the Chinese and other immigrant groups, the Japanese
emigrated to America seeking relief from external forces. During the
1880s, farmers in Japan bore heavy tax burdens for that country's
industrialization and militarization. Many were forced to sell their
property due to their inability to pay their taxes and hunger pre-
vailed in much of the country. Between 1885 and 1924, 200,000
Japanese left for Hawaii and 180,000 for the United States main-
land.9 Initially, most of the migrants from Japan were men;
however, a significant number of women became part of the Japa-
nese migration. By 1920, women represented forty-six percent of the
Japanese population in Hawaii and thirty-five percent in California.9
Hawaiian planters developed a profitable sugar export econ-
omy. Between 1875 and 1910, cultivated plantation lands multiplied
nearly eighteen times, from 12,000 to 214,000 acres. This success was
based on an ethnically diverse imported labor force, composed of
Hawaiians, Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese,
and Koreans. Employers purposely sought laborers from diverse
nationalities as a way to ensure against concerted strike actions. In
1903, planters began importing Korean workers in order to pit them
against the Japanese. Aware of the antagonism between the two
groups, planters believed that the Koreans would not combine with
the Japanese in strike actions. However, the Korean labor supply
was cut off in 1905 after the Korean government prohibited further
emigration to Hawaii due to reports of abuses on the plantations." In
1909, again seeking to supplant the Japanese work force, the planters
96. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 208 & n.47 (reciting the account of Huie Kin).
97. Id. at 246-47.
98. This is in stark contrast to the earlier Chinese migration in 1900 when, 50 years
after the beginning of Chinese immigration, only 5% were women and only 1% were
American born; while in 1930, 52% of the Japanese population had been born in
America. While the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited the entry of Chinese male
and female laborers, Japan negotiated the 1908 Gentlemen's Agreement which pro-
hibited the entry of Japanese "laborers," although it allowed Japanese women to
emigrate to the United States as family members. This opening in immigration policy
resulted in over 60,000 women coming to America, many as "picture brides." See
TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 247-48.
99. See id. at 252-53.
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brought laborers from the Philippines, a territory acquired after the
Spanish-American War.
To strengthen their authority over their ethnically diverse work
force, planters stratified occupations according to race: Whites oc-
cupied the skilled and supervisory positions, while Asian
immigrants were the unskilled laborers. In 1904, the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association passed a resolution that restricted skilled posi-
tions to "American citizens, or those eligible for citizenship. ' '1° Asian
immigrants were excluded, as they were not White and were there-
fore ineligible to become naturalized citizens according to federal
law. Working mostly as field hands and mill laborers, workers were
grouped by ethnicity and gender. They labored under a differential
wage system based on ethnicity, which paid Portuguese workers
more than the Japanese, who constituted seventy percent of the work
force. The planters saw Japanese Americans as a colonized labor
force. They sought to restrict access to education beyond the sixth or
eighth grade, and sought to limit education to vocational training for
successive generations of Japanese plantation laborers.
A large White working class did not exist in Hawaii. In fact,
most of the people in the islands were Asian, and by 1920, the Japa-
nese alone represented about forty percent of the population. As
workers, they were generally confined to the wage-earning planta-
tion labor force. Aware of their extremely limited opportunities for
individual advancement and economic independence, the Japanese
in Hawaii tended to emphasize a class strategy of unionization. 0'
On the United States mainland, however, the Japanese faced a
markedly different situation. They were a racial minority, constitut-
ing only two percent of the population in 1920. They felt scorned by
White society and had become the target of hostile and violent White
workers.0 2 Initially, the Japanese were employed in agriculture, rail-
road construction, and the canneries. As migratory farm laborers,
they constantly moved from field to field. Similarly, railroad work-
ers were shuttled from one construction site to another. Cannery
workers were shipped from the West Coast to Alaska and then back
after the fishing season. Denied access to employment in the
100. Id.; see also GARY Y. OKIHIRO, CANE FIRES: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN
HAWAn, 1865-1945 (1991).
101. TAKAIO, supra note 49, at 266-67.
102. See OKIHIRO, supra note 100; Report on the Conunission on Wartime Reloca-
tion and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied 32 (GPO, 1982), cited in
Lorraine K. Banmai & Dale Minami, Internment during World War II and Litigations, in
ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 1, at 755, 756 & n.14.
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industrial labor market, many Japanese entered entrepreneurial ac-
tivity, becoming farmers and shopkeepers."
The Japanese were able to become farmers so rapidly because of
their timely entry into agriculture. Beginning in the late nineteenth
century, industrialization and urbanization led to increased de-
mands for fresh produce in the cities. The development of irrigation
in California at this time opened the way for intensive agriculture
and a shift from grain to fruit and vegetable production: between
1879 and 1909, the value of crops representing intensive agriculture
skyrocketed from just four percent to fifty percent of all crops grown
in California. This tremendous expansion occurred under a market
stimulus created by two extremely important technological
achievements-the completion of the national railroad lines and the
invention of the refrigerated car. Now these farmers were able to
ship their perishable fruits and vegetables to almost anywhere in the
United States.'O°
However, wealth did not immunize the Japanese farmers from
racism. The first generation of Japanese immigrants, the Issei, hoped
that their children, the second generation Nisei, who were born and
acculturated in the United States, would secure acceptance in the
larger society05 However, even the American born Nisei were
subjected to racist assaults. Nisei were also often perceived as
foreigners 06 and were discriminated against in employment'07 One
of the wealthiest and most prominent Japanese farmers, Kinji
103. TAKAII, supra note 49, at 267; see also YujI ICHIOKA, THE ISSEI: THE WORLD OF
THE FIRST GENERATION JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS, 1885-1924 (1988).
104. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 268-69 & n.61.
105. Japanese Americans' presence and experiences in the United States are typi-
cally identified according to generational delineations, e.g., the Issei (first
generation), Nisei (second generation), Sansei (third generation), and Yonsei (fourth
generation). For an excellent discussion of generational comparisons and contrasts
among Japanese Americans' experiences, see EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI,
WAR BRIDE: THREE GENERATIONS OF JAPANESE AMERICAN WOMEN IN DOMESTIC
SERVICE 3-41 (1986).
106. See TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 274 & n.75; see also DENNIS M. OGAWA, FROM
JAPS TO JAPANESE: THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN STEREOTYPES (1971). As
discussed infra Part I.B.2.a, the construction of foreignness has been a persistent
theme in the lives of Asian Americans. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Foreign-ness & Asian
American Identities: Yellowface, Propaganda and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 3 UCLA
ASIAN PAC. L.J. (forthcoming 1996); Gotanda, supra note 44, at 1087-1103.
107. A study of 161 Nisei who graduated from the University of California be-
tween 1925 and 1935 found that only 25% were employed in professional vocations
for which they had been trained. Twenty-five percent worked in family businesses or
trade that did not require a college education, and 40% had "blind alley" jobs.
TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 275.
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Ushijima (George Shima),1O upon purchasing a house close to the
university in Berkeley, was told by protesters led by a classics
professor to move to the "Oriental" neighborhood. The local
newspapers announced: "Jap Invades Fashionable Quarters" and
"Yellow Peril in College Town." Shima refused to move."
Farming had been the path for many European immigrants to
enter into American society. Many Japanese immigrants believed
that their success, especially in agriculture, would help them become
accepted into American society. But this strategy of acceptance
through agriculture failed to recognize the depth of racial exclusion-
ism. Their very success provoked a backlash. In 1908, the federal
government pressured Japan to prohibit the emigration of laborers
to the United States. Shortly afterward, California and many other
states enacted legislation to exclude Japanese immigrants from
owning and leasing land. These restrictive alien land laws were
based on the ineligibility of the Japanese for naturalized citizen-
ship.110
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that Takao
Ozawa, a Japanese immigrant, was not entitled to naturalized citi-
zenship because he "clearly" was not "Caucasian.""' In denying
citizenship, the Supreme Court noted, among other things, that
Takao Ozawa had graduated from Berkeley, California High School,
had studied at the University of California for three years, attended
American churches, and spoke English at home; therefore, he clearly
met the character and education requirements for citizenship."2 The
Court, however, was not persuaded by Ozawa's argument that per-
sons of Japanese ancestry were constructively "white persons" for
purposes of the immigration laws which expressly excluded Chinese
immigrants."3
108. Ushijima had been dubbed the "potato king" by the press and had controlled
85% of the California potato crop, valued at over $18 million in 1920. GARY Y.
OKIHIRO, Margin as Mainstream, in MARGINS AND MAINSTREAMS, supra note 40, at 153.
109. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 270-71.
110. Cf. Naturalization Law of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (providing that only White persons
could become citizens).
111. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
112. Id. at 189.
113. Id. at 181. Ozawa argued that, unlike Chinese immigrants who were specifi-
cally excluded from citizenship under the Exclusion Law, Japanese immigrants were
not expressly excluded under the naturalization laws, and that therefore he should
be considered a "free white person" according to the prevailing racial theories.
OKIHuRO, supra note 62, at 61. Professor Pat Chew notes that various state and federal
courts had agreed with Ozawa's constructive whiteness argument, where at least 14
cases of the naturalization of Japanese immigrants had been reported at the time of
Ozawa. Chew, supra note 4, at 15 n.46; see also Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 183 (arguing for
Petitioner that no uniform rule could be drawn from decisions since 1875). For a dis-
cussion of Ozawa, see Kim, supra note 48, at 35-37.
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In 1923, the Supreme Court again affirmed anti-Asian immigra-
tion laws in United States v. Thind."4 Bhagat Singh Thind claimed
Aryan ancestry as the basis for claiming Caucasian racial identity." "
Thus, the Court was forced to mediate the inconsistency between its
holding in Ozawa that the test for citizenship was being Caucasian
and Thind's claim of Caucasian racial ancestry. In apparent contra-
diction, Justice Sutherland reasoned that "[ilt may be true that the
blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor
in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly
well that there are unmistakable and profound differences between
them today." 6 The Court then found that the original drafters of the
1790 naturalization law intended that American citizenship would
only be extended to direct descendants of immigrants from the Brit-
ish Isles and Northwestern Europe. 7 Despite its obvious racial bias,
the Court denied any discriminatory underpinnings in its ruling: "It
is very far from our thought to suggest the slightest question of ra-
cial superiority or inferiority. What we suggest is merely racial
difference, and it is of such character and extent that the great body
of our people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of as-
similation.."
In 1924, Congress enacted an immigration law that included a
provision prohibiting the entry of "aliens ineligible to citizenship,"
which was couched in the language of general applicability, while
being unequivocally directed at the Japanese."9 However, the nadir
of anti-Asian, anti-Japanese bias in twentieth-century America was
The Ozawa case and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), illustrate a
point discussed by Professor Robert Chang regarding Asian immigrants arriving
after the Chinese. These later immigrants often sought to distinguish themselves
from Chinese Americans by a variety of means, including adopting more
"westernized" dress and abandoning other cultural practices, thereby attempting to
escape anti-Chinese animus. Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14,
at 1290.
114. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
115. Id. at 210. Professor Chang notes that Asian Indians were distinguished from
other Asians by European and North American scholars who identified Asian Indi-
ans as descendants of the Aryan (White) race. Chang, Asian American Legal
Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1290 n.236 (citing Sucheta Mazumdar, Race and Racism:
South Asians in the United States, in FRONTIERS OF ASIAN AMERICAN STUDIES 25, 26-30
(Gail M. Nomura et al. eds., 1989)).
116. Thind, 261 U.S. at 209.
117. Id. at 213; see also Chew, supra note 4, at 17. For a discussion of Thind, see Kim,
supra note 48, at 37-38 (noting that Justice Sutherland had devised a "zone theory" of
racial inclusion and exclusion, upon eschewing rigid racial categories of what consti-
tuted a "white person" for purposes of the immigration and naturalization statutes.
In this regard, Justice Sutherland adopted a theory of common usage for "whiteness,"
that is, what the popular concept of what a White person meant).
118. Thind, 261 U.S. at 215. For a discussion, see Chew, supra note 4, at 17.
119. Act of May 24, 1924, 43 Stat. 153; see also TAXAKI, supra note 49, at 273.
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the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. In Feb-
ruary 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066,'20 which gave the Secretary of War the power "to exclude, re-
move and then detain U.S. citizens of Japanese descent and their
alien parents. Most of the relocation camps were located in
desolate desert areas in Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Arkansas, Idaho,
California and Wyoming. Families were assigned twenty-by-twenty
feet barracks with rudimentary furnishings resembling a military
prison.'22 Of the 120,000 internees, 70,000 were United States citizens
by birth, members of the Nisei generation. In the relocation camps,
draft-age Nisei men were required to sign a loyalty questionnaire
entitled "Statement of United States Citizenship of Japanese Ances-
try.'
124
The exclusion order was upheld based on presidential war
powers in four major cases challenging the constitutionality of the
Executive Order: Hirabayashi v. United States,23 Yasui v. United
States,26 Korematsu v. United States,'27 and Ex parte Mitsuye Endo.128
120. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. § 1092 (1938-1943), reprinted in 56 Stat. 173
(1942).
121. Although race clearly was the impetus for the internment order, the U.S.
military and political officials "incredibly... denie[d] any connection between the
exclusion and race," Bannai & Minami, supra note 102, at 774, by reasoning that
"Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or
his race. He was excluded because we were at war with the Japanese Empire." Wu,
supra note 57, at 255 & n.148 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223
(1944)).
122. See TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 382-83 (discussing the conditions in the intern-
ment camps). Unlike Americans of German or Italian descent, Japanese Americans
were considered inherently disloyal. Even more illogically, the U.S. government did
not deem it necessary to intern Japanese American citizens in Hawaii, who were
more numerous than their West Coast counterparts. One hundred ten thousand West
Coast Japanese Americans were interned, while of the 150,000 Japanese American
citizens in Hawaii, only 1444 were similarly treated. The War Department justified
this disparity by finding Japanese labor "absolutely essential" for rebuilding the de-
fenses destroyed at Pearl Harbor. Id. at 308.
123. Second-generation Americans of Japanese descent who were born in the
United States.
124. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 29-30 & n.20 (discussing the "Statement of United
States Citizenship of Japanese Ancestry" as quoted in MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF
INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 155 (1976)). De-
spite their country's suspicions, over 33,000 Japanese Americans served in World
War II, as did other Asian Americans. See id.
125. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
126. 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
127. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh 'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). Korematsu was decided
by a 6-3 vote. The opinion, written by Justice Black, gave great deference to the com-
bined war powers of the President and Congress. Justice Murphy's dissent described
the situation regarding the Japanese American internment as "one of the most
sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this
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Although the Japanese American parties in each case asserted
slightly different grounds to challenge the Executive Order, in each
case, the Supreme Court upheld the President's War Powers author-
ity and Congress' enabling legislation upon the belief that the
inherent disloyalty of Japanese American citizens justified the exer-
cise of such plenary authority.'2 As stated by attorneys Dale Minami
and Lorraine Bannai, the government withheld relevant information
about the decision to remove Japanese Americans during World War
II, and the Court rendered its decisions based on scant evidence sug-
gesting disloyalty and on the dubious assertion of "judicial notice"
establishing Japanese Americans' predisposition to espionage and
sabotage.
The campaign for internment generally was supported by gov-
ernment, business, and media institutions. A Los Angeles Times
opinion epitomized the prevailing sentiment: "A viper is nonetheless
a viper wherever the egg is hatched-so a Japanese American, born
of Japanese parents-grows up to be Japanese, not American.'.'.
c. Chinese and Japanese American Women:
Early Experiences, Early Constructions
In a chapter entitled, Recentering Women, Professor Gary Okihiro
states, "Asian American history is replete with the deeds of men.
Women constitute a forgotten factor in Asian American history.
They have 'no name.' ,13 There were substantial differences in the
nation." While the majority opinion agreed with the dissent as to the general un-
constitutionality of imposing burdens, the Justices felt that the needs of the nation, as
perceived at the start of the war, justified these measures. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 622-23 (4th ed. 1991).
Korematsu is generally better known than the other cases, primarily because it
is recognized as the start of a "revolution in constitutional analysis of equal protec-
tion issues." Id. at 622. Korematsu established a heightened level of judicial scrutiny of
government action when racial or national origin classifications were at issue: first,
such classifications were "suspect" because they were likely to be based on an im-
permissible purpose; second, such classifications were to be subject to independent
judicial review--"rigid scrutiny"; third, such classifications would be invalid if based
on racial antagonism and upheld -only if they were based on "public necessity." Ko-
rematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. The Court failed to apply its pronounced scheme of equal
protection analysis in the case itself, however.
128. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
129. See Bannai & Minami, supra note 102, at 755, 758-67; Kim, supra note 48, at 47-
53; see also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
130. Bannai & Minami, supra note 102, at 768-72; see also Eugene V. Rostow, The
Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
131. TAKAJU, supra note 49, at 380 & n.7.
132. GARY Y. OKciIRo, Recentering Women, in MARGINS AND MAINSTREAMS, supra
note 40, at 64. Professor Okihiro's reference to "no name" women is invoked from
Maxine Hong Kingston's The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood Among Ghosts, in
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immigration experiences of Asian American men and women. As
Professor Okihiro further states:
Chinese women, for instance, comprised only 7.2 percent
of the Chinese in America in 1890; Japanese women consti-
tuted 4 percent of the Japanese population of the U.S.
mainland in 1900 and 12.6 percent in 1910; of all the Filipi-
nos admitted into California between 1920 and 1929, only
6.7 percent were women; Korean women comprised 25
percent of the Koreans on the mainland in 1920 and 34 per-
cent in 1930; and of the 474 Asian Indians in America in
1909, none were women. '33
Chinese women emigrated to the United States in substantially
fewer numbers than Chinese men. In 1852, there were only seven
women among the 11,794 Chinese in California.'3 In 1870, the ratio
of Chinese men to women in the United States was 14 to 1, and in
1900, of the 89,863 Chinese in the continental United States, 4522, or
five percent, were women.' 3 Several dynamics appear to account for
this. A combination of Chinese tradition and culture limited
women's migration to the United States.136 The hierarchical system of
Confucianism largely defined women's subordinated status in the
Chinese social structure. 37According to its tenets:
[T]hroughout her life, the ideal woman was subject to her
father as a child, her husband when married, and her sons
which she relates the story of her aunt who committed suicide after giving birth to a
daughter who was fathered by a man other than her husband. The aunt, this "no
name woman," was expunged from the family record, "as if she had never been
born," and even her name was erased from memory, like all the countless other "no
name women," who fail to appear in the pages of history books "as if they had never
been born." OKIHiRo, supra, at 64-65, (citing MAXINE HONG KINGSTON, THE WOMAN
WARRIOR: MEMOIRS OF A GIRLHOOD AMONG GHOSTS (1975)).
133. YAMATO ICHIHASHI, JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES 72 (1932); TAKAKI, supra
note 63, at 273; Kay Leonard, Marriage and Family Life Among Early Asian India Immi-
grants, in FROM INDIA TO AMERIcA: A BREF HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION, PROBLEMS OF
DISCRIMINATION, ADMISSION AND ASSIMILATION 67 (S. Chandrasekhar ed., 1982);
OKIHIRO, supra note 132, at 67 (citing Sucheng Chan, The Exclusion of Chinese Women,
1870-1943, in ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA,
1882-1943, at 94 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991)); STATE OF CAL., DEP'T OF INDUS. RE-
LATIONS, SPECIAL BuLLETIN NO. 3, FACTS ABOUT FLIPINO IMMIGRATION INTO
CALIFORNIA 32 (1930).
134. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 209.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The patriarchal family system in China limited women's mobility in order to
ensure that the men's wages were sent home. In addition, it was considered indecent
for women to travel abroad. See Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 199; see also
TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 209.
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when widowed, and she was taught the four "virtues":
first, a woman should know her place in the universe and
behave in compliance with the natural order of things; sec-
ond, she should guard her words and not chatter too much
or bore others; third, she must be clear and adorn herself to
please men; and fourth, she should not shirk from her
household duties.'3
In addition to cultural factors, conditions in the United States
weighed against Chinese women's emigration. Clearly significant
factors were the economic demands of White employers who sought
single male workers. As a result, most men arrived as sojourners
who planned to return to China after realizing their fortunes. 39 Ra-
cism, harsh living conditions, and a general lack of welcome
dissuaded Chinese women's emigration to the United States.
During the early decades of Chinese immigration, a number of
Chinese women arrived as an act of resistance, many to escape gen-
der oppression and to lead independent lives.14° Frequently,
however, women's immigration was a product of men's exploitation
and often they were forced into prostitution.14' For example, Ah Toy,
who came to San Francisco in 1849 to better her condition, "worked
as a prostitute, and then became the madam of a brothel of Chinese
women.""' Tongs (gangs) soon monopolized the prostitution trade in
1854. Young girls from Canton and Hong Kong were recruited into
prostitution. Men purchased girls from poor families as slaves or put
them under contract for roughly five years; in other cases, girls were
kidnapped or lured onto ships with promises of gold, marriage, jobs,
or education.'4 Once in California, Chinese girls were sold to
wealthy Chinese men as concubines, to brothels reserved for Chinese
138. OKIHIRO, supra note 132, at 69 & n.9 (citing ELISABETH CROLL, FEMINISM AND
SOCIALISM IN CHINA 13,14,19 (1978)).
139. See Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 195; see also TAXAKI, supra note 49, at
210.
140. See OKIHIRO, supra note 132, at 75-79.
141. See Lucie Cheng, Free, Indentured, Enslaved: Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth
Century America, in LABOR IMMIGRATION UNDER CAPrrALISM 402-34 (Lucie Cheng &
Edna Bonacich eds., 1984). Also, as Professor Okihiro reminds us, the economic di-
mension of prostitution should not obscure the fact that the exploitation of Asian
women in America was an extension of preexisting exploitative social relations in
Asia, where patriarchy controlled women's lives. OKIHIRO, supra note 132, at 77.
142. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 201 & n.36.
143. Id. The narratives of Chinese women who were forced into prostitution are
included in Ronald Takaki's work. They include Lilac Chen, who tells of being sold
by her father at the age of six, and was later brought to San Francisco. See TAKAKI,
supra note 49, at 211. Wong Ah So tells of being wooed by kindness and tales of gold
in America, only later to become a virtual slave and forced to work as a prostitute in
San Francisco. See id. at 212 & n.57.
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men, or to lower-class brothels serving Whites as well as Asians.
Others were shipped to mining camps, where treatment often was
particularly harsh. The women endured degradation and abuse. As
Professor Takaki states, "[D]isease was a constant threat: syphilis
and gonorrhea were widespread. Life was dangerous and sometimes
short. Occasionally, prostitutes were beaten to death by their cus-
tomers or owners, and others committed suicide by taking an




In 1870 there were at least 159 brothels in San Francisco alone,
and almost two-thirds of the Chinese women in the city worked as
prostitutes. 14 Chinese women were cast as synonymous with prosti-
tution. In an 1856 editorial reflecting the attitude of much of White
society, the New York Tribune wrote: "The Chinese are lustful and
sensual in their dispositions; every female is a prostitute of the bas-
est order."' ' In 1870, California passed a law to prohibit the
importation of Asian women for the purpose of prostitution. 47 In
1875, Congress followed suit and passed the Page Law to prohibit
the entry of prostitutes; however, it was interpreted so broadly that
it also precluded the entry of Chinese wives.
As a result of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, its renewal in
1892, and passage of the 1924 Immigration Act that denied Asian
immigrants, including Asian women, the right to be permanent resi-
dent aliens, the Chinese population diminished from 124,000 in 1890
to 85,000 in 1920; it expanded very gradually to 106,000 in 1940.'"
The Exclusion Act prevented single Chinese women and the wives
of U.S. residents other than merchants from immigrating.' ° Increas-
ingly, Chinese women immigrants worked as wage laborers in
laundries, garment or cigar factories, and as agricultural workers,
servants, cooks, and on the railroads. After the Chinese Exclusion
144. TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 213 & n.60.
145. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 202.
146. Id. at 202 & n.43.
147. Act of Mar. 3, 1870, ch. 230, 1870 Cal. Stat. 330.
148. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; see also TAKAKI, supra note 49, at 210.
149. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 204.
150. Professor Pat Chew discusses the impact of anti-Asian immigration laws on
her grandparents, who experienced long periods of separation because her grand-
mother was prohibited from immigrating to the United States. See Chew, supra note
4, at 26 n.108; see also Daina Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation,
and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1066 & n.89 (1994) (noting that although
the Chinese Exclusion Act did not specifically exclude Chinese women, the federal
appellate court decision in Case of the Chinese Wife, 21 F. 785, 788 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884),
ruled that Chinese women assumed the same status as their husbands and therefore
were treated identically for exclusion purposes).
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Act prohibited further Chinese immigration in 1882, employers
sought cheap labor from Japanese immigrants.
There were profound differences in Chinese and Japanese im-
migration experiences. One major difference was the greater number
of Japanese women immigrants than the Chinese women immi-
grants of an earlier period. Japanese immigration to the United
States and Hawaii began on a large scale after 1880. In 1900, the ratio
of men to women was twenty-five to one in the Japanese immigrant
community. 5' By 1910, there were over 72,000 Japanese in the conti-
nental United States.5 2 Men initially predominated in the Japanese
immigration in the nineteenth century. In 1920, however, women
comprised forty-six percent of the Japanese population in Hawaii
and thirty-five percent in California.'53
In 1907, federal legislation limited Japanese immigration, with
the signing of the "Gentlemen's Agreement."'' " Under the Agree-
ment, unskilled Japanese men were prohibited entry into the United
States. Thus, between 1910 and 1920, the number of Japanese men in
the United States declined. However, because the Agreement did not
prohibit the entry of wives and relatives (as had the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act), the ratio of men to women was reduced. Over half of the
151. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 219.
152. Id. at 218.
153. In contrast, in 1900, 50 years after the beginning of Chinese immigration, only
five percent of the Chinese population in America were women. See TAKAKI, supra
note 49, at 247.
154. The so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" was reached during the turmoil of
public school segregation and efforts to limit Japanese immigration to America. Con-
cerned that there would be a total exclusion of Japanese immigration like the earlier
Chinese exclusion acts, the Japanese government agreed with the U.S. government to
prevent Japanese citizens carrying passports for Hawaii, Canada, or Mexico from
entering the continental United States. The Immigration Act of 1907 included an
agreement between the two countries that prevented immigration of aliens who were
excluded from admission to the United States. See Kim, supra note 48, at 39-40. The
series of correspondences between the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Japanese
Foreign Minister came to be called the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1908. As Profes-
sor Hyung-Chan Kim states, the complete text of the agreement has never been made
public; however, the following report in the annual immigration report of 1908 re-
veals the provisions:
This understanding contemplates that the Japanese government shall issue
passports to the continental United States only to such of its subjects as are
non-laborers ... who, in coming to the continent, seek to resume a formerly
acquired domicile, to join a parent, wife, or children residing there, or to as-
sume active control of an already possessed interest in a farming enterprise in
this country; so that the three classes of laborers entitled to receive passports
have come to be designated as "relatives," "former residents," and "settled
agriculturalists."
Id. at 40 (citing FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE-
AMERICANS 35 (1976)).
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Japanese women who arrived between 1909 and 1923 were "picture
brides"; roughly 23,000 picture brides came to the United States
during that period.
Like the Chinese, the combination of unbalanced sex ratio and
low wages for female plantation workers contributed to a growing
prostitution business among Japanese immigrants.' Similarly, many
Japanese women who emigrated to America were abducted or
tricked into prostitution. 7 Once they arrived in the United States,
the women were often held in bondage by amegoro (pimps). While
some prostitutes worked as barmaids, most worked in brothels.
Prostitution was race-segregated, with separate brothels serving
Whites, Chinese, and Japanese.
Despite high literacy levels, Japanese women were discrimi-
nated against in the labor market. Almost ninety percent of
employed Japanese women in the United States and Hawaii in 1900
worked in agriculture or as domestic servants."8 Japanese women
worked arduously. As described by Japanese American sociologist
Evelyn Nakano Glenn:
Some went to remote labor camps that were built for rail-
road workers in the Mountain states, coal miners in
Wyoming, sugar beet field hands in Utah and Idaho, labor-
ers in lumbering camps and sawmills in Washington, and
fish cannery workers in Alaska. Others, particularly those
who stayed in California, went into the fields where their
husbands tilled soil as tenant farmers. In addition to
working alongside their husbands, women in labor camps
and farms often drew their own water, gathered wood to
cook and heat the house, and fought to keep dirt out of
houses that were little more than shacks .... [Wiomen
whose husbands resided in urban areas were more fortu-
nate. They too worked long hours and kept house in
155. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 221 & n.108; see also TAKAKI, supra note
49, at 248 (discussing picture bride practice as an extension of the arranged marriage
custom); Sucheta Mazumdar, General Introduction: A Woman-Centered Perspective on
Asian American History, in MAKING WAVES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS BY AND
ABOUT ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN 1, 6-7 (Asian Women United of California ed.,
1989).
156. Mazumdar, supra note 155, at 1-2.
157. See Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 219; see also OKIHIRO, supra note 132,
at 78; Yuji Ichioka, Ameyuki-san: Japanese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America, 4
AMERASIAJ. 1 (1977).
158. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 219-20 & tbl.7-2.
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crowded quarters, conditions were less primitive, and the
presence of an ethnic community eased their adjustment.'"
In 1900, nearly one-half of employed Japanese women worked
in agriculture, and by 1930 approximately one-fourth worked in ag-
riculture.16° Between 1900 and 1930, many Japanese women worked
in domestic service, while others entered sales, manufacturing, cleri-
cal, professional, and managerial jobs.'6' In 1940, just before the onset
of World War II, thirty-eight percent of Japanese American women
were employed in agriculture, ten percent in domestic service, and
twenty percent in other service work. As authors Teresa Amott and
Julie Matthaei note, "Their jobs shared certain common characteris-
tics: they tended to be extensions of women's work in the home,
they were labor intensive and paid low wages, they demanded long
hours, and many of them were located in family-owned or other
Japanese enterprises. ' 62
The internment of Japanese citizens following anti-Japanese
hysteria during World War II exacted severe hardships on Japanese
families. As described by Valerie Matsumoto:
Family unity deteriorated in the crude communal facilities
and cramped housing. Overcrowding and lack of privacy
drove many away from the one-room barrack
"apartments," and family members gradually began to eat
separately in the large mess halls: mothers with small chil-
dren, fathers with other men, and older children with their
friends. All family members spent more time than ever be-
fore in the company of their peers.1
Executive Order 9066, authorizing the internment of 120,000
Japanese American citizens and their American-born children who
were residing in the western half of the Pacific Coastal States and
southern third of Arizona, included 50,000 women.'" There were
important transformations in women's roles within the general diffi-
culty of camp life. For example, wages, while extremely low, were
equal for men and women, and women gained new variety in job
159. GLENN, supra note 105, at 47-48.
160. See generally Gail M. Nomura, Issei Working Women in Hawaii, in MAKING
WAVES, supra note 155, at 135-48 (discussing the history of Japanese women immi-
grants' work and diversification from agricultural into urban occupations).
161. Amott and Matthaei, supra note 95, at 220 & tbl.7-2, 224.
162. Id. at 227 & n.132.
163. Valerie Matsumoto, Nisei Women and Resettlement During World War II, in
MAKING WAVES, supra note 155, at 116, 116-26.
164. Id. at 116.
SUMMER 19961
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
assignments.'" Also, women who had previously lived under fairly
isolated rural conditions were in community with other women
from urban and rural backgrounds.
When the War Relocation Authority slowly began to close the
internment camps in 1942, Japanese Americans returned to areas on
the West Coast. Upon returning to their previous neighborhoods,
they were greeted with signs by new White inhabitants stating, "No
Japanese Welcome."'" Japanese Americans lost an estimated $400
million in property and other incalculable losses. Although many
Japanese Americans remained on the West Coast, many others relo-
cated to other regions in the United States.167
Following the 1965 amendments to the U.S. immigration laws,
most of the vestiges of the Asian exclusion laws were removed. As a
result of unlimited visas for certain relatives and a fixed/increased
number of visas for others, about eighty percent of all legal immi-
gration to the United States each year is from Asia, the Pacific
Islands, and Latin America.'" In addition, a sizable number of
Southeast Asian refugees have come to the United States since
1975.169
While concepts of race often change over time,"7 historical per-
spective is important because so many of the practices and attitudes
that surface in society and in law have deep roots in the past. For
example, Chinese Americans are continually and contradictorily
held to be perpetual foreigners and model Americans. Similarly,
165. Id. at 117.
166. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 230.
167. In 1988, Congress enacted H.R. 442, known as the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,
which authorized $20,000 reparations for each survivor of the internment camps and
established a trust fund to support educational efforts toward the prevention of
similar acts in the future. Matsumoto, supra note 163, at 125 & n.39. The U.S. Justice
Department's Office of Redress Administration reportedly has paid more than $1.59
billion dollars to 79,656 recipients and is still searching for over 4000 eligible recipi-
ents. U.S. Seeking 4,000 Japanese-American Redress Recipients, Japan Economic
Newswire Plus, June 9, 1995, available in DIALOG.
168. HING, supra note 42, at 38-41.
169. Id. at 125-28. William R. Tamayo, managing attorney of the Asian Law Cau-
cus, argues that the disparate immigration policies of the early eras of Asian
immigration are continuing under the recent immigration laws. According to
Tamayo, the 1990 Immigration Act produced modest improvements in Asian immi-
grants' situations; however, "[tihe family reunification system received little increase
and in fact the first preference [immediate family of U.S. citizens] was reduced in
half." William R. Tamayo, Asian Americans and Present U.S. Immigration Policies: A
Legacy of Asian Exclusion, in ASIAN AMERIcANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
1, at 1105, 1123.
170. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 18, at 449 and sources cited therein (noting the his-
tory of over-inclusive and under-inclusive conceptions of race: e.g., race as
synonymous with nationality during the Civil War, and race as representing differ-
ent species or subgroups of the same species under the earlier Linnaean theory).
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Japanese Americans are perceived as enemy aliens and heroic
Americans. Asian American women were incongruously constructed
as socially passive and sexually submissive, and as exotic and
sexually promiscuous. These indelible perceptions were forged in
the legal precedents of the Exclusion Laws; constitutionally-
affirmed, race-based detention; and other legal provisions directed
against citizens of Asian descent. Thus, the imperative to understand
the context in which race influences the contemporary socio-legal
landscape demands comprehension of their historical origins. This is
discussed in the next section.
2. Contemporary Constructions of Asian Identities
Due to racially exclusionist developments in American history,
racial inequality has come to exist in a structural form, sanctioned
and often created by law. Social constructions about Asian Ameri-
cans are firmly rooted in legislative enactments and judicial rulings
originating from the early period of Asian migration to America. The
imprimatur of legal authority continues to have a profound effect on
contemporary perceptions of Asian Americans in American society.
Public attitudes and perceptions frequently follow statutory enact-
ments, and the legal-political subversion that made Asian Americans
less than full citizens served to reinforce what had formerly sug-
gested their subhuman qualities. Bolstered by historical legal
constructions, many racial stereotypes continue to inform societal
views of Asian Americans. These social constructions define Asian
Americans as docile and subservient, perpetual foreigners, pre-
sumptively poor communicators where English-language proficien-
cy is limited, unfair economic competitors, "model minorities," in-
scrutable, and homogeneous.
a. Forever Foreign
The result of express discriminatory immigration and naturali-
zation laws against generations of Asian American immigrants and
their descendants has generated the pervasive construction of Asian
Americans as "foreigner.' 171 Many Asian American commentators
have identified this as a defining characteristic of American
"Orientalism."'172 Professor Neil Gotanda expresses the manner in
171. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN
AMERICANS IN THE 1990s, at 14-15 (1992).
172. Professor and literary critic Edward Said has stated that the European con-
ception of Asia and Asians as "the Other" was a European invention, which connoted
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which the social categories "foreign" and "citizen" parallel the legal
categories "alien" and "citizen," stating that:
[F]or African Americans and Whites in twentieth century
America, there is presumed a close correlation between
U.S. citizenship and social status as an American. Similarly,
for African Americans and whites, if such a person is not a
citizen, then that person is probably not "socially" re-
garded as American but as "foreign." Thus, within the
United States, if a person is racially identified as African
American or white, that person is presumed to be legally a
U.S. citizen and socially an American. . . . [Tihese pre-
sumptions are not present for Asian Americans, Latinos,
Arab Americans, and other non-Black racial minorities.
Rather, there is the opposite presumption that these people
are foreigners; or, if they are U.S. citizens, then their racial
identity includes a foreign component. These are the racial
groups who, collectively, I have called "Other non-
Whites." 73
The "perpetual foreigner" constructions of Asian Americans are
attributable to racist and nativist ideologies. Indeed, Professor Rob-
ert Chang has more aptly named the phenomenon as "nativistic
• ,,174 .. .
racism. As we have seen in the previous section, nativistic racism
spawned discriminatory immigration laws, as well as statutes pro-
hibiting land ownership by Asian Americans, among other anti-
Asian legislative measures. More recently, nativistic racism has been
reflected by official English language movements and fear of a
a place of "romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable
experiences." OKIHIRO, supra note 44, at 10 (quoting EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 1
(1978)). According to Professor Said, "Orientalism" was an ideology that justified the
further "feminization of Asia, colonization, characterizations of Asians as innately
inferior." Id. at 10 & nn.19-21 (citing SAID, supra, at 1, 59, 62, 72, 74, 86, 207-08, 211,
222).
173. Gotanda, supra note 44, at 1095-96 & n.30 (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (1990)).
174. Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1256-57 n.61.
175. See Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken
Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293 (1989); Kathryn K. Imahara, Language Rights
Issues to the Year 2020 and Beyond: Language Rights Policy, in THE STATE OF ASIAN
PACIFIC AMERICA: A PuBuc POuCY REPORT: POLICY ISSUES TO THE YEAR 2020 (LEAP
Asian Pac. Am. Pub. Policy Inst. & UCLA Asian Am. Studies Ctr. eds., 1993); Mari
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust:
An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 269 (1992). As Daina Chiu states, English-only movements are designed to force
assimilation upon non-English-speaking Asian and Latina immigrants. As of 1992, 19
states had adopted measures making English the official language. Chiu, supra note
150, at 1078-79 & n.176 (citing Update on Legal Official Recognition of English in
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Japanese-controlled United States economy. 76 As evidenced by the
killing of Vincent Chin, foreignness continues to explain the manner
in which racism is directed at Asian Americans.'" While this reaction
often is particularly strong toward those who retain the language,
culture, and customs of their ethnic heritage, "even Asian Americans
who exhibit no obvious cultural or linguistic signs of recent immi-
gration are presumed to be foreign."'' m
Professor Mari Matsuda has extensively analyzed race, national
origin, and class-based discrimination in the work place, finding that
Asian Americans with discernible accents frequently face employ-
ment discrimination.7 Professor Matsuda notes with respect to the
social and historical forces in her native multilingual Hawaii:
Missouri, Louisiana, U.S. Newswire, Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
USNWR File).
176. See, e.g., Steve Garbarino, Fear in a Climate of Japan Bashing, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6,
1992, at 67 (discussing fear of Japanese takeover of Rockefeller Centre when Mitsubi-
shi Corporation purchased 51% of shares); Mark Potts, Japan and Mariners: Quandary
for Game, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1992, at Fl; Mark Potts, Japanese Cleared for Seattle
Baseball Deal, WASH. POST, June 10, 1992, at Al (discussing controversy over Nin-
tendo Corporation's purchase of shares in the Seattle Mariners baseball team). For a
discussion, see Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1257 (noting
that the fears of "the Japanese 'taking over' " are conceptually flawed by confusing
and/or equating private corporations to the Japanese people or the nation of Japan,
and noting moreover that "Japanese investors owned less than 2% of United States
commercial property").
177. See infra Part II.B.
178. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at 20. Consider the frustra-
tions of Representative Mineta: "[Although my family has been in this country for
more than 85 years, people still tell me with genuine surprise that I speak English
remarkably well and without a trace of accent." Anti-Asian Violence: Oversight Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 10 (1987) (statement of Representative Mineta) [hereinafter
Hearings on Anti-Asian Violence]; see also Jerry Kang, Note, Racial Violence against Asian
Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1931 & n.41 (1993).
179. See Matsuda, supra note 175. Professor Matsuda analyzes societal prejudices
and employment discrimination against people with different, less acceptable
accents, proposing the use of Title VII to combat accent discrimination in the
workplace. See id. at 1332. Professor Matsuda provides extensive analysis of Fragante
v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989), in which a Filipino-Hawaiian man
took the civil service examination for a Division of Motor Vehicles position. See
Matsuda, supra note 175, at 1333. Despite ranking first on the list of eligibles, he was
turned down for the job of clerk based on a supervisor's low rating of his speech. In
rejecting the applicant, the employer-interviewer's comments cited: "Difficult
manner of pronunciation," and a "Pronounced" and "Heavy Filipino" accent. See id.
at 1337 & nn.22-26. In addition, Professor Matsuda discusses Kahakua v. Hallgren,
No. CV-86-0434-MDC (D. Haw. 1987), aff'd sub nom., Kahakua v. Friday, 876 F.2d 896
(9th Cir. 1989), in which a native Hawaiian applicant with extensive experience in
meteorology was denied a promotion after a speech consultant rated his speech
unacceptable for weather broadcasts. A White applicant with no college degree and
minimal experience in meteorology was selected for the position based on his
"excellent" broadcasting voice. The judge discounted the testimony of the plaintiff's
linguist who stated that Hawaiian Creole pronunciation is not incorrect, but is rather
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Native Hawaiians were encouraged to adopt English and
abandon Hawaiian. There are some adults in Hawaii today
who recall being punished for speaking Hawaiian.... Be-
cause the Creole arose among plantation workers, it was
never the language of American whites who lived in Ha-
waii. A combination of racism, class bias, and linguistic
intolerance meant that Creole sjeakers were segregated
both residentially and in school.'
One aspect of the construction of Asian Americans as perma-
nent foreigners is the perception of Asian Americans as unfair
economic competitors. Since the earliest era of Asian immigration,
politicians, business leaders, workers, and the media have character-
ized Asian Americans as unfair competitors in business, industry
and employment.' Asian Americans in the United States are ac-
cused of taking jobs from "real" Americans.' = The belief that Asian
immigrants deprive Whites of jobs and business opportunities has
recently been exemplified by the tensions between Vietnamese and
White fishers in the Galveston Bay area in the Texas Gulf coast.
When newly arrived Vietnamese immigrants began their independ-
ent shrimping operations in Kemah-Seabrook, the White American
fishers decided that "there are just too many Vietnamese people in
Kemah-Seabrook and therefore [the fishers would] be satisfied only
when some of the Vietnamese le[ft] the area."'l
In order to disrupt or destroy the Vietnamese immigrants'
shrimping businesses, White fishers, with Ku Klux Klan assistance,
threatened the Vietnamese community with cross-burnings, a "boat
ride" while wearing Ku Klux Klan robes and shooting canons,
burning Vietnamese-owned or operated shrimp boats, and pointing
pistols at the Vietnamese fishers and their families.TM The Vietnam-
ese fishers filed a civil rights suit against their tormentors, and the
federal district court enjoined the local fishers' campaign of violence
one of the many varieties of pronunciation of standard English. See Matsuda, supra
note 175, at 1341, 1345-46 & nn.58-62.
180. Matsuda, supra note 175, at 1343.
181. See Aoki, supra note 106, at 22-25 (noting the simultaneous and paradoxical
characterization of Asian immigrants as superior and inferior to Whites, fueling con-
ceptions of Asian immigrants as unfair economic competitors either because they
had superior talent or because they worked for subpar wages).
182. See Hearings on Anti-Asian Violence, supra note 178, at 35.
183. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp.
993, 1002 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (summarizing testimony of Seabrook Chief of Police R.W.
Kerber).
184. Id. at 1001, 1003 n.3, 1004; see also Chew, supra note 4, at 61 (offering a discus-
sion of the Vietnamese Fishermen s case).
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and intimidation, so that the Vietnamese could "pursue their chosen
occupation free of racial animus.
The international dimension of the perception of Asian Ameri-
cans as unfair competitors finds its source in the linkage of Asian
Americans with the economic policies of Asian nations. The synergy
between the domestic and international dynamics, which constructs
Asian Americans as foreign, is central to understanding the context
of Vincent Chin's death.'
b. Model Minorities
Perhaps the most prevalent contemporary social construction of
Asian Americans is the "model minority" characterization, which
conspires with the constructions of perpetual foreignness and unfair
economic competitors. Constructed as the model minority, Asian
Americans have been located beneath Whites in the social hierarchy,
but above other people of color. The media was key in the develop-
ment and dissemination of this image. A few months after the 1965
Watts riots, the New York Times published an article by sociologist
William Petersen entitled, Success Story: Japanese American Style.' A
bevy of media enterprises followed suit by presenting a steady
stream of such representations.'" Professor Neil Gotanda exposes
the way in which Asian Americans are situated within U.S. racial
stratification:
The image of Asians as model minority is a distinctly racial
conceptualization. The perception of economic gains of
Asian American small businesses (especially the image of
the "Korean grocer"), the dramatic presence of Asians at
U.S. colleges and universities, and Japanese automobile
sales are blended together in a confusing mix. These vari-
ous images of the successful Asian have only the Asian
racial image in common. For example, economic ties be-
tween small businesses and Nissan Motors are non-
existent. Small Asian American businesses and giant Asian
corporations share no political allegiances. Similarly, ties of
185. 518 F. Supp. at 1016-17.
186. See infra Part 11.
187. The concept of Asian Americans as an exemplary racial group originates in
the Reconstruction Era of the 19th century. See Wu, supra note 57, at 230-31.
188. William Petersen, Success Story: Japanese American Style, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan.
9, 1966, at 20.
189. For a sampling of media exegeses on Asian Americans' model minority
status, see TAKAKI, supra note 49; Wu, supra note 57, at 236-37 & n.53.
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cultural tradition are irrelevant to the business enterprise.
The common linkages are solely in the mainstream per-
ception of racial similarity."'
Perpetuation of the model minority label to describe Asian
Americans permits the perpetration of the twin tropes of American
ideology: the notions that simply through hard work and determi-
nation, and individual effort, anyone can succeed in American
society. While success is hardly possible without these attributes, it
is misleading to assert them as the sole basis for societal advance-
ment. The consequence of Asian Americans' portrayal as "model
minorities" reinforces the racial and ethnic hierarchies of White su-
premacy and does not disrupt the popular image of America as a
fair and just society, rather than one that is steeped in structural ra-
cism and other inequalities. Thus, despite its widespread acceptance,
the model minority designation is misleading and pernicious for
several reasons. As Professor Pat Chew states:
The model minority label .. .suggests that Asian Ameri-
cans, through their achievements, have been accepted as
equals by others in American society. As models, the infer-
ence is that they have risen above historic subordination
and societal perceptions of inferiority.
Recent and extensive studies of what Americans think of
Asian Americans, however, suggest that these positive in-
ferences from the model minority label may be more
aspirational than real. 9'
Significantly, while Whites perceive Asian Americans more
positively than they do other people of color, they perceive Asian
Americans less positively than themselves.' 92 Compared to them-
selves, Whites perceived Asian Americans as less intelligent, more
violence-prone, lazier, and more likely to prefer living off welfare. 93
Although some Asian Americans have subscribed to the model mi-
nority designation," 4 for many others the myth inscribes a false
190. Gotanda, supra note 44, at 1089.
191. Chew, supra note 4, at 32.
192. See id. at 32-33 (citing Tom W. Smith, Ethnic Images, GEN. Soc. SuRv. TOPICAL
REP. No. 19 (1990); Lawrence Bobo & James R. Kluegel, Modem American Prejudice:
Stereotypes, Social Distance, and Perceptions of Discrimination Toward Blacks, His-
panics, and Asians (Aug. 1991) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual
Meetings of the American Sociological Association)).
193. Id. at 32.
194. Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1260 n.79 (noting
that former Senator S.I. Hayakawa was a proponent of the model minority myth); see
also Wu, supra note 57, at 236 n.53 (noting that one official of the Japanese American
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image of Asian Americans as leading problem-free existences. As
Professor Robert Chang observes, "The successful inculcation of the
model minority myth has created an audience unsympathetic to the
problems of Asian Americans. Thus, when we try to make our
problems known, our complaints of discrimination or call for reme-
dial action are seen as unwarranted and inappropriate."' 95 As
expressed by a student in Professor Mitsuye Yamada's Ethnic
American Literature class, the model minority myth can engender
resentment against those Asian Americans who defy the construc-
tion of contentment: "It made me angry. Their anger made me angry,
because I didn't even know the Asian Americans felt oppressed. I
didn't expect their anger."' 96
Adherence to the myth produces real harms, then, when Asian
Americans, particularly more recent immigrants of lesser means,
including Laotians, Hmong, Cambodians, and Vietnamese, do not
receive needed attention or assistance in response to their social and
economic needs.'7 Even among more economically successful Asian
Citizens League testified before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1966 that "I am
representing the most angelic of minorities in this community"), quoted in DANIELS,
ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 320
(1988). But see Reed Ueda, False Modesty, NEw REPUBLIC, July 3, 1989, at 16 (urging
that Asians embrace model minority status).
195. Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1260. A Wall Street
Journal and NBC poll found that "most American voters thought that Asian Ameri-
cans did not suffer discrimination," but instead received too many "special
advantages." Murray Polner, Asian Americans Say They Are Treated like Foreigners,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at B1.
196. Mitsuye Yamada, Invisibility Is an Unnatural Disaster: Reflections of an Asian
American Woman, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF
COLOR, 35, 35 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzalddia eds., 1981), quoted in Chang, Asian
American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1261.
Related to the myth of model minority status is the social construction defining
Asian Americans as docile and submissive. As one author posits:
In part, this stereotype arises from average physiological differences in
weight and height between Asian Americans and members of other racial
groups. In part it stems from Western interpretations of certain Asian cultural
and aesthetic values. In addition, Asian immigrants' desires to avoid calling
attention to themselves, to survive silently, and to remain invisible further
encourage the perception of submissiveness.
Kang, supra note 178, at 1931 (noting the particular potency of this image as applied
to Asian American women); see also Hearings on Anti-Asian Violence, supra note 178, at
68; see also supra Part I.B.2.
197. Overlapping with the construction of Asian Americans as foreign and com-
pliant is the perception of Asian Americans as interchangeable and indistinguishable.
"[B]ecause many Asian Americans share similar gross physical characteristics,
visually distinguishing one Asian American from another may be difficult, especially
for non-Asian Americans." Kang, supra note 178, at 1932.
Thus, for many reasons, Asian Americans are viewed as monolithic. In reality,
however, a large percentage of the Southeast Asian community live below the
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Americans, income disparities persist. On average, more members
contribute to family income among Asian Americans than among
Whites, and earnings for Asian Americans are generally less than for
Whites.9 8 Information purporting to confirm the greater economic
status of Asian Americans often cite Japanese and Chinese Ameri-
cans as having incomes well above the national average.19 Upon
closer scrutiny, despite apparently surpassing economic parity,
Asian Americans' success in this regard is achieved by acquiring
more education and working longer hours than Whites in compara-
ble employment positions and ages."
poverty level and often have much lower education rates and higher unemployment
rates than the national average. The poverty rates of newer groups of Asian
immigrants are listed at 67.2% (Laotians), 65.5% (Hmong), 46.9% (Cambodians), and
33.5% (Vietnamese). U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at 17; see also
Chew, supra note 4, at 28-30 & sources cited therein (discussing the poor
socioeconomic status of Southeast Asian immigrants and refugees, as well as severe
physical and psychological health problems for many in these communities). In
Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hmong, and Laotian families, incomes range from $1600 to
$5200 per year, which is far below the average. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ASIAN AMERICANS: A STATUS REPORT 22, tbl.1.1 (1990).
198. Diane Crispell, People Patterns: Family Ties Are a Boon for Asian Americans,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1992, at B1 (noting that 63% of Asian and Pacific Islander
households have two or more earners, compared with 60% of White families; and
that 19% have three or more earners, compared with 14% of White families); see also
Arthur Brice, Census Report: Asian Americans Earn Less Despite More Education,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 18, 1992, at C5 (noting that Asian Americans with high
school education who were working full-time earned an average of $2760 less than
comparable Whites, and that Asian Americans with four or more years of college
earned $1660 less than comparable Whites). Scholar Frank Wu also notes that belief
in above-average Asian American incomes ignores geographic differences due to the
concentration of Asian Americans in high-income, high-cost states such as New
York, California, and Hawaii. Wu, supra note 57, at 245 n.104. According to the U.S.
General Accounting Office, the average Asian American income is $6900, compared
to $7400 for the average White American. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
197, at 22. The higher average annual household incomes of Asian Americans
($23,700) as compared to the rest of the U.S. population ($20,300) is partly explained
by the larger size of Asian American households. Id. at 2.
199. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 1157, 1157 (revised text of speech delivered on January 4, 1991, at Association of
American Law Schools convention, where Posner cited Japanese Americans' incomes
as being over 32% above the national average, and Chinese Americans' incomes as
being over 10% above the national average), cited in Chang, Asian American Legal
Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1261 & n.84.
200. Professor Takaki's research from the 1980s reveals that Japanese American
men in California achieved comparable incomes to White men only upon acquiring
17.7 years of education compared to 16.8 years for White men 25 to 44 years old, and
by working 2160 hours compared to 2120 hours for White men in the same age cate-
gories. TAKAKI, supra note 63, at 475.
For men in other Asian American groups, the income disparities are starker.
According to Professor Takaki, in California, Korean men earned 82% of the income
of White men, Chinese men earned 68%, and Filipino men earned 62%. In New York,
Korean men earned 88% of the income of White men, Filipino men earned 76%, and
Chinese men earned 52%. Id.
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For Asian American women, race and gender dynamics com-
bine to form a complex picture of employment and income
disparities. In 1980, thirty-two percent of Asian American women
were in the lowest-wage and lowest-status occupations of machine
operator, farmworker, or service worker, as opposed to twenty-six
percent of Whites.2° Although a higher percentage of Chinese, Japa-
nese, and Filipina women (thirty percent, twenty percent, and forty-
one percent, respectively) have college or advanced degrees than do
White women, the high proportion of Asian American educational
success also obscures structural race- and gender-based disparities.
Moreover, the evidence of Asian American women's stronger edu-
cational and economic advancement is conflicting. According to one
researcher, "Controlling for educational and occupational status
when compared to white women, Asian Pacific Islander women do
as well if not slightly better, in terms of earned median income.
'
"0
However, Professor Sucheng Chan concludes, "[D]espite their high
educational level, [Asian American women] receive lower returns to
their education than do white women. ' 2"
Professor Deborah Woo details the competing and contradic-
tory realities of the model minority myth as it applies to Asian
American women:
Much academic research on Asian Americans tends to un-
derscore their success, a success which is attributed almost
always to a cultural emphasis on education, hard work,
and thrift .... While the story of Asian American women
workers is only beginning to be pieced together, the suc-
cess theme is already being sung. The image prevails that
despite cultural and racial oppression, they are somehow
rapidly assimilating into the mainstream .... Moreover,
they have acquired a reputation for not only being consci-
entious and industrious but docile, compliant, and
uncomplaining as well.2
The geographical concentration of Asian Americans in areas
where both income and cost of living are very high may further
Familiar disparities are apparent from the 1990 census data on individual and
aggregate family earnings. See, e.g., Crispell, supra note 198, at B1; Brice, supra note
198; see also Chiu, supra note 150, at 1089-93 (discussing glass ceiling and occupa-
tional segregation experiences of Asian Americans).
201. Amott & Matthaei, supra note 95, at 250.
202. Henry Der, Asian Pacific Islanders and the "Glass Ceiling"-New Era of Civil
Rights Activism? Affirmative Action Policy, in THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA,
supra note 175, at 215, 220.
203. CHAN, supra note 42, at 169.
204. Deborah Woo, The Gap Between Striving and Achieving: The Case of Asian
American Women, in MAKING WAVES, supra note 155, at 185-86.
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mislead in assertions of Asian American men's and women's higher
earnings. As Professor Woo explains:
National income averages which compare the income of
Asian American women with that of the more broadly dis-
persed Anglo women systematically distort the picture.
Indeed, if we compare women within the same area, Asian
American women are frequently less well-off than Anglo
American females .... When we consider the large immi-
grant Asian population and the language barriers that
restrict women to menial or entry-level jobs, we are talking
about a group that not only earns minimum wage or less,
but one whose purchasing power is substantially under-
mined by living in metropolitan areas of states where the
cost of living is unusually high."' '
For Asian American women in the professional classes, em-
ployment and earning inequities are no less striking. Professor
Woo's research further reveals that "[iln general, Asian American
women with a college education are concentrated in narrow and se-
lect, usually less prestigious, rungs of the 'professional-managerial'
class."20 Moreover, census data suggesting confirmation of unquali-
fied Asian American success emphasize significant Asian American
representation in "professional-managerial" or "executive, adminis-
trative, managerial" categories. However, as managers, usually
male, Asian Americans are concentrated in certain occupations:
"They tend to be self-employed in small-scale wholesale and retail
trade and manufacturing. They are rarely buyers, sales managers,
administrators, or salaried managers in large-scale retail trade,
communications, or public utilities. Among foreign-born Asian
women, executive-managerial status is limited primarily to auditors
and accountants."' Thus, idealizing Asian American men and
women as model minorities without further interrogation of the re-
alities underlying the myths obscures important facts about the
discrepancies between individual and/or group achievement and
institutional barriers which maintain racial, gender, economic, and
social hierarchies.
Especially pernicious, too, is the message of the model minority
myth to other groups of people of color. Express and implied, the
message is that if Asian Americans could overcome the historic bar-
riers of racial discrimination, they could also. Thus, while Asian
205. Id. at 188.
206. Id. at 190.
207. Id.
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Americans are exalted in the mainstream media and American
mindset as formidable profiles of work ethic success, the deprecation
of African Americans, Native Americans, Latina/o Americans, and
poor Whites has been magnified. The clamor for other groups of
people of color to remake themselves in the image of the Asian
American "model" has been sounded not only by the dominant cul-
ture but within communities of color as well. For example, William
Raspberry, an African American columnist for the Washington Post,
urged African Americans to get "beyond racism" and follow the
model provided by "West Coast Asian Americans, who if they had
waited for the end of anti-Oriental prejudice, might still be living in
poverty, rather than outstripping white Americans in education and
income, as they in fact are."28 As the previous discussion has re-
vealed, uncritical acceptance of the model minority characterization
ignores centuries of history of Asian Americans and other peoples of
color who have been reduced in the socio-economic structure by
similar and vastly dissimilar experiences of inequality.
In the cauldron of discontent and devaluation within commu-
nities of color, interethnic tensions have increasingly erupted into
violence. The tragic consequences that can result are exemplified by
the killing of African American teenager Latasha Harlins, an accused
shoplifter, by Korean American store owner Soon Ja Du, in March
1991.2 Professor Reginald Robinson eloquently describes the inter-
ethnic dynamics underscoring the encounter:
Rage and violence filled the exchange between Soon Ja and
Latasha. Rage over a $1.79 bottle of juice seems overly
dramatic-too emotional for the moment. A fifty-one year
old woman, who Judge Karlins adjudged nonthreatening
to the public, verbally and physically battered an African
American child. "Bitch" and "What orange juice?" warrant
less violence. Perhaps Soon Ja's rage came from hundreds
of would-be Latashas, and perhaps Latasha's rage reflected
the anger that had been corked up within the African
American community. Seen in this light, the exchange of
rage took place symbolically between envoys of warring
communities who failed to understand that each side was
required to decode the other's "bitch" and "what orange
juice?" Instead, both envoys lost their patience; diplomacy
aside, each wanted for a moment to speak honestly. Soon
Ja, like Latasha, could probably predict war, but not at that
208. William Raspberry, Beyond Racism, WASH. Posr, Nov. 19, 1984, at A23.
209. People v. Superior Court (Soon Ja Du), 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (Ct. App. 1992).
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moment. While tragic, the rage must be seen contextually,
in its larger, socially important meaning.21
Professor Robinson further explains the sources of the inter-
ethnic discord:
[A]part from individual violence between African and Ko-
rean Americans .. . , the violent discourse is a function of
structural inequities, such as racial injustice and economic
inequality .... This [inevitable socioeconomic pressure]
follows from social difficulty and racial hardship that ap-
pear to be beyond a single individual's control. This
absence of control is placed under erasure by the socialized
other because this instability insists on exposing the source
of other's disempowerment. This insistence can produce
violent "talk," and the resulting violence between African
and Korean Americans represents a form of talk-a means
of communicating. Its message is riveting; it punctuates
decades of rage and penetrates mere rhetoric. In the end,
violence underscores the dissonance between words and
meaning; it shouts, and it gets your attention. I call this
form of "talk" "violent discourse."...
However, if violent discourse proceeds from the premise that
Korean merchants have caused the present despair in black
communities, African Americans' violent "talk" appears
misguided. Racial injustice and economic inequality per-
meated black life before Asian merchants operated in
African American communities.2"
Interethnic conflicts have many origins and hence occur in
many directions. The tensions running in both directions between
the Korean and African American communities have received much
attention. In addition to the Soon Ja Du/Latasha Harlins encounter,
there have been other deaths and economic reprisals. Three months
after Latasha Harlins was killed, store owner Tae Sam Park shot and
killed Arthur Lee Mitchell during a struggle to thwart a theft.2 2 The
killing, and the decision by the Los Angeles County Prosecutor to
210. Robinson, supra note 4, at 93 (footnotes omitted); see also Bill Ong Hing, In the
Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common Good,
47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 909-15 (1995); Jones, supra note 18, at 504 n.276 (discussing the
sentencing judge's projection of fears of continuing hostility of African Americans in
South Central Los Angeles through a racial lens, which resulted in a mere six-month
sentence for Du).
211. Robinson, supra note 4, at 22,24-25 (footnotes omitted).
212. See Hing, supra note 210, at 912-13 & n.56.
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not press charges against Park triggered a lengthy boycott of Park's
store. 3 In Hawthorne, California, store owner Wha Young Choi al-
legedly beat a twelve-year-old African American girl suspected of
shoplifting.1 4
In October 1991, two African American burglars shot Kwang
Yul Chun to death.2"5 This followed the September 1991 shootings of
two Korean shop workers by African American armed robbers; and
in December, two African American robbery suspects shot Yong Tae
Park to death at his store.21 '6 The Korean American community also
expressed outrage at the killing of a nine-year old Korean girl by an
African American during a hold-up of her parents' store.
Similar incidents occurred on the East Coast. In January 1990,
an altercation between a Korean American store owner and a Hai-
tian American woman shopper who was suspected of shoplifting
resulted in boycotts of Korean American-owned stores in Brooklyn,
New York.2 8 In August 1988, another altercation occurred between
Korean and African Americans stemming from an accusation of
shoplifting and a refusal to permit the Korean store owners to search
the African American women's bags."9 A fatal shooting by Korean
grocer Chang Yung Soo resulted in the death of Kevin Coohill, an
African American customer, after an argument in a Brooklyn gro-
220
cery.
Antagonisms run between other communities of color, as well.
It has been noted, for instance, that "Koreans still resent their
country's historical oppression by Japan. And Japanese and Chinese
cultures and militaries have often clashed." '2 It is against this back-
ground that Richard Fung states, "[W]hile the Chinese, the Japanese,
the Koreans, the Filipinos, and the Vietnamese had fought each other
in their old countries, and sometimes continued to do battle in the
new, they had one thing in common. Here, they were all branded
with the mark 'oriental.' "m In another instance, in Johnson v.
213. See id. at 913 & nn.57-60.
214. See id. at 914 & n.64.
215. See id. at 914 & n.65.
216. Id. at 914 & nn.68-69.
217. Id. at 914 & n.70.
218. Id. at 942-43.
219. Id. at 943.
220. Id. at 943 & n.229 (citing Michel P. McQueen, Clashes with Koreans Spark B 'klyn
March, NEwsDAY, Jan. 28, 1990, at 19); see also Robinson, supra note 4, at 50-51
(discussing incidents of interracial violence between African and Asian Americans in
Washington, D.C., Brooklyn, and Manhattan).
221. Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957,963 (1995).
222. Fung, supra note 14, at 162.
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DeGrandy,m Latino and African American plaintiffs independently
alleged that the Florida legislature's redistricting plan violated the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 by diluting the strength of African
Americans and Latinos in the Dade County area."'
Professor Charles Lawrence explains that the rising voices of in-
terethnic tensions speak the language of White supremacy:
When a Vietnamese family is driven out of its home in a
project by African American youth, that is white suprem-
acy. When a Korean store owner shoots an African
American teenager in the back of the head, that is white
supremacy. When 33 percent of Latinos agree with the
statement, "Even if given a chance, [African Americans]
aren't capable of getting ahead," that is white supremacy.
When over 40 percent of African American voters in Cali-
fornia support proposition 187, the antiimmigrant
initiative, that too is white supremacy.
Although White supremacist ideology cannot excuse the indi-
vidual exercise of agency that is involved interethnic conflicts, it
provides a persuasive explanation for the origins of much "violent
discourse" between communities of color. It is here that the model
minority moniker is revealed as an instrument in the service of
maintaining racial and social hierarchy. As stated by Professor
Lawrence:
Those of us who are assigned a higher status on this ladder
find that our belief in another group's inferiority gives us
an investment in white privilege. We are rewarded for our
racism and are less likely to experience the full force of our
own subordination. Those of us who are assigned a lower
status resent the relative privilege of those who are a rung
above us on the ladder. We scapegoat the groups who are
forced by their own subordination to live or work in
proximity to us or take the menial jobs that would other-
wise be ours. We express our anger and resentment in
white racist terms, seizing on the stereotypes and symbols
used by whites to label the targets of our anger inferior. 6
223. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
224. Id. at 2651-52; see also Ramirez, supra note 221, at 969.
225. Charles R. Lawrence, m, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism. and the Jurispru-
dence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819, 829 (1995) (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 831 and sources cited therein (footnotes omitted).
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Hostile racial stereotypes against Asian Americans, misconcep-
tions about the universal affluence of Asian Americans, and beliefs
that Asian Americans are responsible for a variety of social and eco-
nomic ills, have contributed to racially motivated violence and
discrimination against Asian Americans. In 1992, the U.S. Commis-
sion on Civil Rights documented that violence against Asian
Americans had doubled since 1980 .w Understanding the causal
evolution of racist violence requires examining the social contexts in
which it manifests itself.
What must be undertaken, then, is the more complex conversa-
tion about the varieties in which racial subordination and other
sanctioned forms of inequality are manifested between and within
communities of White Americans and communities of Americans of
color. Reaching the deepest levels of this discussion will entail an
interrogation of the role of law in perpetuating subordination and
constructions of "otherness" throughout society and legal systems.
Without this understanding, it will be impossible to effectively
channel social activism and legal acumen to dismantle all structures
of societal inequity. Understanding the contextualized experiences of
racism operating within the criminal justice system is addressed in
the next sections.
II. ANALYSIS OF VINCENT CHIN
[T]he history of Asian Americans and the Supreme Court... [ils
a story of a people who have largely been objects, not shapers, of a
legal system they do not fully understand, a language they do not
fluently speak, a melting pot into which they have not been al-
lowed to assimilate. . . . [Tihe sadness multiplies when one
realizes that for each Asian American whose name and narrative
appears here-Fong Yue Ting, Yick Wo, Korematsu, Hirabay-
ashi, Gong Lum-thousands of others like them suffered in
silence: faceless and voiceless casualties of an alien, hostile legal
system.A
-Harold Hongju Koh
In contemporary times, particularly during the early 1980s, anti-
Asian sentiment in the United States was heightened. This sentiment
was particularly acute in Detroit, Michigan, where the heart of the
American auto industry was economically depressed and Japanese
227. U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, supra note 171; see also infra Part I
(discussing racially motivated crimes against Asian Americans).
228. Koh, supra note 1, at ix.
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auto imports gained in sales and popularity in this country. It was
within this social climate and other social contexts that the killing of
Vincent Chin occurred, bringing national and international attention
to the issue of racially motivated violence against Asian Americans
in the United States.22
Ostensibly, the facts surrounding Vincent Chin's death are not
in dispute. On June 19, 1982, Vincent Chin, a twenty-seven-year-old
naturalized American citizen, went to the Fancy Pants Lounge in
Highland Park, Michigan, with three friends to celebrate his upcom-
ing marriage. Highland Park is a suburb of Detroit; it is also the
headquarters of the Chrysler Corporation. Ronald Ebens, a general
foreman at Chrysler, and his stepson, Michael Nitz, a Chrysler
worker, were also at the Fancy Pants, a nude dancing club. Ronald
Ebens and Michael Nitz sat across the elevated dancing runway
from Vincent Chin and his friends, Jimmy Choi, Gary Koivu, and
Robert Sirosky.2
As two female dancers, one White and one Black, performed a
striptease on an elevated runway, Ebens reacted after watching Chin
give a generous tip to the White dancer. "Hey, you little m-!" he
shouted at Chin, telling the Black dancer, "Don't pay any attention
to those little f-, they wouldn't know a good dancer if they'd seen
one." Vincent Chin got up from his seat and started toward Ebens.nI
"Little f-, big f-, we're all the same," Ebens said to Chin. Vin-
cent Chin took umbrage at the remark and struck Ronald Ebens. A
fight ensued. Ebens began making racial and obscene remarks to-
ward Chin calling him a "Chink" and "Nip" and making remarks
about foreign car imports. The dancers heard Ebens say that "it's
because of little mother f- that we're out of work.''2, 2 Ebens lifted a
chair to strike Chin and struck his stepson's head instead. The
doorman and parking lot attendant broke it up and ejected every-
one. The verbal jousting continued in the parking lot. Chin called
Ebens a "chicken s--" and challenged him to continue the fight in
the parking lot. Ebens went to Nitz's car and removed a baseball bat.
Seeing Ronald Ebens with the bat, Vincent Chin and his friends ran
down the street. Ebens and Nitz pursued Chin, and upon meeting
Jimmy Perry, Nitz offered Perry twenty dollars to help them go find
the "Chinese guy." According to Perry's testimony, Ebens and Nitz
229. See, e.g., Andersen, Vincent Chin Case Gets National Audience, ASIAN WK., July
14, 1989, at 1, 12.
230. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1427 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Michael
Moore, The Wages of Death, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 30, 1987, at 15.
231. See Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1427; see also Moore, supra note 230.
232. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1427.
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talked during the ride about catching a "Chinese guy" and "busting
his head" when they caught him.m
The ultimate confrontation occurred in the lot of a supermarket
next to a McDonald's restaurant. After searching the area, Ebens and
Nitz spotted Chin sitting outside the McDonald's. Nitz pulled into
the lot, and Ebens jumped out. He ran toward Chin, bat in hand.
Upon seeing Ebens coming, Chin ran out into the street. Nitz joined
the chase and within seconds caught and held Chin while Ebens
swung the bat into Chin's legs. Chin screamed and fell to the
ground. Ebens continued to swing, breaking a number of Chin's
ribs. While Vincent Chin was crumpled and bleeding on the pave-
ment, Ebens struck him again, directly on the skull. Vincent Chin
did not move. Two off-duty Highland Park police officers were
among the two dozen or so people in or near the McDonald's who
watched the entire scene as Ebens continued to bash the unconscious
Chin. The officers ran out and ordered Ebens to drop his bat."'
Vincent Chin was taken to Henry Ford Hospital, losing con-
sciousness several times en route. He suffered lacerations on the
back left side of his head and abrasions on his shoulder, chest and
neck. He lapsed into a severe coma, and after emergency surgery, his
brain ceased functioning entirely. On June 23, 1982 at 9:50 p.m., the
ventilator was removed and Vincent Chin was pronounced dead.23
Wayne County, Michigan, prosecutors originally charged Ron-
ald Ebens, 43, and Michael Nitz, 23, with second-degree murder. 6
Ebens pleaded guilty to manslaughter prior to trial. Wayne County
Circuit Judge Charles Kaufman sentenced each man in March 1983
to three years probation and fined them $3780."3
Chinese American citizens formed American Citizens for Jus-
tice, an advocacy group to protest the perceived leniency in the
sentences and to raise awareness about the killing. After Judge
Kaufman rejected the group's request to change the sentence, the
committee appealed to the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate
the case for civil rights violations. Ebens and Nitz were indicted in
November 1983 on federal civil rights charges. m After a trial by jury,
233. Id. at 1427-28.
234. Id. at 1428.
235. Id.
236. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at 25.
237. Id. In Michigan, conviction of second-degree murder carries a maximum
penalty of life in prison, and manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of 15 years
in prison. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.317, 750.321 (West 1991); see also infra Part
Il (discussing Legal Formalism and Contextualized Reading of Criminal Law).
238. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1425-26; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at
25. There were two counts on the indictment. The first count alleged violation of 18
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Michael Nitz was acquitted and Ronald Ebens was found guilty and
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.29 Ronald Ebens appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that Ebens was
denied a fair trial and reversed his conviction on the basis of errors
in rulings made by the district court.2' The case was remanded for
retrial, and Ebens' motion for change of venue to the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio was granted.2 41 When the case was retried in Cincinnati,
Ohio, in 1987, the jury found that the assault was not racially moti-
vated. Ronald Ebens was acquitted.2
U.S.C. § 241 (1988), charging conspiracy to deprive Vincent Chin of his civil rights.
The second count alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(F) (1988), which provides:
(b) "Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of
force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with...
(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and
because he is or has been...
(F) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which pro-
vides lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom,
lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility which serves the public and
which is principally engaged in selling food or beverages for consumption on
the premises, or of any gasoline station, or of any motion picture house,
theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or any other place of exhibition or
entertainment which serves the public, or of any other establishment which
serves the public and (i) which is located within the premises of any of the
aforesaid establishments or within the premises of which is physically located
any of the aforesaid establishments, and (ii) which holds itself out as serving
patrons of such establishments; shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results... shall be fined
under this title, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death
results... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years
or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
239. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at 25.
240. One of the major reasons for the reversal involved the existence of tape re-
cordings that Ebens' lawyers subpoenaed from the American Citizens for Justice
(ACJ) which seemed to indicate that the group sought to influence the witnesses to
tell a consistent story on the stand. According to the court of appeals, on the tapes,
the attorney for ACJ, Lisa Chan, could be heard apparently trying to coax Choi,
Koivu and Sirosky to corroborate each other's statements. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1430-31,
1442-45 (discussion of transcripts and tapes).
241. United States v. Ebens, 654 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
242. In addition to marked demographic differences between Detroit and Cincin-
nati, Cincinnati citizens were not aware of the degree of antipathy toward Asian
Americans and particularly toward Japanese auto imports in the Detroit area in the
early 1980s. These factors, possibly compounded by confusion about the elements for
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (1988), may have accounted for the acquittal. See
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at 26; CHAN, supra note 42, at 176-78;
see also M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for
Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1855 (1993)
(discussing choice of venue decisions within the context of racially charged cases,
such
as the Rodney King case, and proposing that federal and state legislatures enact
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Although the outlined facts in the Vincent Chin case were not in
dispute,3 central questions remain concerning the motivation for
the killing and the operation of the criminal justice system under
which Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz pled guilty to lesser charges
and ultimately evaded substantial penalties for the killing of Vincent
Chin. The next section examines these issues as they are presented in
Who Killed Vincent Chin? The pedagogical value of the film also is
explored as an interactive medium to examine criminal law homi-
cide doctrine in a contextualized discourse based on the events
culminating in Vincent Chin's death.
A. Pedagogical Perspectives
Legal educational methods have come under sharp criticism for
various reasons. Many of the criticisms focus on adherence to the
reformulation of American legal education in 1870 by Christopher
Columbus Langdell, the dean of the Harvard Law School. Langdell
declared the study of law to be a science that was to be taught from
old English cases, in chronological order, primarily in Socratic
dialogue.2" Langdell's most far-reaching reform was the intro-
duction of the case method for teaching law. According to the
method, the teacher became a Socratic guide to the excavation of
concepts and principles buried within the cases.24" Although the
Langdell school dominated legal education in the first half of the
twentieth century,2" there were early criticisms of the method as
being unsuitable for developing good lawyers. For some critics, the
Langdellian method severed the connections between the study of
law and American political, social, and economic policies. In short,
statutes which require consideration of demographic similarities of the alternative
site in choice of venue decisions, beyond the traditional factors of cost, convenience,
and the degree of publicity).
243. In claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 245 (1988) in the subsequent civil rights trial, Ronald Ebens essentially admitted the
physical facts of the assault; however, he denied that there were any racial motiva-
tions attending his conduct. See Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1428.
244. John Henry Schlegel, Searching for Archimedes-Legal Education, Legal Scholar-
ship, and Liberal Ideology, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 103, 104-05 (1984) (citing ROBERT B.
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s
(1983)). After Harvard's adoption of the Langdellian method, early converts were
Northwestern, Columbia, Western Reserve, Cornell, Stanford, and the University of
Chicago. See LAWRENCE M. FREEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 612-15 (1985).
245. FRIEDMAN, supra note 244, at 612-13. Professor Friedman also notes that
Langdell was not the first to teach through cases. John Norton Pomeroy used a case
method at New York University Law School in the 1860s. However, Pomeroy did not
"shape the whole program of a leading school" with this technique. See id. at 513,
n.20 (quoting J. WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 261 (1950)).
246. FRIEDMAN, supra note 244, at 593.
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the legacy of Langdell is that law became divorced from society and
life.247
These and other criticisms led to a search for alternatives to the
Langdellian method. One significant alternative was the Legal Real-
ism movement. Legal realists rejected the work of nineteenth
century judges and scholars, with their emphasis on legal logic and
purity of concepts. Instead, the legal realists were concerned with
the actual value and use of legal rules. Under this approach, law had
to be a working tool; it also had to be regarded as such.2 Oliver
Wendell Holmes' oft-quoted edict that "[t]he life of the law has not
247. The Langdellian method continues to predominate in legal education and
maintains many proponents. Considering criticisms of the Langdellian method, one
can also acknowledge that "appellate opinions can serve as an especially useful ve-
hicle for the education of sentiment as well as to teach the importance of
approaching abstract principles skeptically." See Terrance Sandalow, The Moral Re-
sponsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 163 (1984). As Dean Sandalow argues:
Appellate opinions... report only carefully selected facts, and even those are
often stated in highly abstract fashion; they are, for that reason, implausible
vehicles for conveying a sense of the variousness and complexity of life. But
though it is true that the opinions are written in that way, it does not follow
that they must be read in the same way. A skillful teacher will lead students
to read opinions imaginatively, with attention to the human possibilities that
lie beneath their abstract language. The exploration of these possibilities,
conjoined with consideration of their implications for judgment, offers oppor-
tunity for developing that fusion of feeling and intellect we call sensibility.
Id. at 172. In this regard, Dean Sandalow emphasizes two points:
First, legal education can dull sensibility as well as enlarge it. A failure to de-
vote class time to probing beneath the abstract language that judicial opinions
typically-and statutes invariably-employ conveys to students the lesson
that emotion and the complexities of life are irrelevant to law. And by leading
students during a formative intellectual period to think only in abstract cate-
gories, legal education can dull both feeling and their sensitivity to
complexity. But a second point needs also to be recognized. The appropriate
objective is not the release of feeling, but its education. This . . .requires
bringing feeling into contact with the full range of life's possibilities, but it
also requires that it be brought into contact with those general ideas we call
knowledge.
Id.; see also Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL.
L. REV. 517 (1991) (suggesting modifications to Langdell's case method of teaching
that would synthesize both practical lawyering skills and intellectual abstraction).
248. The works of Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and Arthur Corbin epitomize
legal realist scholarship. FRIEDMAN, supra note 244, at 591-93. Judicial adherents in-
clude Chief Justice Earl Warren, during whose Supreme Court tenure, as Professor
Friedman states, "overruling became positively epidemic." Id. at 592. For representa-
tive works, see, e.g., Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947);
Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 651 (1935).
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been logic; it has been experience," best captures the realists' phi-
losophy.249 As Professor Elizabeth Mensch states:
The realists urged judges to eschew the rigid, abstract for-
malism of constitutionally protected property and contract
rights in favor of increasing deference to the legislative
adjustment of competing claims, enacted in the service of a
larger "public interest." Meanwhile, in private law, en-
lightened, progressive judges should be willing to sacrifice
rigid adherence to the logic of doctrine for the sake of do-
ing a more commonsense and overtly policy-oriented
"justice within the particular context of each case. ''
Other responses to legal educators' dissatisfaction with the case
method have included a variety of methods designed to incorporate
realism into the study of law."' Most notably, clinical education,
simulation, and problem methods emerged to meet these goals.
Although the earliest legal education followed a clinical educa-
tion model, that is, an apprenticeship in which the clerking attorney
worked under the direction of a more experienced attorney, clinical
education has remained controversial since its resurgence in the
1960s.f2 Professor Robert Dinerstein states that:
249. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
250. Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 13,21 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
251. With respect to this effort, Professor Melvyn Zarr observes:
Students rightly sense that the meaning of legal concepts is intimately tied to
the workings of the legal process and that whatever the appellate court
decides has real meaning only if understood in the context of the entire case.
The students rightly sense that a great deal has happened in the case before
the appellate stage, and that, if a retrial is ordered, more is yet to come....
There is demonstrable need for delving more deeply into the process and
rationale of trial and appeal. But this is subordinated to the need for
"coverage." . . . The professor will try to fill in the blanks .... But for the
students, never having been exposed to a whole case, it is an uphill struggle.
Melvyn Zarr, Learning Criminal Law Through the Whole Case Method, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
697 (1984).
252. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law
Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 465-66 & nn.7-10 (1995).
For a brief history of clinical legal education, see id. at 465-71. Although it would
seem that few would dispute the obvious benefits of students learning through clini-
cal legal education methodology, since the case method gained primacy in legal
education, "hands-on" methodologies became intellectually suspect in many quar-
ters. Many writers have explicated the falseness of such dichotomous valuations of
legal learning and knowledge-skills versus analysis--and have explained that these
forms of learning and pedagogy form a continuum of complementary opportunities
for legal education. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal
Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87 (1990); Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in
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To many people, the relationship between clinical pro-
grams and the justice mission of American law schools is
so clear as to be self-evident .... Indeed, for many law
students, the law clinic may be the only place in which con-
cerns about 2ustice are discussed and, at least sometimes,
acted upon.
For all of its attributes, however, clinical legal education cannot
meet all of the demands to provide authentic lawyering experi-
ences, 2  particularly when many clinical educators and programs
remain marginalized within their institutions. 5 Thus, time con-
straints and student-teacher ratios often limit the extent of clinical
offerings in an institution. These factors, compounded by ever-
present fiscal concerns, call for expanded opportunities for students
to obtain experiential learning.
The problem method of instruction is frequently used in law
schools, particularly in advanced courses. As described by propo-
nents, theoXroblem method is a "major alternative to case method
teaching." Professor Gregory Ogden defines the method by what is
required of the student: "The student is expected 'to focus his study
on a problem or problems posed in advance of the class. His task is
to wrestle with each problem drawing on whatever material may
have been assigned to be studied in connection with it.' "M There are
disadvantages associated with the problem method, however. As
Professor Ogden observes, the problem method is time-consuming
Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 HASrINGS L.J. 1187 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A
Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1599 (1991); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the
Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992); Mark
Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34
UCLA L. REV. 577 (1987).
253. Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the Justice Mission, 40 CLEv. ST. L.
REV. 469, 469 (1992).
254. See James M. Brown, Simulation Teaching: A Twenty-Second Semester Report, 34
J. LEGAL EDUc. 638, 639 (1984) (discussing selected benefits of simulation in compari-
son to clinical programs).
255. Boswell, supra note 252, at 1192-93; see also Donald Schon, Educating the Re-
flective Legal Practitioner, CLINICAL L. REV. 231 (1995) (discussing the historical status
of clinical legal educators); Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic,
42 J. LEGAL EDUc. 508, 512 (1992) (describing the variety of clinical educational offer-
ings and the consensus amongst programs on the nine primary goals of clinical
education).
256. Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
654, 654 (1984); see also Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach
with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUc. 241 (1992); Stephen Nathanson, The Role of Problem
Solving in Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1989); Charles R. Calleros, Varia-
tions on the Problem Method in First-Year and Upper Division Classes, 20 U.S.F. L. REV.
455 (1986).
257. Ogden, supra note 256, at 654-55 (footnote omitted).
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for instructors and students; like the clinical programs, small classes
work best for this pedagogy, but that is an expensive proposition,
and preparing problems requires specialized skill. Furthermore, this
method raises questions of potential compromises in course cover-
age and is less real than simulation or clinical courses.m
The use of simulation exercises has been widely adopted in
clinical courses;.. increasinly they are being incorporated into tra-
ditional classroom settings. However, several difficulties arise with
the simulation model. As noted by Professor Andrew Taslitz:
Specifically, it has been suggested that: (1) the time re-
quired to draft a good simulation is not worth its benefits;
(2) some faculty members are uncomfortable teaching par-
ticular skills at which they may have had little practice; (3)
simulation is a time-consuming exercise which may cut
into time necessary to achieve other course goals; and (4)
simulations are difficult to conduct in a large class."6'
More recently, however, critics have identified more pervasive
problems throughout legal education. The traditional guise of value-
neutral principles which permeates legal education has been
disclosed by legal educators and scholars who call for more critical
and contextualized analyses of law and its operation in society. As
Professor Peter Shane states: "The values and practices of most
academic communities in this country still predominantly reflect a
set of experiences and expectations most associated in our culture
with white, mainstream, Protestant, heterosexual, elite men. These
258. Id. at 664-66.
259. See Stacy Caplow, Autopsy of a Murder: Using Simulation to Teach First Year
Criminal Law, 19 N.M. L. REV. 137 (1989) (describing the reliance on simulation exer-
cises in clinical programs to accomplish several goals, including teaching legal
process and specific skills to universalize the students' experiences, to emphasize
critical decision making, and to raise professional responsibility and values con-
cerns).
260. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 254, at 638; Caplow, supra note 259 (describing the
development of an elaborate simulation exercise for first year students in a criminal
law course).
261. Andrew E. Taslitz, Exorcising Langdell 's Ghost: Structuring a Criminal Procedure
Casebook for How Lawyers Really Think, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143, 168-69 & nn.109-13,
(citing THOMAS E. GUERNSEY, PROBLEMS AND SIMULATIONS IN EVIDENcE: IN-
STRUCTOR'S MANUAL at iii-iv (1991) (referring to Thomas Guernsey's approach to
resolving these issues)). Professor Stacy Caplow expressed similar reservations: "I
am not wholly convinced that the project added to the depth and breadth of the stu-
dents' knowledge of substantive criminal law to justify the extra time and effort
required of all the participants." Caplow, supra note 259, at 138.
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experiences and expectations are, indeed, so predominant that they
are often claimed falsely to embody neutrality."'62
Critical legal scholars26 begin from the premise that identity,
perspective, and context matter. Across disciplines, critical legal
scholars challenge the claims of objectivity, and claims of knowledge
and power as universal. Identifying the bias(es) in purportedly
neutral principles requires intellectual vigilance. It means, among
other concerns, ferreting out implications based on gender,
2
" class,
262. Peter M. Shane, Why Are So Many People So Unhappy? Habits of Thought and
Resistance to Diversity in Legal Education, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1990).
263. By "critical legal scholars," I do not mean to refer exclusively to the "Critical
Legal Studies" (CLS) movement in legal education. As described by Professor David
Trubek, the goals of the CLS movement are to "expose the assumptions that underlie
judicial and scholarly resolution of such issues, to question the presuppositions
about law and society of those whose intellectual product is being analyzed, and to
examine the subtle effects these products have in shaping legal and social conscious-
ness." David M. Trubek Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REv. 575,588-89 (1984).
However, despite its value in critiquing the underlying assumptions in the
law, CLS has been criticized for its own theoretical shortsightedness in failing to ob-
serve intersectional analyses, such as issues of race and gender. See, e.g., Robin D.
Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical
Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1868 (1990); Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1369 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301
(1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal
Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory
for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 103 (1987).
Furthermore, CLS has been duly criticized for paying scant attention to sub-
stantial areas of legal doctrine, particularly criminal law. As Professor Kathryn
Russell notes:
Given the apparent charge and worth of a critical legal critique, it is surpris-
ing that critical legal scholars have focused so little of their attention upon
criminal law.... [T]he relative omission of criminal law from the critical legal
scholars' scrutiny is particularly glaring given the seminal role criminal law
plays in the American legal system.
Katheryn K. Russell, A Critical View from the Inside: An Application of Critical Legal
Studies to Criminal Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 222, 223-24 (1994). In accord
with the purposes of this article, Professor Russell argues that "[i]t is precisely the
importance of criminal law to the social order which necessitates its close scrutiny."
Id. at 226.
264. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 191 (1990); Mary I. Coombs, Non-Sexist Teaching Techniques in
Substantive Law Courses, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 507 (1990); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Ann E. Freedman, Feminist
Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism and Homophobia in Law School, 4 GA.
L. REV. 849 (1990); Goldfarb, supra note 252; Harris, supra note 14; Menkel-Meadow,
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sexuality,26 ableism," and of course, race in ostensibly neutral prin-
ciples and practices of law. In feminist legal theory, for example, the
sine qua non is consciousness-raising and questioning express and
implied male norms in legal reasoning and practices.2
Critical race scholarship, then, is equally distinctive by its chal-
lenge to purportedly normative values underpinning legal doctrine.
Like other forms of critical legal theory, critical race theory ad-
vances the contexts, perspectives, and entrenched hierarchies within
the law. Articulating the need for a critical race analysis, Professor
Kimberl6 Crenshaw argues:
Racism is a central ideological underpinning of American
society. Critical scholars who focus on legal consciousness
supra note 263; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617
(1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
265. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988); Regina Austin & Sharon
Dietrich, Employer Abuse of Low-Status Workers: The Possibility of Uncommon Relief from
the Common Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 250, at 350; Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 250, at
38; Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 250, at 61.
266. See Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians Gays, and Feminist Legal
Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Nar-
ratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent? The Need to
Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 513 (1993); Leigh
Megan Leonard, A Missing Voice in Feminist Legal Theory: The Heterosexual Presump-
tion, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39 (1990); RIJTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT) LAW:
SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992); Sharon E. Rush, Sexual Orientation: A Plea
for Inclusion, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 69 (1995); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Speaking Its
Name: Sexual Orientation and the Pursuit of Academic Diversity, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 121
(1992); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992);
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," "Gender, "and "Sexual Orientation " in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
267. See Nasa Begum, Disabled Women and the Feminist Agenda, 40 FEMINIST REV. 70
(1992); Keri K. Gould, And Equal Protection for All... The Americans with Disabilities
Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 123 (1993-94); Deirdre M. Smith, Comment,
Confronting Silence: The Constitution, Deaf Criminal Defendants, and the Right to Inter-
pretation during Trial, 46 ME. L. REV. 87 (1994); Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to
Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245
(1994) (reviewing JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993)); Barbara Faye Waxman, Hatred: The Unacknow-
ledged Dimension in Violence against Disabled People, 9 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 185
(1991).
268. By asking what Professor Katharine Bartlett calls "the woman question,"
male-based normative assumptions are investigated for the inclusion (or exclusion)
of women's perspectives, life experiences, and other factors which lend context to
analysis and understanding. The authority of lived experiences becomes a measure
of the authenticity of the law. Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 829, 837-49 (1990); see also Goldfarb, supra note 252, at 1626; Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 264.
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alone thus fail to address one of the most crucial ideologi-
cal components of the dominant order. The CLS practice of
delegitimating false and constraining ideas must include
race consciousness if the accepted object is to transcend
oppressive belief systems. 269
Critical race scholars have identified several defining elements
of the genre: (1) "recogniz[ing] that racism is endemic to American
life"; (2) "[expressing] skepticism toward dominant legal claims of
neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy"; (3)
"challenging ahistoricism and insisting on a contextual/historical
analysis of the law"; (4) "insisting on recognition of the experiential
knowledge of people of color and our communities of origin in ana-
lyzing law and society"; (5) "[borrowing] from several traditions,
including liberalism, law and society, feminism, Marxism, poststruc-
turalism, critical legal theory, pragmatism, and nationalism"; and (6)
"[working] toward the end of eliminating racial oppression as part of
the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression . . . [as] experi-
enced by many in tandem with oppression on grounds of gender,
class, or sexual orientation."m
Yet, in fulfilling the mission to "ask the race question,"M critical
race scholars and scholarship have increasingly been criticized for
bipolar approaches to racial dilemmas embedded in law. Professor
Robert Chang asserts that "[c]ritical race theory ... claims that race
matters but.., has not yet shown how different races matter differ-
ently."2 To the extent that Professor Chang's observation reflects a
269. Crenshaw, supra note 263, at 1336 (footnote omitted); see also John 0. Cal-
more, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic
Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992); Richard Del-
gado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990).
270. CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, 1I, ET AL., Introduction to WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 6-7
(1993).
271. See Bartlett, supra note 268, at 837 (explaining "the woman question"). In
analogous fashion, critical race theorists ask "the race question."
272. Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1248 & n.13
(extending a challenge to critical race scholars to explore more fully the different
experiences of racism, particularly pertaining to Asian Americans). Professor Debo-
rah Ramirez observes that demographic changes from 1960 to 1990 reveal the steady
increase in Americans who identify as people of color. According to Professor
Ramirez, between 1980 and 1990, the Asian American population grew by 107.8%,
and the Latino population by 53%, while the number of non-Latino Whites increased
by only 6%. Ramirez, supra note 221, at 960. In 1960, Blacks comprised 96% of the
population of people of color. Increases in the Asian and Latino communities have
changed the demographics such that Blacks are currently about 50% of the popula-
tion of people of color. Id. at 962. With further projections that Latinos will be the
majority group of people of color in the United States in the 21st century, Professor
Ramirez concludes that " '[m]inority' [i]s [n]o [1longer a [s]ynonym for 'African-
[VOL. 1:2
Pedagogy of Vincent Chin
less inclusive exploration of racial and ethnic experiences within
critical analyses of law and society, it presents a challenge and an
opportunity to engage in a multifaceted critical discourse. This call
for expanded subjectivity on the issue of race in law must be heeded
throughout the range of legal affairs involving doctrinal develop-
ment, legal education, and law practice. Because the academy
maintains gatekeeper status on future involvement in most aspects
of legal affairs, multiple perspectives, pedagogical techniques, and
interactive learning experiences must become integral to the educa-
tional scheme. Thus, even without total rejection of the Langdellian
method and other pedagogical schools, it is clear that legal theory
and legal education must include more of the contexts in which law
shapes our lives, all of our lives.273
American.' "Id. at 960 & nn.12-16, 962 & nn.25-28; see also Hernndez Truyol, supra
note 15, at 373-74 & n.14 (stating that "[within the wealth of 'outsider jurisprudence']
there appears to be a void: a critique or analysis of the law from the particular per-
spective of Latinas'/os' experience").
As scholar Frank Wu proclaims, "The time has come to consider groups that
are neither black nor white in the jurisprudence on race." Wu, supra note 57, at 225.
He then proceeds to assert the following:
[B]ipolarity is an organizational scheme both imposed by and reflected in the
law. Bipolarity has been associated with essentialism in the conception of
race. Race is conceptualized as breaking down into two all-encompassing and
mutually exclusive categories, black and white. Race is further conceptual-
ized as biological fact, relatively immutable, always visible in skin color, and
a defining facet of a person. These trends toward bipolarity and essentialism
manifest themselves as white against black, majority against minority, or
American against foreign. Racial groups are conceived of as white, black,
honorary whites, or constructive blacks.
Id. at 248-49 (footnotes omitted).
Asian American legal scholars have been among the leading voices to raise
concerns regarding essentialist and bipolar racial analyses. See, e.g., ONE & WINANT,
supra note 38; Aoki, supra note 106; Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra
note 14; Chang, Meditation, supra note 14; Chon, supra note 42; Neil Gotanda, "Other
Non-Whites " in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLuM. L. REV.
1186 (1985) (reviewing IRONS, supra note 129); Gotanda, supra note 34; Gotanda, supra
note 44, at 1087; Sharon K. Hom, Engendering Chinese Legal Studies: Gatekeeping, Mas-
ter Discourses, and Other Challenges, 19 SIGNS 1020 (1994); Ikemoto, supra note 4; Lee,
supra note 36; Matsuda, supra note 175; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989).
273. In this regard, we would do well to embrace the words of activist educator
Angela Davis:
It is our responsibility to examine the rich histories of all of our sisters. In de-
ciding to define ourselves as "women of color" we assent to a unity which, in
turn, urges us to inform ourselves about those with whom we unite. We
rightfully claim that we have been relegated to the margins of history and
have been denied the opportunity... to acquire knowledge about ourselves.
By and large, the knowledge accessible to us has been determined in accor-
dance with race, gender, and class biases. Having challenged institutions of
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In criminal law, for instance, topics often seem facially neutral;
however, when viewed from the perspective of real-life experience,
the manner in which these topics are taught often expose them as
racially and culturally biased. As Dean Gregory Williams observes:
"The purpose of endorsing the 'objective view' is to attempt to create
an illusion that we have a relatively smoothly functioning criminal
justice system where judges, police, prosecutors and defense counsel
all reason in a similar manner and all share a common set of beliefs
and normative values."27 Furthermore, Socratic and other ap-
proaches to legal education that profess neutrality of legal principles
often alienate students of color and give an unrealistic worldview to
non-minority students.276 The consequences of such an allegiance to
"neutral" principles of law can be extensive, affecting students'
perspectives and their chances of academic and professional success.
The reliance on hidden or overt stereotypes in law school
examinations, for example, may seriously affect a student's psyche,
as well as his or her grade.27 In this way, harmful potential
learning for having relegated us to a state of invisibility, let us not replicate
this process among ourselves.
Angela Y. Davis, Keynote Address: Third National Conference on Women of Color and the
Law, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1991).
274. See Gregory Howard Williams, Teaching Criminal Law: "Objectivity" in Black
and White, 9 HARv. BLAcKLETrERJ. 27 (1992).
275. Id. at 29.
276. Other students who experience having "outsider" perspectives in the law
school environment also describe feelings of alienation from the material and meth-
ods of legal education. In a study of women law students at Yale, for instance, the
women attributed their silence in the classroom to "alienation from self, community,
the classroom, and the content of legal education." Sandra Janoff, The Influence of
Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REv. 193, 206 & n.83 (1991) (citing
Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1299 (1988)). The participants in the Yale study criticized the content of legal
education and complained that legal education was "too theoretical" and indifferent
to real-world issues, yet "not theoretical enough" and lacking in adequate "inquiry
into the social, historical, political, or economic underpinnings of the cases." Id. at
206 & nn.88-89 (quoting Weiss & Melling, supra, at 1347). Professor Taunya Banks'
work has also been instrumental in identifying the loci of the disaffection experi-
enced by women law students and students of color. See Taunya Lovell Banks,
Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527 (1990).
277. Professor Patricia Williams discusses the phenomenon of gratuitous refer-
ences to race, gender, and sexual orientation in law school examinations, finding that
when such human dilemmas and dimensions are not the subject of the problem, they
are reduced to the same racist, sexist, classist, homophobic, and ableist generaliza-
tions and stereotypes. Moreover, she recognizes, such uses place "an enormous
burden on black [and other marginalized] students ... who must assume, for the
sake of answering these questions, these things about themselves." PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, Crimes Without Passion, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A
LAW PROFESSOR 82 (1991). Illustrating her point, Professor Williams states:
[I]n the Othello problem, the exam is put in a frame where to contest those
subtly generalized "truths" (blacks are sexually dangerous, blacks are milita-
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ristic-would the Capulets or the Montagues ever be characterized as
"militaristic"?) is not only irrelevant but costs the student points: it is, accord-
ing to the model answer, necessary to argue that "a rough untutored Moor
might understandably be deceived by the wiles of a more sophisticated Euro-
pean." In other words, a student who refuses to or cannot think like a racist-
most people of color, I would guess-will receive a lower grade. My further
guess is that everyone, including perhaps the students of color, will rational-
ize this result away as an inability to "think like a lawyer."
Id.
From her survey of exams, Professor Williams concluded that the problems
drew their justifications from the "preference for the impersonal above the personal,
the 'objective' above the 'subjective.' Most of these problems require blacks, women
who have been raped, gays and lesbians, to not just re-experience their oppression,
but to write against their personal knowledge." Id. at 87. Upon compiling exams on a
variety of subjects, given at law schools around the country, Professor Williams
found:
& a tax exam that asks students to calculate the tax implications for Kunta
Kinte's master when the slavecatchers cut off his foot;
* a securities-regulation exam in which the professor muses about whether
white-collar defendants should go to jail, since "unlike ghetto kids" they are
not equipped to fare in that environment;
e a constitutional law exam in which students are given the lengthy text of a
hate-filled polemic entitled "How to Be a Jew-Nigger" and then told to use the
first amendment to defend it;
* a description of the "typical criminal" as a "young black male with an I.Q.
of 87 who is one of eight children and has always lived on welfare and who
spends his time hanging out in pool halls with his best friend Slick";
e numerous criminal law exams whose questions feature exclusively black or
Hispanic or Asian criminals and exclusively white victims;
* many questions depicting gay men as the exclusive spreaders of AIDS,
asking students to find the elements of murder;
* many, many questions in which women are beaten, raped, and killed in
descriptions pornographically detailed (in contrast to streamlined questions,
by the same professors, that do not involve female victims).
Id. at 84-85.
The phenomenon that Professor Williams has discussed may be more wide-
spread than previously imagined. Law school can be a particularly anger-producing
and painful experience for students who find negative characterizations of them-
selves as inculcated into exams, as well as in classroom experiences. See Paula C.
Johnson, The Role of Minority Faculty in the Recruitment and Retention of Students of
Color, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1075 (1992). Also, as Professor Leslie Espinoza has dem-
onstrated, testing biases occur prior to law school attendance, and indeed, may
greatly affect such entry. Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U.
J. GENDER & L. 121, 134 (1993) ("The [LSAT] can keep you out of law school, it can
determine which law school you attend, and it can greatly affect the way you feel
about yourself and your potential for success while in law school .... For many stu-
dents, the LSAT is their first official contact with the study of law and the
construction of legal professionalism. The questions within the test often present a
social world view that excludes outsider test takers....").
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occasioned by the gratuitous use of race, class, gender and sexuality
into the curriculum also must be recognized. As Professor Patricia
Williams instructs, "[W]hat we write into exams, as much as what
we teach, conveys stereotypes, delimits the acceptable, and
formulates ideals.'"
Of course, race and its constructions have always been more
complex than the Black-White paradigm.' Because of this historical
truth and present demographic reality regarding racial and ethnic
diversity, it is more important than ever to increase knowledge and
dialog about the effects of social and legal constructions of all people
of color in American society. As an African American woman law
professor, I find it necessary to pursue such theoretical understand-
ing and pedagogical efforts as part of my responsibility and
commitment to increase my own and my students' knowledge about
distinctive ways in which law, particularly criminal law, denotes the
relative value of citizens' lives through constructions of identity.
°
This article undertakes these challenges through its deconstruc-
tion of the Vincent Chin case for analytical and pedagogical
purposes. Hence, my discussion of Who Killed Vincent Chin? springs
from a commitment to multidimensional discourse, and entails
analysis of the doctrine and application of criminal law when Asian
American identity is implicated. The multidimensional approach, as
I view it, must incorporate more inclusiveness of "other" perspec-
tives and greater attention toward methodologies that can effectuate
increased awareness of the interactions between legal institutions
and those whose subjectivity long has been ignored throughout legal
discourses. As Professor Berta Hernndez Truyol demonstrates in
her discussion of the "multidimensionality" of Latinas'/os' lives, the
commitment to the multidimensional approach is essential, not
simply desirable, in order to improve the lives of all peoples:
278. WILLIAMS, supra note 277, at 85.
279. Frank Wu notes that:
Even on its own terms, race has never been a black and white matter. There
have always been as many shades of black and brown as there have been in-
dividuals who identified themselves, or were identified by others, by that
concept. There have always been Native Americans, Chicanos, and Asian
immigrants.
Wu, supra note 57, at 251 (footnote omitted); see also Ramirez, supra note 221, at 964-
69 (discussing the implications of increasing numbers of Americans who claim mul-
tiracial identities on legal programs "which rely on simplistic racial classifications").
280. See Judy Scales-Trent, Using Literature in Law School: The Importance of Reading
and Telling Stories, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 91 (1992) (discussing the development of
a seminar focusing on the experiences of women of color in the law and asking,
"Were the issues for all women of color similar to each other? Different? Finding and
exploring these issues was the aim of this course.").
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The problems and misunderstandings that result from
analysis of complex conduct and peoples through a sim-
plistic single-lens perspective can be solved ... if we trade
in the monocle for a prism that allows a multidimensional
perspective that will result in an analytical framework that
can accommodate the complexities of our society ...
Rarely can we find the best answer... by asking only one
obvious question, such as "What is the effect of a practice
on an ethnic group?" Rather we will reach the better reso-
lution by asking many questions, including questions that
address the conflation of traits."'
My analysis of the socio-legal circumstances surrounding Vin-
cent Chin's death embraces the insights of critical legal studies
disciplines, including, but not limited to, critical race theory and
feminist legal theory. It is an interdisciplinary analysis that deliber-
ately "looks for the coercive and hidden assumptions embedded in
law, and values the multiple consciousness of the disempowered. '282
In agreement with Paulo Freire that "[e]ducation of a liberating
character is a process by which the educator invites learners to rec-
ognize and unveil reality critically," the use of the film Who Killed
Vincent Chin? appealed to me as ideal for pursuing the goal of exam-
ining criminal law doctrine in a context that would reveal, among
other critical perspectives, the racial implications of law from the
standpoint of Asian Americans. In addition, the film provided the
opportunity to gain a macro and micro perspective on the connec-
tions among legal doctrine, factual analysis, legal analysis, and legal
processes. In this regard, it is also important that students appreciate
the connections between each stage of the criminal process, and not
simply the appellate stage, in order to foster their recognition that
earlier stages of criminal process are often more critical than the ap-
pellate stage with which law students become accustomed.
Finally, for pedagogical purposes, Professor Paul Baier's appeal
also resonates. As he states: "Cases alone are not enough.... Yet as I
cover the terrain of teaching materials . . . I see mainly cases, cases,
and more cases .... The tapes add a vital advocacy component to
our learning [and] also teach the usual analytical skills, and in a
manner far superior to the printed page. '' "
281. HemAndez Truyol, supra note 15, at 382, 431.
282. Matsuda, supra note 175, at 1330.
283. PAULO FREIRE, THE POLIcs OF EDUCATION 100-02 (Donald Macedo trans.,
1985).
284. Paul R..Baier, What Is the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619, 621, 632 (1984). Indeed, there is a burgeoning interest in the
creative use of film in legal education. While film and film technology have long
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B. Scenes from Who Killed Vincent Chin?2
WOMAN'S VOICE: The jukebox was sitting here... back here.
You can see the mirrors and the lockers where they would get
ready for their dance. Then one of the girls would perform three
dances: the first one in their outfits and the last two had to be
topless.
RONALD EBENS (Defendant): I'm no racist. I've never been
a racist.
LILY CHIN (Mother of Vincent Chin): I got off the boat dur-
ing the first month of the lunar calendar of 1948. We lived and
worked in a basement laundry. Highland Park was high class
back then but when the neighbors' kids saw us in the basement
they made ugly faces. They stuck out their tongues and made as if
to slit our throats. When I first came here I didn 't know much of
anything! So my husband like to take me to new places. We went
been used in clinical education programs, there is a growing recognition of the value
of film in other areas of the curriculum. As Professor Rennard Strickland notes,
"There is a long history of law in film." Rennard Strickland, Using Popular Culture to
Raise Social Justice Issues, Remarks at the Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools (Jan. 1994) (tape of conference available at AALS; handouts on file with
the author). Professor Strickland's slide presentation of movies having legal themes
included: Inherit the Wind; To Kill a Mockingbird; Twelve Angry Men; A Man for All
Seasons; The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance; The Verdict; Career Woman; Adam's Rib; and
a number of other titles. Professor Strickland also discussed his slide collection enti-
tled, Depictions of Native Americans in Film.
On the same panel, Professor Michelle Jacobs also discussed her use of popu-
lar television shows, such as Cops, Law and Order, 20/20, 48 Hours, and Day One, to
explore topics in criminal procedure, evidence and ethics. Michelle Jacobs, Teaching
Law Through Pop Culture, Remarks at the Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools (Jan. 6, 1994) (tape of conference available at AALS; handouts on file
with the author); see generally Christine Alice Corcos, Columbo Goes to Law School: Or,
Some Thoughts on the Uses of Television in the Teaching of Law, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 499
(1993).
285. I want to thank director Christine Choy for providing a transcript of Who
Killed Vincent Chin?, which is on file with the author, and for giving generous time
for an interview during the preparation of this article.
Who Killed Vincent Chin? has received numerous awards and recognition-
including an Academy Award nomination, 1989; Best Film, Global Village Documen-
tary Festival, 1988; Best Documentary, Hawaii International Film Festival, 1988-and
has been shown to worldwide audiences, including those at the San Francisco Film
Festival, the Montreal World Film Festival; Sundance Film Festival; and the United
States Film Festival. The film runs 82 minutes, and is available from Filmmakers
Library, 124 East 40th Street, New York, NY 10016. It originally aired for general
audiences in the United States on PBS television stations in June 1989; the PBS broad-
cast featured an interview with director Christine Choy and producer Renee Tajima
following the film.
[VOL. 1:2
Pedagogy of Vincent Chin
to see a baseball game but when people saw Chinese sitting there
they kicked us and cursed at us. I never went back.
FRANK EAMAN (Defense Attorney): Ron Ebens is guilty of
having too much to drink, being a macho man who wouldn't back
down from a fight and wanted to avenge his stepson. And he's
guilty of letting himself go too far and killing somebody with a
baseball bat. A serious crime no doubt .... He is not guilty of
doing this because of racial animus or racial feelings or racial bias
or racial prejudice. It so happens the person he was involved with
was Chinese.
JUDGE CHARLES KAUFMAN (Wayne County Circuit
Court): The victim lingered for four days, which again, based
upon everything was indicative to me that they attempted to
administer a punishment. They did this too severely, in careless
disregard of human life, which is what manslaughter is. And
that's what they were found guilty of and that's what I predi-
cated my sentence on. Had it been a brutal murder of course these
fellas would be in jail now.
HELEN ZIA (American Citizens for Justice): The one thing
that has pulled together through sheer concern all Asian Ameri-
cans in this country and brought press and soforthfrom overseas
and ... concern from overseas, is the belief that Vincent Chin
would be alive today if he were not Asian. And there is no ques-
tion about that in any of our minds.
STARLENE (Fancy Pants Dancer): Yeah, we all were sur-
prised that they didn't come to us and ask us what happened.
You know, all the dancers were like shocked.
OFFICER MORRIS COTTON: When you have two police offi-
cers as eyewitnesses to any type of, I believe both officers should
have been notified for court. Both officers should have [gone] to
court and both officers should have been notified of any plea bar-
gaining. In this matter we were, I would have to say, maybe the
last to know.
HELEN ZIA: They didn't even know that the sentencing was
going to take place. One friend, one family friend was able to find
out that day and was present at the sentencing. And he was to-
tally shocked by the outcome of the sentencing. When it happened
he says he stood there and.., is this it? You know. Isn't anybody
else going to be allowed to say anything?
MIDDLE-AGED ASIAN AMERICAN MAN: I got involved
because actually in looking at it, here are two complete strangers
who... they can do something like that and get away with it on
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probation when just the other day a man on a negligent homicide
or manslaughter got 15 years. Being able to see the possible
manifestations with my own children I thought we ought to do
something to send a message out.
RACINE (Fancy Pants Dancer): I turned around and I heard.
• . Mr. Ebens say something about the little motherfucker and
Vincent said I'm not a little motherfucker. And he [Ebens] said I
don't know if you 're a big one or a little one. Then he said some-
thing about well because of ya 'll motherfuckers we're out of work.
CNN DETROIT REPORTER: Ebens and Nitz now face ar-
raignment in Federal District Court and will stand trial on
charges they conspired to violate the civil rights of Vincent Chin.
If convicted both face life terms in prison.
RON EBENS: In the first place when you hear them say your
name versus the United States of America . .. it's kind of a heavy
feeling, you know. Especially when you served in the army,
know. You had your feelings of loyalty to the country and it's like
they're saying, you know, we're against you. That's hard to take.
Especially when you know that the charges are fabricated.
HELEN ZIA: All ACJ (American Citizens for Justice) and the
many people who supported us in this case ever wanted was to
have this case looked at in a court of law the way it should've
been the first time.
OFFICER MICHAEL GARDENHIRE: I couldn't say if it was
premeditated. It could have been. I would say that the instance
that the problem started, which was down at the Fancy Pants,
and I don't know what happened down there. There was enough
time for them to cool off. Whatever it was. But I think that Mr.
Ebens and Mr. Nitz stalked Jimmy Choi and Vincent Chin.
JUROR (Federal Civil Rights Trial): The problem with his
[Ronald Ebens '] testimony was that his memory was very selec-
tive. He had a lot to drink the night of the killing and he testified
that he didn't remember many details of the evening. But when
asked about various racial remarks that other witnesses said they
had heard he said he was sure that he didn't say these things.
And that was received very skeptically by the jury. We felt his
memory was too selective.
FRANK EAMAN: When they read through the verdict it was
not guilty, not guilty, not guilty, guilty. When they got through
three not guilties, boy, we thought, "God we did it." Did we do
this and then when they said the fourth guilty it was sort of like
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the anvil fell that we were always waiting for it was gonna
fall.
We're absolutely going to appeal it. The case is not over yet.
REPORTER: Outrage. That is the cry coming from the metro
Detroit's Chinese American community this evening. A federal
appeals court has ordered a new trial for Ronald Ebens. He's the
man convicted of beating Vincent Chin to death with a baseball
bat four years ago. Eyewitness news reporter Al Alan says the
new trial was ordered because of trial errors.
LILY CHIN: I ask you, how would you feel as a mom?
Please, I want everybody... appeal the government do not drop
this case. I want justice for Vincent. I want justice for my son.
Documentary filmmakers Christine Choy2 and Renee Tajima2
became aware of the Vincent Chin case in 1984, having learned
286. Christine Choy is chairperson of the New York University Film School, at the
Tisch School for the Arts. She was born Chai Ming Huei, to a Korean father and a
Chinese mother. Her documentary films explore the relationships between women
and people of color and American society. Her films include Sa-I-Gu, which recorded
the perspectives of four Korean women after the Los Angeles rebellion following the
first "Rodney King" trial. Mississippi Triangle focuses on Chinese laborers who were
brought to the Delta from the West after the Civil War to replace emancipated slaves.
See Martin Johnson, A Mississippi Triangle: Chinese, Blacks and Mr. Charlie, NEW
AMSTERDAM NEWS, June 16, 1984, at 22. Bittersweet Survival focuses on the migration
of Southeast Asian (primarily Vietnamese) refugees to the United States, the difficul-
ties of their transition to a culture with new customs, language, and laws, and the
exploitation faced by refugee workers. To Love, Honor, and Obey addresses violence
against women. Sisters on the Inside examines women inmates' experiences in New
York, North Carolina, and Illinois prison institutions. Homes Apart: Two Koreas exam-
ines the lives of Korean Americans, who are generally represented on film less than
Chinese and Japanese Americans. From Spikes to Spindles focuses on life in New York
City's Chinatown and larger issues in Chinese Americans' experiences.
287. Renee Tajima is a third-generation Japanese American. She was born in Chi-
cago and raised in Southern California. She studied filmmaking at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and was a film critic for The Village Voice. In discussing the
motivation for her work, Renee Tajima states that she had been told by producers
that "the political documentary [was] dead." According to her, however, "for Asian
Americans it [was] just beginning." James Minor, Oscar Nomination for Vincent Chin
Film, ASIAN WK., Feb. 24, 1989, at 1, 10. Further impetus for her involvement in the
"Vincent Chin" film stemmed from her family's history. During World War H, her
mother was interned at Heart Mountain, Wyoming, and her father served in the U.S.
armed forces. Shortly before the Vincent Chin incident her own brother was killed in
a racial riot in California. Kay Bourne, Boston Producer Explores Racism in Documentary
Film, BAY ST. BANNER (Boston), July 20,1989, at 14.
Her collaboration with Christine Choy on Vincent Chin "started out to be a 15-
minute piece that would raise awareness about anti-Asian feelings." Id. "After we got
to Detroit and talked to some of the people," Tajima recalled, "we realized there was
much more to the story than two whites killing a Chinese guy. It was more than an
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about the predominantly Asian American organization Americans
Citizens for Justice from a New York Times news clipping. Accord-
ing to director Christine Choy, "We wanted to present the story in its
whole context-how it was interwoven into American culture, point
out the contradictions within society, how different races are viewed
and who becomes the scapegoat. We wanted to make a good film
that would tell the story and become a part of American history." 9
Moreover, the filmmakers endeavored "to disjel the image of the
Asian as either a noble victim or noble savage."
The effectiveness of the documentary film form lies in its ability
to make viewers literally "see" issues in need of attention. Documen-
taries provoke and encourage response, shape and challenge
attitudes and assumptions. As one film scholar has stated, "[W]hen
documentaries are at their best, a sense of urgency is created....
Such films have a powerful, pervasive impact."21 Pioneering docu-
mentary filmmaker Paul Rotha regards the medium "as a powerful,
if not the most powerful, instrument for social influence today....
Hence, the nonfiction film has been best described as "the creative
interpretation of actuality."293
Who Killed Vincent Chin? is in the documentary film genre of
cinema verit6, and more particularly, it is in the mode of interactive
documentary filmmaking.294 Regarding Who Killed Vincent Chin?, di-
rector Christine Choy opines:
isolated incident." Serena Chen, Vincent Chin Lives on in Documentary of His Murder,
S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 16, 1988, at D8.
288. Chen, supra note 287.
289. Id.
290. David A. Kaplan, Film About a Fatal Beating Examines a Community, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1989, at H27, H32 (quoting Christine Choy).
291. BILL NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY: ISSUES AND CONCEPTS IN DOCU-
MENTARY at ix-x (1991); see also Annette B. Weiner, Epistemology and Ethnographic
Reality: A Trobriand Island Case Study, 80 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 752, 757 (1978).
292. PAUL ROTHA, DOCUMENTARY FILM: THE USE OF THE FLM MEDIUM TO IN-
TERPRET CREATIVELY AND IN SOCIAL TERMS THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE AS IT Exisrs IN
REALrrY 25 (1952).
293. NONFICTION FILM THEORY AND CRITICISM 15 (Richard M. Barsam ed., 1976)
(quoting John Grierson).
294. Professor Bill Nichols provides an excellent history and discussion of docu-
mentary filmmaking. Four modes of representation are recognized as the primary
methodologies of documentary film: expository (classic "voice-of-God" commentar-
ies, for example), observational (minimizing the filmmaker's presence), interactive
(where the filmmaker and social actors expressly acknowledge one another in con-
versation, participatory actions, or interviews), and reflexive (where the filmmaker
draws the viewer's attention to the form of the work itself). NICHOLS, supra note 291,
at xiv, 32. Some commentators regard observational documentaries interchangeably
as "direct cinema," or "cinema veritd." Other commentators regard them as distinct
forms, although some assign the label "direct cinema" to the more observational
mode while others would assign the label "cinema verit6" to the same mode. Nichols
eschews these controversies in terminology, preferring the more descriptive appella-
[VOL. 1:2
Pedagogy of Vincent Chin
[I]f the film is successful, it is because it was told by the
people who are directly involved in the situation rather
than told by me as the filmmaker. Of course, that does not
mean I do not have a point of view, obviously I do have a
point of view. But I did give equal time, as much as
possible, to both the victims as well as the defendants. I
designed the film in the genre of minimalism. The issues
get repeated, but every time you repeat, it reviews new
information. So, at the end, the audience becomes a judge.
So, I designed the film like a visual courtroom; I've
tions, observational and interactive modes of documentary representation. Id. at 38.
Eric Bamouw, for example, distinguishes direct cinema from one recognized form of
cinema verits as follows:
The direct cinema documentarist took his camera to a situation of tension and
waited hopefully for a crisis; [the Rouch version of] cinema verit6 tried to
precipitate one. The direct cinema artist aspired to invisibility; the Rouch cin-
ema verit6 artist was often an avowed participant. The direct cinema artist
played the role of uninvolved bystander; the cinema verit6 artist espoused
that of provocateur.
Id. (citing ERIC BARNOUW, DOCUMENTARY: A HISTORY OF THE NoN-FICTION FILM 254
(1974)); see also Brian Wilson, The Documentary Form as Scientific Inscription, in
THEORIZING DOCUMENTARY 37 (Michael Renov ed., 1993).
In either conceptualism, it is the filmmaker that espouses the depiction of real-
ism, particularly in the observational and interactive modes of filmmaking, i.e.,
"direct cinema" or "cinema verit6." Yet, the filmmaker's presence is absence as
"observational cinema ... conveys the sense of unmediated and unfettered access to
the world." NICHOLS, supra note 291, at 43. However, some filmmakers and film
theorists assert that the "cinema verit6" appellation remains appropriate even where
there is, albeit minimal, filmmaker presence. In this regard, interactive documentary
stresses images of testimony or verbal exchange and images of demonstration. This
mode often revolves around the form known as the interview. Id. at 56.
But compare Trinh T. Minh-ha, who posits: "There is no such thing as docu-
mentary-whether the term designates a category of material, a genre, an approach,
or a set of techniques." Trinh T. Minh-ha, The Totalizing Quest of Meaning, in
THEORIZING DOCUMENTARY, supra, at 90. In the final analysis, because Who Killed
Vincent Chin? defies rigid categorization, I conclude with Lindsay Anderson:
It isn't a question of technique, it is a question of the material. If the material
is actual, then it is documentary.... If you get so muddled up in your use of
the term, stop using it. Just talk about films. Anyway, very often when we use
these terms, they only give us an opportunity to avoid really discussing the
film.
Id. at 92 (quoting Lindsay Anderson) [italicization omitted].
Finally, filmmaker Jean Rouch offers this definition:
[Cinema veritd:] it would be better to call it cinema-sincerity.... That is, that
you ask the audience to have confidence in the evidence, to say to the audi-
ence, This is what I saw. I didn't fake it, this is what happened.... I look at
what happened with my subjective eye and this is what I believe took place..
. It's a question of honesty.
Id. at 95 & n.9 (quoting Jean Rouch).
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involved the audience from the first frame to the last
frame.... Towards the end, I disappear .... The audience
becomes the one you who makes the decision!"
Indeed, the ethics and dialectics of the documentary film have
many parallels in legal activism. Documentary communication,
much like lawyering, "seeks to initiate a process which culminates in
public action by presenting information, and to complete the process
by making this presentation persuasive. Documentary seeks to in-
form but, above all, it seeks to influence.' 296 Like the advocate, the
filmmaker creates the manner and sequence within which subjects
and images will be revealed. As described by Paul Rotha, the direc-
tor's role, then, bears striking resemblance to the lawyer's role,
particularly relating to the development of case theory, legal advo-
cacy, strategy, and policy making:
At one and the same time he considers his themes and his
actors, his special approach and his innumerable angles of
vision, his lighting and his changing shapes of composi-
tion; he imagines his sounds and the speed of his
movements, visualizes the assembling and contemplates
the eventual effect on the screen. All these distinct but
closely related ideas and materials are arranged, devel-
oped, suspended, dispersed and brought together again-
gradually becoming fused into a unified film under the
will of the director and.., producer. And in the successful
film, these elements are closely interwoven, so that the
unity achieved by their fusion is of greater value than
simply their sum.
295. MICH. DAILY WEEKEND MAG., Nov. 11, 1988, at 10, 11 (quoting Christine
Choy).
296. A. William Bluem, The Documentary Idea: A Frame of Reference, in NONFICTION
FILM THEORY AND CRITICISM, supra note 293, at 75, 76-77. Also, as Professor Bernard
Hibbitts discusses, American legal discourse long has embraced figurative language
evocative of sensory experiences, particularly favoring visual metaphors. Professor
Hibbitts then posits that there is a metaphoric paradigm shift occurring within legal
discourse such that visual metaphors are being supplanted by aural metaphors
("different voices," "speaking," "singing," "hearing," "silence," and "listening").
While Professor -ibbitts regards the move towards metaphoric aurality as a signifi-
cant reconfiguration of American legal discourse, its power will ultimately be
derived from a synergistic application with other sensory capacities. In other words,
applying all available senses will be necessary for understanding legal (con)texts.
Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfigura-
tion of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZo L. REv. 229,229-32,356 (1994).
297. ROTHA, supra note 292, at 31.
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Cinema Professor Bill Nichols draws a direct comparison be-
tween the two fields, upon stating that "[i]nteractive documentary
stresses images of testimony or verbal exchange and images of dem-
onstration (images that demonstrate validity, or possibly, the
doubtfulness, of what witnesses state)." '' Unexpected juxtapositions,
unusual framing, incongruous or contradictory statements about the
same issue prompt the viewer to reassess initial statements in light
of subsequent, discrepant assertions. As recognized by Professor
Nichols:
These possibilities pose distinct ethical issues for practitio-
ners. How far can participation go? How are limits beyond
which a filmmaker cannot go negotiated? What tactics does
"prosecution" outside of a formal legal system allow? The
word "prosecution" refers to the process of social or his-
torical inquiry in which the filmmaker engages in dialogue
with witnesses to carry forward an argument. Actually, the
relation to witnesses may be closer to that of public de-
fender that prosecutor; it is not commonly an adversarial
relationship but one in which the filmmaker represents his
or her witnesses, particularl 7 when differing motives, pri-
orities, or needs are at work.
In interactive documentaries, generally, the actual words and
gestures of interviewees take precedence, and their comments and
responses provide a core part of the film's perspectives or conten-
tions. In Who Killed Vincent Chin? the filmmakers present nearly all
of the individuals at the center and on the periphery of the incident.
The strength of the film is derived from the multiple and conflicting
perspectives that are presented. The juxtapositions of identity, place,
and present and historical context are essential for understanding
the conflicting accounts and, importantly, the event of Vincent
Chin's death. These contradictions elucidate rather than confuse.
The presentation of events is not linear; rather, it interweaves
the facts and social circumstances of the killing in a slow-moving
montage of music, evidence, interviews, perspectives, media
coverage surrounding the killing, automobile advertising cam-
paigns, social events, and cultural and economic conflict. Of course,
the title of the film, Who Killed Vincent Chin?, is ironic and rhetorical,
since it is known from the start that Ronald Ebens, with assistance
from Michael Nitz, killed Vincent Chin. Clearly, then, something
larger is at issue. Thus, it is through the multidimensional
298. NICHOLS, supra note 291, at 44.
299. Id. at 45.
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presentation of central characters' lives, and the complex unraveling
of events and perspectives, that the specific and larger implications
of text, subtext and context contained in Who Killed Vincent Chin?
unfold to provide meaning.
Vincent Chin was adopted by David and Lily Chin and became
a naturalized American citizen in 1961.3 ° The viewers' knowledge of
Vincent Chin is revealed through others. Through family photos and
the descriptions of family and friends, he appears to be thoroughly
enamored with life in his new homeland, fully assimilating into
American society. As described by his childhood friend Gary Koivu:
I think Vincent fit in very well. He learned the ways of America
and he didn't seem handicapped by the fact that he was a Chi-
nese. He made a lot of friends, had a lot of girlfriends. People
accepted him pretty readily. He had a very good sense of humor.
He was always laughing. I was always the quiet one. You know,
the friends I have are very close but he was making friends all the
time. He could walk into a place and get to know people real well
and he was always the life of the party. ... Vincent used to work
with his father on Sundays at the restaurant. Vincent wanted to
get married and have an American job. And he accomplished that
goal by working at the engineering place.... "
He is seen as a cherubic boy who arrives to America for the first
time at the age of six. Later, he is seen to engage in typical youthful
behavior: cars are a passion, he enjoys parties with his friends, and
dates intra- and inter-racially. An engineer, Vincent Chin planned to
find employment as an automotive engineer in Detroit. Much later,
unsparing autopsy photos of his battered skull bear stark contrast to
the images of Vincent's seeming contentment and acceptance in
American society.
Viewers observe Ronald Ebens, who expresses his continuing
longing for the Wisconsin farm life of his youth, as he describes his
reluctant adjustment to life in urban Detroit in order to advance as
an auto industry worker. Ronald Ebens shares with viewers that:
300. Vincent Chin was born in the People's Republic of China on May 18, 1955. He
was adopted by Hing (David) and Lily Chin when he was three years old. His adop-
tion became finalized when he was six years old, at which time he became a U.S.
citizen. See American Citizens for Justice, Confidential Report on the Vincent Chin
Case to the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division 14 Uune 28, 1983) (copy on file
with author) [hereinafter ACJ Report on the Vincent Chin Case]; see also United States
v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1427 (6th Cir. 1986); Ronald Takaki, Who Really Killed Vincent
Chin?, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1983, at B3.
301. Gary Koivu, quoted in Film Transcript to WHO KILLED ViNCENT CHIN?
(Filmmakers Library 1988), at 9 (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Film
Transcript].
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I was raised on a farm. I spent my first 17 years on a farm with
five kids and I guess that part of my life I really miss. I enjoyed
the farm more than anything I've ever done. If I had to pick a
place to live that's where I'd live again.'
Ebens admits to killing Vincent Chin, while declaring that it
had nothing to do with race. "It just so happened that the guy was
Chinese," he says.3 In contrast, two dancers at the Fancy Pants,
Racine Colwell and Angela ("Starlene") Rudolph, state that they
heard Ebens say, "It's because of you m- f- that we're out of
work."
Ronald Ebens is never presented as villainous in the film. In-
stead, he presents himself with an earnestness which resounds with
the ordinariness of his attitudes. He describes his brutal beating of
Vincent Chin as "preordained." He also states that while he knows
few "Asians," the ones he knows are "really nice people."05 Accord-
ing to director Christine Choy, "When we met Ebens, he was the one
who thought he was the victim because he thought he was going to
jail....
Lily Chin, the mother of slain Vincent, provides another per-
spective on the killing of her son. Speaking in her native Toisanese
dialect and uncertain English, she is at the center of the moral, legal,
and cultural intersections identified in the film. Lily Chin arrived
from Canton, China, to Detroit in 1948 after her marriage to Hing
(David) Chin, a Chinese American serviceman who served in the
Army during World War I. She and her husband settled in High-
land Park, just outside Detroit. They established a successful Chinese
restaurant after their laundry business declined. They hoped to
blend into the "melting pot" and obtain their share of the American
Dream.
Lily Chin defied gender and cultural stereotypes by engaging in
a five-year struggle for justice after the killing of her son. Her image
conflicts with that proliferated by mainstream movie/media por-
trayals:
Pearl of the Orient. Whore. Geisha. Concubine. Whore.
Hostess. Bar Girl. Mama-san. Whore. China Doll. Tokyo
Rose. Whore. Butterfly. Whore. Miss Saigon. Whore.
Dragon Lady. Lotus Blossom. Gook. Whore. Yellow Peril.
302. Id. at 4.
303. Id. at 3, 24.
304. Id. at 8.
305. Id. at 16; see also Moore, supra note 230, at 20.
306. WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, July 17, 1989, at 3 (quoting Christine Choy).
307. See Moore, supra note 230, at 20.
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Whore. Bangkok Bombshell. Whore. Hospitality Girl.
Whore. Comfort Woman. Whore. Savage. Whore. Sultry.
Whore. Faceless. Whore. Porcelain. Whore. Demure.
Whore. Virgin. Whore. Mute. Whore. Model Minority.
Whore. Victim. Whore. Woman Warrior. Whore. Mail-
Order Bride. Whore. Mother. Wife. Lover. Daughter. Sis-
ter. 8
Through the autobiography of Lily Chin, the film provides a
feminist interpretation through which viewers witness the raising of
Lily Chin's consciousness as she raises the consciousness of others,
308. Jessica Hagedorn, Asian Women in Film: No Joy, No Luck, Ms., Jan./Feb. 1994,
at 74. Further criticizing the portrayals of Asian women in film, Filipina writer Jes-
sica Hagedorn states:
In Hollywood vehicles, we are objects of desire or derision; we exist to pro-
vide sex, color, and texture in what is essentially a white man's world....
Movies are still the most seductive and powerful combination of sound and
image. In many ways, as females and Asians, as audiences or performers, we
have learned to settle for less-to accept the fact that we are either decorative,
invisible, or one-dimensional.
Id. at 78-79. Furthermore, Renee Tajima asserts:
Asian women in American cinema are interchangeable in appearance and
name, and are joined together by the common language of non-language-
that is, uninterpretable chattering, pidgin English, giggling, or silence. They
may be specifically identified by nationality-particularly in war films-but
that's where screen accuracy ends. The dozens of populations of Asian and
Pacific Island groups are lumped into one homogeneous mass of Mama Sans.
Renee E. Tajima, Lotus Blossoms Don't Bleed: Images of Asian Women, in MAKING
WAVES, supra note 155, at 308-09.
In April 1991, Asian American activists, in coalition with others, protested the
Broadway production of Miss Saigon, an updated version of the Puccini opera Ma-
dame Butterfly. Miss Saigon is the story of a Vietnamese prostitute, Kim, who falls in
love with a White American soldier, Chris. The soldier leaves during the fall of Sai-
gon, to return three years later with Ellen, his White U.S. wife. In the intervening
years, the Vietnamese woman has cared for the Eurasian child whom she conceived
with the soldier. After loathsome entreaties by a Vietnamese government official,
Kim flees to Bangkok, where she reunites with Chris, subsequently dying in his arms
in an act of self-immolation so that he and his wife will take the child to America. See
Steven DeCastro, Identity in Action: A Filipino American's Perspective, in THE STATE OF
ASIAN AMERICA, supra note 14, at 302. The bases of the Miss Saigon protest were lo-
cated in the multiple sites of gender, racial and political stereotypes and
subordination. As stated by activist Yoko Yoshikawa, "[W]e saw Miss Saigon as the
latest in a long line of Western misrepresentations of Asians, perpetuating a damag-
ing fantasy of submissive 'Orientals,' self-erasing women, and asexual, contemptible
men." Yoko Yoshikawa, The Heat Is on Miss Saigon Coalition: Organizing across Race
and Sexuality, in THE STATE OF ASIAN AMERICA, supra note 14, at 275-76. Politically,
the storyline evokes not only the stereotyped images of Asian women and men, but
also the colonialist mentality of the West toward Asian nations, specifically sanitiz-
ing the Vietnam War as a subplot to Asians' imagined love affair with America.
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including that of the viewers2"l This is a painful and complex trans-
formation as she simultaneously embodies one gender role
stereotype-that of the long-suffering mother who is literally para-
lyzed by grief-and eschews another-that of the docile,
uncomplaining Asian American woman demanding justice for her
son for five years. In the film, Lily Chin discusses her early life in
Detroit, when Chinese immigrants were relegated to service indus-
tries such as laundries and restaurants, but could not work in the
auto plants.310 Lily Chin's experiences, counterpoised against the
perspectives of Ronald Ebens, reveal the interlocking race, gender,
and class dynamics in American society.
Visual metaphors enhance the film's powerful portrayals. The
city of Detroit, once a mecca for industrial innovation and manufac-
turing, particularly for automobile production, displays a more
tarnished image during the auto industry's decline. Blue-collar De-
troit is observed through a contemporary grey miasma. While the
automobile industry once characterized Detroit as an urban "Gold
Mountain" of sorts, its other distinguishing industry-music,
epitomized by the presence of Motown Records-relocated to Cali-
fornia in a move that has been described as "part of what broke
Detroit's spirit."31' Furthermore, the influence of media images in the
development of mainstream attitudes and values can be seen
through film and advertising clips in the film. For example, an early
Chevrolet commercial showing Dinah Shore singing exuberantly
about her American car is juxtaposed with a cartoon depicting men-
acing hordes of Japanese cars overwhelming the United States.
309. Film writer Julia Lesage has written that "[fleminist documentaries represent
a use of, yet a shift in, the aesthetics of cinema veritd due to the filmmakers' close
identification with their subjects, participation in the women's movement, and sense
of the films' intended effct .... Either the stance of the people filmed or the stance of
the film as a whole reflects a commitment to changing the public sphere as well; and
for this reason, these filmmakers have used an accessible documentary form." Julia
Lesage, The Political Aesthetics of the Feminist Documentary Film, Q. REV. FILM STUD.
507, 521 (1978). The work of male cinema v~ritd documentarists, on the other hand,
often has been characterized "precisely by the film's ironic distance from the subject
and the filmmaker's presentation of his vision of the subject as his 'creation.' "Id. at
522 n.7. These observations are consonant with the ethos of Who Killed Vincent Chin?
Having grown up in Shanghai, then having moved to Korea at age nine, and later to
Japan before being transplanted to the United States, director Christine Choy found
resonance in Lily Chin's immigrant experience with her own and also identified with
her as a woman of color. In addition, her experiences with the gender, race, and class
dynamics in Asia and in the United States influenced her filmmaking philosophy and
approaches. Interview with Christine Choy, fimmaker, in New York, N.Y. (July 15,
1994) (on file with author).
310. See Moore, supra note 230, at 20.
311. Bourne, supra note 287, at 15 (quoting documentary producer Juanita Ander-
son).
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However, the most salient and riveting metaphor is the recur-
ring image of baseball. In many minds, baseball transcends mere
sport and is integral to the American identity. Consider, for example,
the following sentiment:
To many of us, baseball is more than just a game-it's a
magical, spellbinding, almost religious experience, a won-
drous force that takes over our lives when we're young,
and stays with us for life.... [I]t's not possible to imagine
what North America would be like without baseball, for as
our society evolved and grew, baseball evolved and grew
right along with it, and became woven into the very fabric
of our culture.312
In Who Killed Vincent Chin?, this quintessential conception of
Americanism materialized itself in perverse, interrelated propor-
tions. First, Vincent Chin is killed by Ronald Ebens' use of a baseball
bat; this metaphorical and literal image of an Asian American man
being beaten to death by such a fundamental symbol of American
life is eerily profound and prophetic. Second, Ronald Ebens is play-
ing baseball when he cannot be reached to learn that Vincent Chin
has died after lingering in a coma for four days. Third, Lily Chin
provides a searing counter-narrative to baseball-as-apple-pie, based
on her early experiences in Highland Park. One of her most vivid
memories is of her first trip to a major league baseball game to see
the Detroit Tigers. She and her husband decided to participate in the
American pastime. She recalls the crude encounters with other sta-
dium-goers, whom she says mocked their ethnic features and their
language and mimicked as if to slit their throats. They never went313
back. Once again, the baseball images and the manner of her son's
312. RON MCCULLOCH, How BASEBALL BEGAN: THE LONG OVERLOOKED TRUTH
ABOUT THE BIRTH OF BASEBALL 1 (1995). Documentary filmmaker Ken Burns' 1994
"nine inning" series on baseball on PBS expressed similar views in its effort to place
baseball within a larger socio-historical framework.
313. Lily Chin's less-than-sanguine remembrance of baseball is, of course, replete
with historical reference. Assigned the emblematic status of American society and
values, baseball also long has mirrored the chasms in society at large. While the sport
spans over 150 years in existence, it was not until 1946 that the baseball color line
ended when Jackie Robinson became the first African American to play in the minor
or major leagues in the 20th century. TOM GILBERT, BASEBALL AND THE COLOR LINE 9
(1995). Prior to the integration of major league baseball, the various Negro Leagues
provided opportunities for African Americans to play competitive-level baseball.
However, as Bruce Chadwick writes, "[B]lack baseball was avoided by the main-
stream press, shunned by record keepers, and ignored by the white major leagues."
BRUCE CHADWICK, WHEN THE GAME WAS BLACK AND WHITE: THE ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S NEGRO LEAGUES 9 (1992). The color line in baseball shifted
slightly and arbitrarily with the inclusion of Cuban players Armando Marsans and
Rafael Almeida in 1911. However, darker-skinned Cubans, like African Americans,
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death suggest an uncanny coincidence. Lastly, Detroit-area auto
workers take turns destroying Japanese-model cars with baseball
bats and sledgehammers. These acts powerfully conjure images of
the actual beating death of Vincent Chin.
The significance of these clashing images and perspectives and
the manner in which they inform the doctrine and decision making
in the criminal justice system are discussed in the next section.
C. Contextualizing Criminal Law Doctrine and Discretion
The legal formalism ideal would advance a theory of neutrality
with respect to the development of doctrine and the exercise of dis-
cretion in the criminal law, and in application to cases such as
Vincent Chin. However, reexamining this case from a critical stand-
point suggests that issues of race permeate the entire incident, from
the facts to the subsequent criminal justice system's handling of the
Vincent Chin case. How, then, can the facts of Vincent Chin be ana-
lyzed within a context that acknowledges formalistic criminal law
doctrine and also asks the critical "race question" in order to under-
stand the extant socio-legal dynamics in the case? This closer
analysis requires recognizing the role of law, particularly of the
criminal law, in ascribing value to the harms experienced through
systems of law enforcement, penal laws, and punishment schemes.
As the most serious offense within the scope of criminal law, homi-
cide can be singled out for imparting such messages and value
judgments.
As a matter of legal formalism regarding criminal law doctrine,
Michigan is primarily a common law state. That is, its criminal
homicide statute contains two basic categories of criminal homicide,
murder and manslaughter, as well as a third category of negligent
homicide.314 Within these categories, murder is divided into first de-
gree and second degree.1 5
remained excluded from the major leagues. GILBERT, supra, at 107-08; CHADWICK,
supra, at 29. For a discussion of women's history in amateur and professional base-
ball, see BARBARA GREGORICH, WOMEN AT PLAY: THE STORY OF WOMEN IN BASEBALL
(1993) (noting that "[iun 1943, the first and so far, only women's professional baseball
league was born: the All-American Girls Baseball League," which lasted until 1954).
314. See generally DOUGLAS B. SHAPIRO & JACK VAN COEVERING, CRIMINAL LAW
(1991); see also Timothy A. Baughman, Michigan's "Uncommon Law" of Homicide, 7
COOLEY L. REv. 1, 18 (1990) (stating that the common law definition of murder in
Michigan is the statutory definition).
315. MiCH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.316-.317 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996). The
common law distinctions between first and second degree murder apply. The
Michigan Penal Code defines first degree murder in part as "[m]urder perpetrated by
means of... willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing." § 750.316; see, e.g., People
v. Dykhouse, 345 N.W.2d 150 (Mich. 1984); People v. Taylor, 350 N.W.2d 318 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984); People v. Thomas, 337 N.W.2d 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); People v.
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Although Michigan has not statutorily defined manslaughter, it
recognizes the common law distinction between voluntary and in-
voluntary manslaughter. 316 Thus, voluntary manslaughter occurs
when a person acts "out of a temporary excitement induced by an
adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection
that marks the crime of murder.' 317 Involuntary manslaughter gen-
erally applies to the defendant who did not intend to cause death or
serious bodily injury but who engaged in nonfelonious criminal ac-
tivity or performed a lawful act in a criminally negligent manner."'
Of course, where a defendant is charged with a greater degree
of homicide, he or she is entitled to have the trier-of-fact (jury or
judge) consider conviction on lesser homicide charges that are con-
sistent with defense theories and which meet evidentiary
sufficiency.319 To some degree, this concern was obviated in the Vin-
cent Chin case since Ronald Ebens pleaded guilty to manslaughter;
however, it remains relevant in evaluating the possible and appro-
priate charging levels, and the basis for the offer and acceptance of
Doyle, 342 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). Also, a death which occurs during the
course of enumerated felonies will constitute first-degree murder. § 750.316; see also
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980). Finally, the requisite intent to
establish first degree murder can be shown by a specific intent to kill, or "[an] intent.
• . to inflict great bodily harm or with a wanton and willful disregard of the
likelihood that the natural tendency of [defendant's] behavior is to cause death or
great bodily harm." Id. at 329.
Second degree murder involves the defendant's conscious creation of a high
risk of death. See People v. Clayton, 296 N.W.2d 177, 199 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). In
addition, second degree murder can be established by either an intent to kill, an in-
tent to cause great bodily harm, or an act committed in wanton and willful disregard
of the probability that the act will cause death or great bodily harm. See, e.g., People
v. Mackey, 423 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) ("Malice or the intent to kill
may be inferred from the acts of the defendant where the defendant actually in-
tended to inflict great bodily harm."); People v. Klave, 343 N.W.2d 565 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984) (inferring malice from defendant's repeated beating of two-year-old
daughter; the inference of malice arises when defendant willfully engages in activity
likely to result in serious injury or possibly death).
316. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); People v.
Richardson, 293 N.W.2d 332, 335 n.8 (Mich. 1980).
317. People v. Townes, 218 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Mich. 1974).
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Richardson, 293 N.W.2d 332. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed a
jury conviction of first degree murder where the trial court instructed the jury on first
and second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but denied defense requests
to instruct on involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of firearms resulting in
death. The court reversed because the jury was deprived of its "option to convict
consistently with the defendant's testimony, evidence and theory." Id. at 338; see also
People v. Martin, 344 N.W.2d 17, 18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) ("[the trial court's] failure
to instruct on involuntary manslaughter, consistent with the defense theory of acci-
dent, required reversal even where the jury convicted defendant of first-degree
murder.").
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Ebens' plea to a lesser charge."' Thus, the formalistic definitions of
criminal homicide, examined in the Vincent Chin case through Who
Killed Vincent Chin?, evoke numerous questions regarding the de-
termination of blameworthiness deemed sufficient for murder
conviction, the difference between first and second degree murder,
the conditions that can reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter,
and the bases for line drawing between reckless killings which con-
stitute murder and those which constitute involuntary
manslaughter.
Consideration of these issues involves recognition of the sub-
stantial discretion which inheres in law enforcement and judicial
entities and also prompts recognition of the potential for abuse and
discrimination. As a matter of legal formalism, for example, discre-
tionary decisions by law enforcement and the courts regarding
investigation, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing initially must be
based on considerations of probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that a particular person has committed an of-
fense. However, the decision to investigate, arrest, prosecute, and
sentence often are influenced by the race, gender and/or economic
status of the victim and of the alleged perpetrator of crime .32'When
the contextual dimensions are fully considered, more depth is added
to the analysis of this case and to the criminal justice system as a
whole.
1. Doctrine
As revealed in Who Killed Vincent Chin?, there are fundamental
conflicts between the interested parties' theories of the case. These
320. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(0; see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
In Alford, the defendant was indicted for first degree murder, pleaded guilty to
second degree murder, but maintained his innocence upon taking the stand. On the
stand, he testified that he was pleading guilty only to avoid the possibility of
receiving the death penalty. Despite Alford's claim of innocence, the Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's acceptance of the plea; indeed, it held that the "strong factual
basis for the plea removed the taint of constitutional error from the trial court's
decision to accept Alford's plea." Alford, 400 U.S. at 38. After the Court's ruling in
Alford, many states have required a judicial determination of the factual basis or
accuracy of the plea. The Court's failure to provide further guidance to determine
what constitutes a "strong factual basis" leaves the integrity of the plea bargaining
process in question. For further discussion of plea bargaining in connection with the
Vincent Chin case, see infra Part II.C.2.
321. See RONALD BARRI FLOWERS, MINORITIES AND CRIMINALITY 149-62 (1988)
(discussing differential enforcement of law in communities of color by law enforce-
ment agencies and the courts) (1990); CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A
QUESTION OF COLOR 115-219 (1993); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal
Process, supra note 7.
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conflicts are starkly drawn in the subsequent federal civil rights
trial;32 however, they are no less pronounced at the state criminal
proceedings level, which is the focus of this article.3  These disparate
views can be evidenced dualistically by the defense's insistence at all
levels and proceedings that nothing more serious than a barroom
brawl resulted in Vincent Chin's death, contrasted by the State's and
Asian communities' contention that a far more serious criminal of-
fense had occurred. The defense argued that the killing was not the
result of racial animosity, as stated by defense attorney Frank Ea-
man:
Ron Ebens is guilty of having too much to drink, being a macho
man who wouldn't back down from a fight and wanted to avenge
his stepson. And he's guilty of letting himself go too far and kill-
ing somebody with a baseball bat. A serious crime no doubt....
He is not guilty of doing this because of racial animus or racial
feelings or racial bias or racial prejudice. It so happens the person
he was involved with was Chinese.
In contrast, members of American Citizens for Justice (ACJ), ar-
gued that race was the precipitous factor of Vincent Chin's death. As
stated by Helen Zia:
I think anybody who takes the time to go over the facts of this case
and to read what people who were witnesses there, who had no
motivation, no self interest in coming forward and saying they
heard certain things . . . racial things. Anybody who takes the
time to look at that, I think can only conclude that there was ra-
cial motivation in this killing.
32
322. See supra Part ll.B.
323. The primary focus of this article regards the state criminal proceedings; how-
ever, it is the subsequent federal civil rights proceedings that illuminate the criminal
action. In large part, this is due to the lack of a record or reported case in the state
proceedings. The state record is absent in this case because the prosecutorial decision
is not subject to hearing on the record, and because a plea bargain was reached.
Thus, in addition to the accounts provided in the film and in other sources, the fed-
eral court provides a source of written record and a recitation of the underlying facts.
However, as discussed infra Part II.D, the important analytical and pedagogical pur-
poses extend beyond the criminal law. In discussing my use of Vincent Chin with
colleagues Professors Paulette Caldwell, at New York University; Taunya Banks, at
the University of Maryland, and Angela P. Harris, at the University of California, at
Berkeley, they expressed interest in the film for use in civil rights and procedural law
courses, in addition to criminal law.
324. Film Transcript, supra note 301, at 21-22.
325. Id. at 2.
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In the film, witnesses who were present at the Fancy Pants
provide accounts of the events triggering the fight between Ronald
Ebens and Vincent Chin:
Starlene: I was on the stage dancing and Chin and his friends
were at the other end of the stage. And so they had encouraged
me to come down to their ... to their end of the stage to dance for
them. You know, cause they were having a party. And so you
know, being in a new club I felt a little leery but it was alright so
I went down to dance for 'em. And he [Chin] wanted to give me a
tip which was cool with me you know, I wanted to accept the tip.
But when I went to accept the tip he didn't want to give it to me
the way I wanted to receive it you know. I had just started here
and I was very uncomfortable so I kind of refused and told him
that's alright. You know, keep the tip and I ... went to the other
end of the stage and then Ebens comes in.
I remember seeing him [Ebens] walk through the door all the way
down to the stage, cause he sat right in front of me, you know.
Obviously he came in a couple of days before . . . and saw me
dancing. He liked me, we must 've talked and got along. Cause he
was you know, boosting me up and encouraging me and it made
me feel good you know. Cause he was making me ... yeah it's
Starlene you know, what's been happening you know. Party
down or whatever.326
Ebens: I think her name was Starlene. That's all I remember.
And I wouldn't have known that if she hadn 't been at the [federal
civil rights] trial.32
Starlene: And so I felt better. Then Chin and his friends... well
maybe not his friends but someone in the corner .... They got
upset . . . "ah she's nowhere you know. You don't know what
you're talking about." And Ebens . . . is at the other end of the
stage going "what, man you don't know a good thing when you
see one, you know. And Chin... goes "I'm not a boy. "3
Gary Koivu: I was talking to Jimmy [Choi] on my left. Vincent
was on my right when I heard Vincent say "don't call me a f-.
I'm not af-." And that's when I turned and saw who Vincent
was talking to. And I put my hand on Vincent's arm and I
calmed him down.
326. Id. at 20.
327. Id. at 21.
328. Id.
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* . . I was looking at Ronald Ebens when he said, "I'm just not
sure if you're a bigf- or a littlef-." And then with that Vin-
cent stood up and walked around me and Jimmy and approached
Ronald Ebens. Ebens stood up and Vincent shoved him in the
chest and Ebens shoved back and they both started punching.329
Racine Colwell: I came around the bar and all I saw was Mr.
Ebens was yelling at Vincent Chin. And the next thing you
know Vincent got up and walked around and hit Mr. Ebens. 30
Ronald Ebens: And he came around and sucker punched me.
And that was ... that was the start of it all right there. I never
even got a chance to stand up. Never seen it coming. That's the
way the whole thing started.
Racine Colwell: I was close enough to hear Mr. Ebens say to
Mr. Chin, "It's because of you m-f--s that we're out of work."
Mr. Chin replied "I'm not a little m-f-."
[Mir. Nitz jumped into the fight to help Mr. Ebens. And Mr.
Ebens raised a chair and Vincent raised a chair to deflect and
somehow Mr. Ebens' son ... stepson Mr. Nitz got hit with the
chair. And after that they were broken up by the parking lot at-
tendant. 2
Starlene: I didn't see anybody throw blows but I saw Chin
standing in a position as to where he had just got through
throwing a few blows and Ebens was on the floor you know.
Ebens was on the floor and his stepson... I think he was on the
floor too on the otherside somewhere, but he was thrown off you
know and Chin was the only one standing. Like you know the
survivor of whatever he had done right there. He was the one who
had, you know, won. Cause, he, hey, they were kinda busted up
you know. He kinda busted them up by himself His friends
didn't help him cause he was handling it by himself.3
Ronald Ebens: Well Racine Colwell testified [at the civil rights
trial] that she had heard me say "It's because of you little so and
so's that we're out of work." I guess if you want to construe that
329. Id. at 8.
330. Id. at 9.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 21.
333. Id. at 22.
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as a racial slur. I don't, I don't know how you could do that but I
never said that period.-
Scholar Jayne Lee cautions against a knee-jerk characterization
and interpretation of the events and conflicting accounts surround-
ing Vincent Chin's death. In moving beyond a visceral reaction to
events that are quickly labeled "racist," a more discerning analysis is
needed in order to understand the milieu of social construction and
the social contexts in which such events occur. As Jayne Lee states:
Because we cannot determine the "racism" of a practice
from its content alone, we can never predict whether a
practice will be racist or antiracist. Instead, we must exam-
ine the practice's social situation and effects. This
indeterminacy does not mean we need abandon all predic-
tion .... What this indeterminacy does mean is that we
often cannot ascertain whether a practice is racist apart
from its social context and its effects.
What, then, to make of Ronald Ebens' actions and anti-Asian
epithets within the social and historical context and within the appli-
cation of formalistic criminal law doctrine and discretion? Professor
Marvin Jones provides a clue, though speaking in another context,
when he says that:
In [this] case, there is a clear intersection between the plane
of interpretation and adjudication, and the plane of histori-
cal narrative .... They are, like the racial myths they reflect,
reducible to certain constituent components, as if they were
expressions of deep structures within our social and legal
culture, rather than random or peculiar events.36
Thus, when Ronald Ebens, in the midst of the events that began
at the Fancy Pants, rails at Vincent Chin that "it's because of you
m- f--s that we're out of work," this provides greater insight into
his state of mind than he is willing to or is capable of admitting. It
also has historical resonance. Through a narrow lense, what hap-
pened at the Fancy Pants was nothing more than a barroom brawl,
as the defense contended. Viewing events through the narrow pur-
view of formalistic legal analysis propagates the myth of objectivity;
race and other contextual factors need not be considered, and in-
deed, would sully the colorless palette of neutral, albeit rational,
334. Id.
335. Lee, supra note 36, at 758.
336. Jones, supra note 18, at 505.
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determinations. However, when viewing the events through the
wider lense of multiple perspectives, including race, ethnicity, gen-
der, and class, a more pernicious picture emerges. Opening the lense
in order to absorb and cast light onto the significant historical, con-
textual, and identity dimensions would inform the criminal doctrine
and process.
There are several such intersections in this case. On one level, at
least, it would seem that Ronald Ebens and Vincent Chin enjoyed a
male bond of sorts, as both affirmed their gender identities by par-
ticipating in women's objectification at the Fancy Pants Lounge as
regular entertainment in the time-honored tradition of the bachelor
party. As Rich Wagner, a friend of Ronald Ebens, describes:
We used to go to other topless bars like the Fancy Pants, places
like this. It would just be a place to go and a bunch, group of
guys. It was just a way to relieve yourself. And you'd have girls
up dancing that would dance you know topless and people would
you know sometimes yell at the girls. Sometimes just sit there
and drink or whatever-but it was a place for the group of people
from the plants to go and meet. You know and most of them were
married and very family orientated people, but it was a night out.
337It was a night out for the guys.
In the end, Ronald Ebens disavowed any racist inclinations, and
also disavowed any affinity for the women strippers.3m Furthermore,
Ebens and Chin seem to find commonality in another ritual display
of male aggressiveness-fighting. There appears to be no doubt, in
fact, that Vincent Chin threw the first punch.339 In addition to
337. Film Transcript, supra note 301, at 7.
338. The African American dancer Starlene asserted that Ronald Ebens boosted
her confidence after she had been offended by Vincent Chin. Id. at 20. Ebens, how-
ever, denies having any special knowledge of Starlene, stating, "I think her name was
Starlene. That's all I remember. And I wouldn't have known that if she hadn't been at the
trial." Id. at 21.
The women dancers were variously devalued and discredited in the legal pro-
ceedings as well. In the initial stages, they were never interviewed regarding their
observations. In the subsequent civil rights trial, government attorneys attempted
character assassination of Starlene, which was found to be trial error on appeal.
United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1442 (6th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor suggesting
sexual liaison between Ebens and Starlene).
Another sentient witness, Racine Colwell, also was dismissed as unrealistic,
although she was found to be more credible than Starlene by the federal civil rights
jury. Film Transcript, supra note 301, at 22. Ronald Ebens stated, "Well Racine Colwell
testified that she had heard me say 'It's because of you little so and so's that we're out of
work.' I guess if you want to construe that as a racial slur. I don't, I don't know how you
could do that but I never said that period." Id. at 22.
339. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1427-28; see also Film Transcript, supra note 301, at 8-9
(comments of Gary Koivu, Racine Colwell, and Ronald Ebens).
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recognizing the dynamic of male braggadocio and the devaluation of
women which Ebens and Chin apparently shared, it is necessary to
comprehend where they diverge in their shared male identities in
order to deconstruct the meaning of Ronald Ebens' racial animus.
Toward this end, it is important to recognize the obvious and
subtle nature of Ebens' racial behavior. First, there is the most obvi-
ous form-name calling. Ebens began to make obscene remarks
toward Vincent Chin, calling him a "Chink" and a "Nip.'" ° How-
ever, it is the more subtle demonstration of racism that is telling in
this case. When Ebens comments further that "it's because of you
little m- f-s that we're out of work," an expression of nativistic
racism3" directed at Vincent Chin specifically and Asian Americans
generally is revealed. The racial animus contained in this statement
is not made clear by the accompanying anti-Asian epithets; rather, it
is clear from the social context surrounding those utterances.
The growing national recession became depression in Detroit in
1982. As one news reporter states in the film, officially Detroit's un-
employment rate was at seventeen percent. Half of the people in the
city were on some sort of government assistance, and the mayor had
declared a hunger emergency in the city.34 Government officials lo-
cated the source of the United States' economic woes in Japan. In one
news broadcast, the late Speaker of the House Thomas P. ("Tip")
O'Neill urges, "[1f I were President of the United States for two months I
said I'd fix the Japanese like they've never been fixed. I said I would put a
moratorium on automobile .... "343 The invective expressed by public
officials, the frequent public gatherings to bash Japanese auto im-
ports with sledgehammers, and Ronald Ebens' and Michael Nitz's
identities as laid-off U.S. auto workers provide a clear referent for
"we." In this respect, the Japanese are not distinguished from Japa-
nese nationals, Japanese Americans, Chinese Americans, or any
ethnic Asian person for that matter, and they are the clear referent
for "you."
The next sequence of events stemming from the Fancy Pants
altercation reveals how the racial animus found its fatal expression.
The fight continued outside the Fancy Pants, with Vincent Chin
challenging Ebens to finish the fight. Ronald Ebens then removed a
baseball bat from Michael Nitz's hatchback. Upon seeing the
baseball bat, Vincent Chin ran and was pursued by Ebens and Nitz.
Vincent Chin was found by one of his friends, Jimmy Choi, and the
two of them ran for several blocks until they stopped at a
340. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1427.
341. See Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1252-53.
342. Film transcript, supra note 301, at 11.
343. Id. at 12.
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McDonald's restaurant hoping to find refuge in the crowd." Ebens
and Nitz continued to look for Chin. They happened upon an
African American man named Jimmy Perry during their search; they
offered Perry twenty dollars to help them find and catch a "Chinese
guy.' " Perry testified at the civil rights trial that Ebens and Nitz
talked during the ride about catching a "Chinese guy" and "busting
his head" when they caught him."
The ultimate confrontation took place in the parking lot of the
supermarket next to McDonald's. According to the court of appeals:
Ebens and Nitz approached Chin and Choi using a parked
car for cover. Ebens was still carrying the baseball bat.
Chin saw them coming and yelled "Scram." Choi escaped
but Nitz grabbed Chin in a bear hug from behind. Chin
broke loose and ran onto Woodward Avenue. Ebens struck
Chin several times with the bat on the back and head
causing Chin to fall to the ground .... [I]t is undisputed
that Ebens was the aggressor. Meanwhile, the Highland
Park police officers who were working as security guards
at McDonald's came up, drew their guns and ordered
Ebens to drop his bat.
Chin was taken to Henry Ford Hospital, losing con-
sciousness several times en route. He suffered two
lacerations on the back left side of his head and abrasions
on his shoulder, chest and neck and lapsed into a severe
coma. After the performance of emergency surgery, his
brain ceased functioning entirely. At 9:50 p.m., June 23,
1982, a ventilator which had been employed to keep him
breathing was removed and he was pronounced dead. 7
Normatively, Ronald Ebens' killing of Vincent Chin can be
analyzed according to the common law paradigms for homicide,
with little or no explicit reference to race. In this regard, the analysis
would begin with second degree murder, the presumption for ex-
press-malice intentional killings, and implied malice killing where
there is an intent to cause grievous bodily injury that results in
death, and/or where the defendant acts with extreme recklessness
(or "depraved heart").
Thus, the basic facts would support a second degree theory on
express or implied malice theories. As a matter of express malice,
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Ebens' intent to kill Vincent Chin can be argued based on the
"natural-and-ordinary-consequences" rule m After the initial fight at
the Fancy Pants, Ebens took the confrontation to a more dangerous
level by retrieving the baseball bat from Nitz's car, chasing Chin
with it, then driving around in pursuit for twenty to thirty minutes
to "catch a Chinese guy" and "bust his head." 9 The ensuing vicious
beating with the bat to Chin's head, back, chest, neck and shoulders
would evince an intent to kill in that the probable outcome of such a
beating would be death. In the absence of evidence that Ebens was
not an "ordinary" person, a trier of fact could infer that he intended
the natural and probable consequences of his conduct, that is, Vin-
cent Chin's death. Off-duty Highland Park Police Officers Michael
Gardenhire and Morris Cotton reported observing numerous dou-
ble-handed swings to Vincent Chin's body and four fatal blows to
his head5 ° The use of the baseball bat, as a deadly weapon,
strengthens this argument 51
Under implied-malice murder theories, a second degree charge
can be supported by the severe beating by Ebens based on the inter-
related doctrines of intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and
"depraved heart" killings. In this regard, culpability exists where the
actor who unjustifiably and inexcusably intends to cause such seri-
ous injuries is guilty of murder when the victim dies as a result of
the assault5 2 The depraved heart murder results from the creation of
an extremely high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury.
Whether defendant's conduct will fall within the high degree of risk
creation which suffices for negligence/recklessness manslaughter or
that which qualifies as murder is a subjective determination to be
made by the prosecutor at the charging juncture, and by the trier of
fact at the close of evidence. Thus, the difference between risk crea-
tion which is murder and that which is manslaughter is a matter of
348. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 471 (1987).
349. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1428.
350. ACJ Report on the Vincent Chin Case, supra note 300, at 4.
351. The "deadly weapon rule" permits the inference that one who uses a deadly
weapon, or who intentionally uses a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the
human body, intends to kill. DRESSLER, supra note 348, at 471; WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AusTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 613-14 (2d ed. 1986) (noting those items that
have been considered deadly weapons, not by virtue of intrinsic qualities, but by
virtue of the circumstances of their use: e.g., loaded guns, daggers, swords, axes, iron
bars, baseball bats, bricks, rocks, ice picks, automobiles, and pistols used as bludg-
eons). In both instances of the natural and probable consequences theory a
permissible inference as to intent can be drawn; constitutionally, however, this can-
not be a presumption on a material element of the offense. See Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979).
352. See DRESSLER, supra note 348, at 476; see also People v. Mackey, 423 N.W.2d
604 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
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degree. It is a profoundly elastic measure of fault and seriousness of
the offense which permits flexibility, but also invites abuse where
the determination is based on biased considerations of race, gender,
and the like.
Although the putative starting point for express or implied
malice killings is second degree murder, the facts and circumstances
of the Vincent Chin case also warrant analysis under the first degree
paradigm. Beyond intention, first degree murder doctrine requires
premeditation and deliberation. There is no presumption of first de-
gree murder; there must be a showing that the defendant actually
premeditated and deliberated.353 This involves a quantitative and
qualitative analysis. Quantitatively, when first degree murder is al-
leged, the element of premeditation is interpreted to require an
appreciable time to contemplate the killing beyond the time in which
an intent to kill can be formed. However, the terms "premeditation"
and "deliberation" defy precise definition. According to LaFave and
Scott, "perhaps the best that can be said of 'deliberation' is that it
requires a cool mind that is capable of reflection, and of
'premeditation' that it requires that the one with the cool mind did
in fact reflect, at least for a short period of time before [committing
the] act of killing.",3 4 Qualitatively, the inquiry focuses on the actor's
capacity to premeditate and deliberate. In such instances, the defen-
dant's subjective capacity to reflect on the intention to kill may be
found to be impaired by intense emotion, intoxication, or limited
mental capacity.
Both quantitative and qualitative inquiries are relevant in the
Vincent Chin case. Evidence of premeditated desire to kill often is
based on three categories of evidence: (1) planning activity, (2) mo-
tive, and (3) manner of killing.3  Certainly, what Ebens considered to
be the affront of Vincent Chin's presence at the Fancy Pants and of
his defeat at Chin's hands, indicate motive. And that the killing is
accomplished by Ebens' striking directly at Vincent Chin's vital
body parts, particularly his head, evinces a mien and manner calcu-
lated to result in Vincent Chin's ultimate demise.
As stated, however, this inquiry must also resolve the issue of
capacity to premeditate. In this case, Ebens' apparent rage, com-
pounded by some degree of intoxication, would render a finding of
subjective premeditation somewhat problematic. This is particularly
so where other institutional players in the criminal justice system are
353. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 351, at 644.
354. Id. at 643.
355. Id. at 644.
356. DRESSLER, supra note 348, at 475.
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inclined to sympathize with the actor's condition and conduct. 7
Where present, intoxication must be considered a salient factor in
connection with the theories of criminal homicide liability. Both
Ronald Ebens and Vincent Chin were drinking at the Fancy Pants.
The state of Ebens' sobriety is primarily at issue for the determina-
tion of his culpability, however. As such, the state of his sobriety has
significant implications on the charging level and potential outcome
of the case, upward from voluntary manslaughter.
With respect to a first degree charge, for example, even volun-
tary intoxication may vitiate the requisite finding of premeditation
and deliberation if the actor is unable to form this subjective specific
intent to kill. With respect to heat-of-passion manslaughter, volun-
tary intoxication is not available to the actor who is more apt to
anger or slower to cool down than a reasonable or ordinary per-
son.35 8 Under the depraved heart theory, voluntary intoxication
offers no defense for creating an extreme risk of death or harm. 39 The
net result, then, would suggest second degree murder as an appro-
priate charging level-downward from first degree; though upward
from voluntary manslaughter.
Again, as a normative matter, one of the most plausible theories
against the second degree charge would be a defense in mitigation,
or voluntary manslaughter.30 Prevailing on a provocation defense
requires that the killing be committed (1) in the heat of passion, (2)
during passion resulting from adequate provocation, (3) before a
reasonable opportunity to cool off had elapsed, and (4) the provoca-
tion was the impetus for the killing. 6' At common law, adequate
provocation could be based on circumstances of aggravated assault
or battery, or mutual combat. Both possibilities exist under the Chin
facts.
Time-framing is crucial in analyzing a provocation defense, as
necessitated by the "cooling off" inquiry. In this case, two critical
time periods are at issue: the initial altercation at the Fancy Pants,
and Ebens' and Nitz's pursuit of Vincent Chin after this initial con-
frontation. As to the first time period, Ebens could argue that Chin's
"first blow" ignited his anger to retaliate, under the first paradigm
case of aggravated assault or battery. Complicating this provocation
357. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 280-82 (1993) (discussing how prosecutors, jurors, and judges empathized
with middle-class drunk drivers on the basis of class-and likely gender and race-
and accorded more lenient treatment until widespread movements emerged to con-
demn drinking and driving).
358. LAFAVE & SCO"r, supra note 351, at 393.
359. Id. at 652-53; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985).
360. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996).
361. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 351, at 653-63.
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claim is whether there would be any recognition that Ebens' racist
name-calling constitute a provocation claim availed to Vincent Chin,
as his passions clearly were aroused by Ebens' racial slurs.-2
Under the second paradigm case, mutual combat, the defense
would argue that Vincent Chin's death resulted from the mutual
combat between himself and Ronald Ebens. Again, time-framing is
important. These arguments are much stronger for the events which
occur at the Fancy Pants, where the fight originated. For purposes of
voluntary manslaughter analysis, mutual combat is defined as "a
fight or struggle which both parties enter willingly or in which two
persons, upon a sudden quarrel, and in hot blood, mutually fight
upon equal terms and death results from the combat." ' The mutual
combat theory is a paean to male violence. It suggests what Profes-
sor Susan Estrich has discussed in terms of the force-resistance
requirement in rape law." In addition to countenancing an unreal-
istic standard with respect to male violence in women's lives,
recognizing mutual combat also perpetuates the homophobic notion
that "real men fight," or alternatively, that "real men fight back." It
is in this vein that Professor Mari Matsuda asserts that "patriarchy
killed Vincent Chin.""
362. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 270, at 66-69 (positing that racist
speech is the equivalent of "fighting words," which is likely to produce physical
symptoms in victims and to provoke victims' violent response, and is therefore un-
deserving of First Amendment protection).
363. People v. Neal, 446 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
364. Professor Estrich states: "[M]ost of the time, a criminal law that reflects male
views and male standards imposes its judgment on men who have injured other
men. It is 'boys' rules' applied to a boys' fight." Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.
1087, 1091 (1986) (footnote omitted).
365. Professor Estrich explains the "sandlot" dynamic, with its homophobic over-
tones thusly:
The first [view of force in human relations] understands force as most school-
boys do on the playground: force is when he hits me; resistance is when I hit
back. That is the definition of force traditionally enforced in rape cases....
[I]t is not at all difficult to understand that a woman who had been repeatedly
beaten, who had been a passive victim of both violence and sex during the
"consensual" relationship ... would not fight. She wouldn't fight; she might
cry. Hers is the reaction of "sissies" in playground fights....
Id. at 1105, 1111.
366. Professor Matsuda states:
Most people think that racism killed Vincent Chin. When white men with
baseball bats, hurling racist hate speech, beat a man to death, it is obvious
that racism is a cause. It is only slightly less obvious, however, when you
walk down the aisles of Toys R Us, that little boys grow up in this culture
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Courts have vacillated in defining the principles for this form of
manslaughter; typically, however, one or two things must be
proven: (1) that defendant's conduct, under the circumstances
known to the actor, must involve a high degree of risk of death or
serious bodily injury, in addition to the unreasonable risk required
for ordinary negligence; and/or (2) whatever the level of risk re-
quired, the actor must be aware of the fact that their conduct creates
the risk.67
Undergirding both theories is a requirement for reasonableness
and/or proportionality. Therefore, Ebens' actions, after the initial
confrontation, would appear to militate against success on the de-
fense. His use of the baseball bat (a deadly weapon), along with the
aid of Nitz, takes his response out of the realm of a "fair fight."
Moreover, the thin line that exists between self-defense and provo-
cation theories is erased where, after the initial confrontation, Ronald
Ebens responds to repel the nondeadly force of Vincent Chin's bat-
tery with the deadly force of the vicious beating. In the space
where self-defense converts into provocation, Ebens, it can be ar-
gued, acts with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm to Chin
as revealed by his retrieving the bat, driving around in pursuit, and
expressing the desire to "bust the Chinese guy's head." At issue is
whether or not the time between the initial altercation at the Fancy
with toys that teach dominance and aggression, while little girls grow up
with toys that teach about being pretty, baking, and changing a diaper. And
the little boy who is interested in learning how to nurture and play house is
called a "sissy." When he is older he is called a "f-g." He learns that accep-
tance for men in this society is premised on rejecting the girl culture and
taking on the boy culture, and I believe that this, as much as racism, killed
Vincent Chin.
Matsuda, supra note 39, at 1189-90.
367. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 351, at 653-55. The standard for criminal
negligence manslaughter has alternately been articulated in terms of negligence or
recklessness standards. The distinction lies in the requirement of the defendant's
awareness regarding the creation of risk of death and/or that defendant is aware that
his or her conduct creates the heightened degree of risk. The former standard sug-
gests negligence, while the latter, singly or combined with the former, suggests
recklessness. Many states have followed the lead of the Model Penal Code on this
matter, thereby requiring consciousness of risk, or recklessness. See LAFAVE & SCOTr,
supra note 351, at 669-71; MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(c), 210.3 (1985). However,
some states condemn risk creation irrespective of the actor's realization of the risk.
368. In this respect, the subtle line between provocation and self-defense becomes
apparent. As Professor Dressler explains: "If V unjustifiably strikes D with the intent
to kill her, D is justified in killing V in self-defense, assuming that she reasonably
believes that the attack will continue and that deadly force is necessary. If V
commences a nondeadly attack on D, D may justifiably use nondeadly force to protect
herself, and if an accidental death ensues she will not be guilty of any homicide
offense. If V starts a nondeadly assault and D, enraged, intentionally kills V, her
disproportionate response impairs her claim of self-defense, but the provocation
defense comes into play." DRESSLER, supra note 348, at 491.
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Pants and Ebens' and Nitz's subsequent half-hour search for Chin
throughout the neighborhood evinces Ebens' continuing state of
"hot blood," and whether a reasonable or ordinary person would
have cooled off within this period. Paradigmatically, the resolution
of these issues could support a reduction from second degree mur-
der to voluntary manslaughter; yet Ronald Ebens' disproportionate
response would not seem to support this result.
Involuntary manslaughter must also be considered under the
Chin facts. In this instance, where a defendant acted with criminal
negligence or recklessness, or engaged in non-felonious criminal ac-
tivity and did not intend to cause death or serious bodily injury, but
engaged in non-felonious criminal activity in which death resulted,
he may be culpable for involuntary manslaughter. Addressing the
two possibilities, in Ebens' defense claim, the nonfelonious criminal
activity presumably is the retaliatory battery against Vincent Chin.
However, this claim would seem to be unavailing where Ebens
struck Chin with severe blows intended to cause severe harm; not as
is often recognized, where a defendant intends a minor blow but ac-
tually causes greater harm than was anticipated. Similarly, Ebens'
retaliatory actions suggest a conscious awareness of the risk of harm
to Vincent Chin and that Ebens' conduct created a grave degree of
risk. Nevertheless, a trial judge would have a duty to instruct on in-
voluntory manslaughter if the evidence could support such a
theory.
Analysis of the Vincent Chin case according to formalistic crimi-
nal law principles, while clearly possible, does not render a fuller
understanding of the dynamics in the case and their relationship to
these principles. Simple application of formalistic analysis would
mean adoption of the defense's theory that race was only an inciden-
tal aspect of the case, and that the subtle and overt anti-Asian slurs
by Ronald Ebens were inconsequential. Minimization of the impor-
370tance of racist speech and their connection to racist acts is common.
Professor Patricia Williams states that "the attempt to split bias from
violence has been this society's most endearing rationalization."37' In
this vein, Professor Mari Matsuda includes the following examples
369. See, e.g., People v. Heard, 103 Mich. App. 571 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting a duty
to instruct on the cognate offense of involuntary manslaughter "if supported by the
evidence"); People v. Ora Jones, 395 Mich. 379 (1975) (noting that where the trial
judge instructs on manslaughter without a request from the parties, it is reversible
error to give only an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, where the defense's
theory was based on accident).
370. See generally LAWRENCE, ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 270; Peggy
C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989).
371. Patricia Willliams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpoint-
ing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 139 (1987).
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in a list of "just kidding" stories which minimize the harms of ra-
cism:
An African American worker found himself repeatedly
subjected to racist speech when he came to work. A noose
was hanging one day in his work area; a dead animal and
other threatening objects were placed in his locker. "KKK"
references were directed at him, as well as other racist slurs
and death threats. His employer discouraged him from
calling the police, attributing the incidents to "horseplay."
In San Francisco, a swastika was placed near the desks of
Asian-American and African-American inspectors in the
newly integrated fire department. The official explanation
for the presence of the swastika at the fire department was
that it was presented several years earlier as a "joke" gift to
the battalion chief, and that it was unclear why or how it
ended up at the work stations of the minority employees.
An African-American FBI agent was subject to a campaign
of racist taunts by white coworkers. A picture of an ape
was pasted over his child's photograph, and racial slurs
were used. Such incidents were called "healthy" by his su-
pervisor.
In Seattle, a middle-management Japanese-American was
disturbed by his employer's new anti-Japanese campaign.
As the employer's use of slurs and racist slogans in the
workplace increased, so did the employee's discomfort.
His objections were viewed as overly sensitive and unco-
operative. He finally quit his job, and he was denied
unemployment insurance because his departure was
"without cause."
[A] Hmong family in Eureka, California, was twice victim-
ized by four-foot high crosses burning on their lawn. Local
police dismissed this as "a prank."3
Therefore, giving full weight to the significance of Ebens' refer-
ence to Vincent Chin as a "Chink" and "Nip" and to his accusation
that "because of you we're out of work" reveals something more
than an accidental killing, as the defense suggests. Instead, more ap-
propriate homicide charges would recognize intentionality by
Ronald Ebens based on theories of express and implied malice. The
372. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 270, at 20-21.
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racial bias that fueled Ronald Ebens' criminal intent can be located
in the conscious and subconscious mind. The defense argued that
Ebens' racial epithets were meaningless to the analysis of this case.
On some level this is an understandable position given the wide-
spread acceptance of racist discourse in U.S. society. Thus, Ronald
Ebens describes his encounter with Vincent Chin as "pre-
ordained,"3' 3 not as a deliberate racist act. According to Professor
Charles Lawrence:
Much racist conduct is considered unrelated to race or re-
garded as neutral because racist conduct maintains the
status quo, the status quo of the world as we have known
it .... [T]his is particularly true when the message and
meaning of the epithet resonates with beliefs widely held
in society.... [Elach individual message gains its power
because of the messages that are conveyed in a society
where racism is ubiquitous.374
Research reveals that bias-motivated violence is particularly
vicious. 375 This helps to explain the virulence of the attack on Vincent
Chin. One witness at the McDonald's described the manner of
Ebens' attack on Vincent Chin as "as though he were swinging for a
home run."3 76
Thus, consciously, Ronald Ebens was aware of Vincent Chin as
an Asian American within the socio-economic climate of Detroit's
industrial decline, which was largely attributed to persons of Asian
descent, particularly the Japanese. That such violence should occur
during such difficult economic times also typifies bias-related as-
saults. Many researchers noted the rise in racially motivated crimes
during the recession of the late 1970s to the early 1980s.37 According
373. In an interview in the film, Ronald Ebens states: "What if we'd had an accident
prior to it. What if we'd went to the ball game. There 're 10,000 what if I can ask myself. It's
just like this was preordained to be I guess. It just happened." Film Transcript, supra note
301, at 8.
374. Charles R. Lawrence, Ifl, Regulating Racist Speech, 1990 DUKE L.J. 443, 453 &
n.90.
375. In a study conducted by Dr. Jack McDevitt, it was found that while the na-
tional average for injury to assault victims is 29%, 74% of victims of bias-related
assaults were injured. McDevitt concluded from his research that bias-related attacks
are far more lethal than other kinds of attacks, resulting in hospitalization of their
victims four times more often than for other assaults. Goleman, supra note 4, at 1
(discussing the McDevitt study).
376. See WHO KILLED VINCENT CHINm? (Filmmakers Library 1988) (remarks of Offi-
cer Gardenhire).
377. Precise figures from that period are not available, however, since systematic
tracking of bias crimes began only in the mid-1980s. Goleman, supra note 4, at 1; see
also infra note 457.
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to UCLA sociologist Dr. Ivan Light, "The roots of intergroup conflict
are as much in economic competition as it is in negative stereo-
types." 7 Dr. Steven Salmony, a psychologist at the University of
North Carolina who has studied Klan violence, adds, "Economics
and political uncertainties lead to personal insecurities. For the most
vulnerable people, it's a short step to ethnic violence."7
In addition to the obvious nativistic racist impulse, a subtler
degree of racial animus was involved in the case. Although more
elusive, the social construction of Asian Americans as meek surely
was inculcated into Ebens' psyche from popular representations.
Again, Professor Charles Lawrence is instructive, stating that "for
the most part, we do not recognize the myriad ways in which the
racism pervading our history and culture influences our beliefs. In
other words, most of our racism is unconscious."3 " More specifically,
Renee Tajima writes:
[S]everal generations of Asian women have been raised
with racist and sexist celluloid images. The models for
passivity and servility in these films and television pro-
grams fit neatly into the myths imposed on us, and
contrasts sharply with the more liberating ideals of inde-
pendence and activism. Generations of other Americans
have also grown up with these images. And their accep-
tance of the dehumanization implicit in the stereotypes of
expendability and invisibility is frightening.?"
Thus the clash in the constructed image of Asian Americans
with the reality of Vincent Chin's single-handed defeat of Ebens and
Nitz at the Fancy Pants ignited a fury that led the men to avenge the
racial affront against them. Ebens, it should be noted, was "a very
large, well-built man," compared to Vincent Chin, who was of small
build . 2 Ronald Ebens also had a reputation for violence. According
to Ebens' friend Rich Wagner:
378. Goleman, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting Dr. Ivan Light).
379. Id. (quoting Dr. Steven Salmony).
380. Lawrence, supra note 374, at 469.
381. Renee Tajima, supra note 308, at 317.
382. Interview with Christine Choy, supra note 309. Christine Choy estimated that
Ronald Ebens was six feet, two inches tall and weighed about 200 pounds, Michael
Nitz was six feet, three inches tall and weighed about 200 pounds, while Vincent
Chin was five feet, six inches tall and weighed about 155 pounds. Generalizations
about Asian Americans account for their being targeted for economic street crime;
viewed as physically weak and culturally averse to defending themselves, Asian
Americans are considered low direct risks in any physical confrontation. See Calvin
Sims, Seeking Cash and Silent Victims, New York Thieves Prey on Asians, N.Y. TIMES,
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Yes, I was surprised and the one thing is I know that Ron in a lot
of cases would be a little bit an extrovert. He would talk, he talked
to anybody. That's the kind of person he was but every little
while he would get into arguments with people. You know, not
into fights and stuff like that but he'd get into arguments. He's
been in some scrapes in, in, in a bar. You know one or two before.
And he really ... Ron just, he did have a knack at times where he
would rub somebody the wrong way. But normally it would end
up in a discussion and you know it would end there.3
To the extent that the widespread use of racial epithets is con-
sidered ordinary parlance, it distances the speaker/actor from the
responsibility of claiming their actions as conscious or intentional.
For this reason, legal analysis of intentionality must be reconceptual-
ized to consider acts that are deliberate, though on some level
unconscious.3 In this case, the manifestation of Ronald Ebens' con-
scious and unconscious racism, as evidenced by the severity of the
attack, was the intention to cause lethal harm to Vincent Chin
and/or to avenge the loss of position of White superiority at having
been beaten by Vincent Chin in the Fancy Pants brawl. Beyond the
formalistic application of criminal law principles, then, the racist
underpinnings of Ebens' actions explain not only that such criminal
intentions were formed, but, more significantly, why. Furthermore, a
more searching analysis, from the victim's point of view, is instruc-
tive toward understanding how conscious or unconscious bias can
determine whether a given harm is considered more or less serious
depending on the identities and constructions of the victims and de-
fendants, and of those with discretionary decision-making authority,
including police officers,35 prosecuting attorneys, judgesY37 and
Oct. 7, 1990, at Al (citing hundreds of subway attacks on Asian Americans); see also
Kang, supra note 178, at 1930.
383. Film Transcript, supra note 301, at 7.
384. See Charles R. Lawrence I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); see also Davis, supra note 370
(discussing the term defined by Black mental health professionals as "incessant, often
gratuitous and subtle offenses" which stem from social constructions of Black iden-
tity which assume White superiority and Black inferiority and subordination. The
microaggressive acts that characterize interracial encounters are carried out in
"automatic, preconscious, or conscious fashion" and "stem from the mental attitude
of presumed superiority" (footnote omitted)).
385. See Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Law Enforcement: Implications of the Rodney King
Beating, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 469, 469 (1992); Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discre-
tionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1984); Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion-Who's In
Charge, 68 IOWA L. REv. 431 (1983).
386. See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc'Y REV. 587 (1985); Helen Zia, Asians Are America's Forgot-
ten Victims, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 17, 1991, at 6.
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also jurors.38 It is not a matter of finding racism throughout the
criminal justice system if one looks hard enough for it; it is a matter
of looking hard enough for it in order to find the presence of racial
bias that so many citizens of color experience in various ways. Ap-
plying formalistic principles without consideration of context
permits a false sense of equal justice within the criminal law.
2. Discretion-Law Enforcement
The problems of race that resulted in Vincent Chin's killing
were replicated during the adjudication of the case. It is unlikely that
the state prosecutor considered the full racial underpinnings of the
Vincent Chin case; rather, it is more likely that the case was handled
in a faceless, formalistic manner. Although Ronald Ebens was origi-
nally charged with second degree murder, it appears that law
enforcement regarded the case with only perfunctory attention.
The prosecutor's investigation into the offense did not include
interviews with the women dancers at the Fancy Pants who
observed the fight and heard the critical exchanges between Ronald
Ebens and Vincent Chin. Similarly, the Chin family and the two
African American police officers who were on the scene during the
beating at McDonald's and who forced Ronald Ebens to stop, were
not notified about the plea bargained agreement, nor was a
representative from the prosecutor's office present in the court when
sentence was pronounced." Perhaps this, too, can be interpreted as
normative practices and results stemming from an overtaxed law
enforcement agency; however, the racial, gender, and class dynamics
would suggest something more that was amiss.
The influence of race on law enforcement efforts has been well
documented.3 ° In one study that examined the degree to which race
387. See Developments in the Lawe--Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 7, at
1626-37 (discussing race-based sentencing disparities under indeterminate sentenc-
ing schemes).
388. See generally id. at 1557-87 (discussing racial disparities and the criminal jury);
see also FLOWERS, supra note 321, at 155 (citing studies of juror discrimination, in
which the disparity in finding defendants of color guilty more often than Whites
increases for serious crimes and crimes against White victims); Sheri L. Johnson,
Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1749, 1792 (1993) (discussing
lack of protections for defendants of color against racial imagery used to enhance the
likelihood of their convictions, and jurors' use of explicit or implicit racial arguments
in the course of deliberations).
389. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1425 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
criticisms of the local Wayne County Prosecutor's investigation and general handling
of the case); see also John Holusha, Two Fined in Detroit Slaying Are Indicted by Federal
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1983, at A26.
390. See generally Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, supra note
7, at 1500-20.
SUMMER 19961
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
influenced police arrest decisions, the researchers found that police
were more responsive to White victims of crime. The authors con-
cluded that "[t]he results of [their] study show that differential
responsiveness to victims may be greater in magnitude than suspect-
directed bias, thus representing a greater challenge to equitable ad-
ministration of justice."391 The authors attributed the crime victim
response differential to the likely degree of social distance between
majority White police departments and people of color, citing earlier
research which indicated that police view non-Whites as hostile and
resentful toward them, and that police generally harbor an unsym-
pathetic attitude toward people of color. 39' Indeed, most studies
reveal that "police use race as an independently significant, if not
determinative, factor in deciding whom to follow, search, or ar-
rest.
'393
As noted earlier, there is great latitude in the prosecutor's deci-
sion-making authority. Three arguments are generally advanced for
this far-reaching discretion-the separation of powers doctrine,39i the
expertise of the prosecutor's office, and the impracticability of sub-
jecting prosecutorial decisions to potentially lengthy judicial
review.9 However, as persuasive as these arguments may be, re-
search indicates that race often improperly influences the
prosecutor's decision making in regard to investigation, severity of
charges, and level of requested penalties.
Studies of prosecutorial decision making at the initial screening
stage, for example, 396 reveal that the race of the victim is the most
391. Smith et al., supra note 385, at 249.
392. Id. at 248.
393. Id. at 249; see also Developments in the Law.-Race and the Criminal Process, supra
note 7, at 1494-96 & nn.9-12, 1497-1520 (discussing critiques of racially discrimina-
tory police conduct).
394. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Also, many state constitutions have a corollary to the
separation of powers doctrine found in the federal Constitution.
395. See Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 7, at
1522-23; see also Dwight Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion
and the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 760-73 (1991)
(discussing feeble efforts by federal courts in limiting prosecutorial discretion where
judicial intervention may not be constrained by constitutional proscriptions).
396. As Professor Greene notes:
Theoretically, there are several checks available to limit abuses in prosecuto-
rial discretion. First, decisions to prosecute are subject to judicial oversight.
Second, prosecutorial discretion may be legislatively controlled by pruning
criminal statutes, setting priorities for prosecutorial budgets, providing less
vague standards and creating or requiring the creation of written guidelines,
policies and procedures. Finally, prosecutors are accountable to the elector-
ate, directly or indirectly.
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salient factor in determining whether full prosecution would be pur-
sued, the chances for which increase when the victim is White. One
such study, by looking at prosecutors' decisions to fully prosecute
rather than to reject a case, or to try a case rather than to plea bar-
gain, found that the probability of full prosecution increased when
victims were White and other factors were controlled.
3 7
Radelet and Pierce studied the influence of race in the assess-
ment of homicide offenses. The study examined 1017 homicide
defendants in Florida and compared the initial police assessment of
the severity of each homicide with the initial prosecutorial assess-
ment, and then determined whether the prosecutor upgraded or
downgraded the police assessment of severity. The authors con-
cluded that crimes involving White victims and Black offenders
were much more likely to be upgraded by the prosecutor in severity
assessment, while crimes involving Black victims and White offend-
ers were more likely to be downgraded. These (re)assessments in
turn led to more serious charges, more vigorous prosecution, and
higher sentences for crimes involving White victims.39
A similar study conducted by Bowers and Pierce examined per-
sons indicted for first degree murder in several Florida counties over
a five year period (1972 to 1977). Bowers and Pierce concluded that
homicide cases characterized by the police as involving no felony
circumstances or only suspected felony circumstances were most
likely to be upgraded by the prosecutor to felony murder if the de-
fendant was Black and the victim was White. The authors further
concluded that the prosecutor's selective upgrading and downgrad-
ing for crimes involving Black victims or White defendants, was the
primary reason for the hijh proportion on death row of Blacks who
had killed White victims.
Greene, supra note 395, at 760 & n.90 (noting that over 44 states hold elections for the
office of prosecutor, including Michigan). See MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.191
(West 1991 & Supp. 1996); see also Greene, supra note 395, at 760 & n.91 (stating that
elections are also held with respect to federal prosecutors, who are accountable to the
U.S. Attorney General and, through that officer, to the President. Congress can exer-
cise control through its advise and consent function. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Congress may also initiate impeachment pro-
ceedings. U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 2, cl. 5; see Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74
(1970)).
397. Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the
Allocation of Court Resources, 26 SoC. PROBs. 439, 441-47 (1979).
398. Radelet & Pierce, supra note 386, at 615-19, discussed in Developments in the
Lazo--Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 7, at 1526 & n.21.
399. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under
Post-Fuhrman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DEuNQ. 563, 614-16 (1980), reprinted in W.
BowERs, G. PIERCE & J. McDEvrIr, LEGAL HoMICIDE 199, 244-46 (1984). Of course, the
premise of this article is that bipolar analysis such as applied in the aforementioned
studies, while valuable, may not reflect the particular dynamics attendant to differ-
ently constructed racial and ethnic groups. In this way, these findings may or may
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The complexity of the prosecutor's role as a discretionary deci-
sion maker involves consideration of the strength of evidence, public
opinion, legislative and/or public policy, expenditure of finite re-
sources, and conjecture about the trier of fact's response (judge or
jury). Of course, the prosecutor is ethically bound to bring only those
cases that are supported by probable cause;" however, race may
influence the decision to proceed beyond a basic finding of probable
cause where the prosecutor and the jury may believe the victim or
defendant of color not to be as valuable as other members of society.
As stated by Professor Dwight Greene:
[Wihile the prosecutorial function takes into account many
intangible factors including administration, resource allo-
cation, case evaluation and assessment, equity, fairness,
and justice, which make judicial review difficult, these le-
gitimate bases for granting prosecutors some discretion
also reveal the potential for abuse. Prosecutors could read-
ily rely upon, albeit perhaps unconsciously, improper
considerations, including racist, sexist or classist stereo-
types or other forms of pluralistic ignorance.40'
As previously examined, typically there is a range of charges
which potentially could be brought against a defendant."2 The
prosecutor has the discretion to decide what, if any, charges to bring.
At every stage where there is prosecutorial discretion there may be
discrimination and abuse of discretion. As the Vincent Chin case in-
dicates, this includes the decision to devise plea bargained
not reflect the precise circumstances within interactions between Whites and other
people of color and Asians in the victim-defendant, or defendant-victim identities.
This cannot be extrapolated with confidence. What is clear, however, is that the re-
sponse of law enforcement agencies places a premium on the value of White citizens'
lives, as defendants and particularly as victims of crime. See Harris, supra note 26
(stating that "[A]merican law has recognized a property interest in whiteness that,
although unacknowledged, now forms the background against which legal disputes
are framed, argued, and adjudicated").
400. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY DR 7-103(A) (1980)
(stating that a finding of probable cause requires a determination both that the law
can be applied to the facts and that there is sufficient evidence the defendant proba-
bly committed the crime).
401. Greene, supra note 395, at 759 n.89. Research released in January 1991 by the
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and sponsored by the
National Science Foundation, found that White Americans still believe, often uncon-
sciously, in very racist stereotypes about Blacks and Hispanics with respect to
laziness, tendency to commit acts of violence, intelligence and national loyalty. See id.
(citing Smith, supra note 192, at 5). As Professor Greene opines: "There is no reason to
believe that prosecutors as a group are free from such thinking. Indeed, given the
skewed populations to which they are exposed, prosecutors may be more prone to
such stereotyping." Id.
402. See supra Part II.C (discussion of formalist and contextual homicide law).
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dispositions, where the opportunity to misapply prosecutorial dis-
cretion also can occur. Plea bargaining is the most common form of
criminal case disposition. In the plea bargaining process, the defen-
dant waives certain constitutional protections attendant to the right
to a trial in exchange for a reduction in charge and/or sentence. 4 As
was asserted in Who Killed Vincent Chin?, the prevalence of plea bar-
gaining practices is in response to the demands of high case loads.4m
Also frequently cited are the risks associated with the uncertainties
of trial from the prosecutor's point of view.4°5
In 1971, the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on plea bar-
gaining, thereby expanding prosecutorial discretion, in Santobello v.
New York." In Santobello, Chief Justice Burger called plea bargaining
"an essential component of the administration of justice. '" Never-
theless, plea bargaining has its proponents and detractors. 40
Proponents of plea bargaining contend that it prevents logjams in
the criminal courts; it permits sentences to be tailored to individual
defendants; it efficiently allocates criminal justice system resources;
and prosecutors can obtain higher conviction rates without risking
the expense and uncertainty of trial.40
Opponents of the process have argued that plea bargaining un-
dermines the deterrent value of punishment by permitting evasion
of legal sanctions; that plea bargaining is coercive, i.e., defendants
plead guilty because they are led to believe that they will receive
longer sentences if they insist on going to trial and are subsequently
403. Criminal defendants give up several constitutional rights under plea bar-
gained dispositions, including the right to remain silent, to confront witnesses, to be
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and to a trial by jury. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 211 (1979); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059,
1059 n.1, 1136-37 (1976).
Charge reduction bargaining involves prosecutorial waiver of certain charges
or counts in a multiple charge or count case, thereby reducing the maximum poten-
tial sentence length. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 357, at 390 (tracing plea bargaining
back to the 19th century).
404. NAT'L MINORITY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE INEQUALITY
OF JUSTICE-U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 211 (1980).
405. See HAROLD J. VETTER & IRA J. SILVERMAN, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIME 500
(1986); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 109-12 (1978).
406. 404 U.S. 257 (1971); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Bor-
denkircher v. Hayes, 284 U.S. 357 (1978).
407. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
408. See generally Malvina Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles in the Admini-
stration of Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea
Bargaining Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1982).
409. See Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 949, 950 (1986), and sources cited therein.
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found guilty; and that defendants with a strong case may be encour-
aged to plead by his or her attorney simply because the attorney
does not have the time or energy to prepare for trial.4 0 Lastly, it is
argued that plea bargaining detracts from the legitimacy of the legal
system because defendants regularly plead to lesser crimes than
those actually committed.4
For all of its asserted benefits, however, plea bargaining re-
mains a controversial practice in which questions are raised
regarding the purported societal interests being served. And, for all
of its controversies, among the least explored areas is the impact of
plea bargaining on under-served and/or devalued communities that
are victims of crime.12 In this respect, the decision to plea bargain a
case, rather than to vigorously investigate and prosecute, can reflect
a determination based less on the underlying facts than the identi-
ties, real and constructed, of those involved. Where prosecutorial
discretion is (mis)applied in this fashion, society and members of
underserved communities suffer because plea bargaining often leads
to pleas which stray from the actual offense, and results in sentences
that do not correspond to the crimes committed. Consequently, the
defendant is undercharged, inadequately punished, and members of
communities of color are underprotected and undervalued.413 As re-
vealed by the Vincent Chin case, the adverse impact of plea
bargaining in this way becomes especially apparent in the sentenc-
ing decision, which is discussed below.
410. Id. at 949.
411. Ursula Odiaga, Note, The Ethics of Judicial Discretion in Plea Bargaining, 2 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 695 (1989).
412. There has been considerable research on the discriminatory impact of plea
bargaining practices on defendants of color. See, e.g., MANN, supra note 321, at 182-
84; Kevin C. McManigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989). However, little attention has been paid to the practice when
people of color are victims of crime. For a notable exception, see Stephen L. Carter,
When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988); see also Randall Kennedy,
Changing Images of the State: The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994) (calling for harsher treatment of defendants
of color regarding drug penalty schemes).
413. Indeed, according to the American Citizens for Justice report to the Civil
Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, the preliminary hearing judge,
Thomas C. Bayles, remarked at length that Ebens and Nitz had been "undercharged"
with second degree murder, whereas Ebens had obtained the baseball bat from
Nitz's car and the two defendants had searched for Vincent Chin for 20 to 30 minutes
before Ebens beat him to death. ACJ Report on the Vincent Chin Case, supra note 300,
at 3-5.
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3. Discretion-Judging and Sentencing
It would be fantasy to assume that the pervasive influences of
race discussed earlier in this paper did not also influence the per-
ceptions of judges."" The deeply embedded racial stereotypes in U.S.
society renders this outcome implausible. Members of the bench are
unlikely to be any less impacted than are other Americans by racial
and ethnic stereotypes. In this vein, Professor Kenneth Karst asks
that we:
Think again about all the ways awareness, thought, and
feeling are affected by acculturation. Consider, too, how
each type of socially defined difference produces its own
specialized barriers to understanding. Even the most con-
scientious judge will have difficulty in imagining the
thoughts and feelings of people who have grown up in
groups that his culture has trained him to see as outsid-
415
ers....
Upon accepting their pleas of guilty to manslaughter, Wayne
County Circuit Judge Charles Kaufman sentenced Ronald Ebens and
Michael Nitz to three years probation and $3780 fines.416 Judge
Kaufman was heavily criticized for the light sentence, which sparked
public outrage, particularly in the Asian American community.417
Despite the application of formalistic considerations in sentenc-
ing dispositions, numerous studies of disparate treatment in
criminal sentencing indicate that White defendants receive less
414. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that, "A judge should perform
the duties of his office impartially and diligently." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3 (1980).
415. Kenneth L. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1957, 1965 (1987).
416. Ronald Ebens pleaded guilty, and Michael Nitz pleaded nolo contendere.
Changes in sentencing schemes have restricted the role of judges in this area. Many
states have followed the federal sentencing guidelines in this regard. Therefore,
while a federal judge has no discretion to participate in plea bargaining under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(e), he or she has total discretion as to sentencing following a plea bar-
gain under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(3)&(4), which state that the court may accept or
reject a plea agreement. The federal sentencing guidelines give somewhat limited
judicial discretion in this area, by stipulating sentencing ranges for offense levels.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 991-99 (1984).However, the judge maintains some sentencing dis-
cretion because departures from the guidelines are provided for when "the court
finds that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately
taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and
that should result in a sentence different from that described." Sentencing Reform
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1984).
417. See United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1425 (6th Cir. 1986); CHAN, supra
note 203, at 177; see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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severe sentences than their counterparts of color.18 In these
instances, the race of the victim is the salient determinant in the
defendant's sentence-the perpetrators of offenses against White
victims receive harsher sentences.419 The impetus for disparate
sentencing may be conscious and unconscious bias, and has not
abated as a result of the increase in determinate, rather than
indeterminate, sentencing schemes.4 In a study of three states
(Michigan, California, and Texas), which was controlled for relevant
variables influential in sentencing, criminal justice researcher Joan
Petersilia found that White felony offenders were more likely to
receive probation or shorter sentences that defendants of color. 2'
According to Professor Coramae Richey Mann, "In addition to
different backgrounds, potential racial prejudices, and cultural
stereotyping, administrative pressures can play an integral role in
judges' decisions."422 Addressing the latter circumstance, Judge
Kaufman pointed to an overwhelming docket in response to an in-
terviewer's question about the sentence:
I am the presiding judge in the Criminal Division of the Wayne
County Circuit Court. I have approximately 50 sentences every
week. With 50 sentences a week, you're talking about 200 sen-
tences a month. You're talking about 2000 sentences per year.4
As to the former concerns, however, Judge Kaufman provides
further detail upon which Ebens' and Nitz's sentences were based,
stating:
The victim lingered for four days, which again, based upon every-
thing was indicative to me that they attempted to administer a
punishment. They did this too severely, in careless disregard of
human life which is what manslaughter is. And that's what they
were found guilty of and that's what I predicated my sentence on.
418. See, e.g., Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical
Evaluation with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783 (1981).
419. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); RONALD
BARRI FLOWERS, RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 157 (citing studies by W.
Bowers and G. Pierce, and G. LaFree).
420. See MANN, supra note 321, at 198-200; Paula C. Johnson, Experiences of African
American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 1, 37-41 (1995);
see also Developments in the Law--Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 7, at 1626-41
(discussing indeterminate and determinate sentencing schemes).
421. JOAN PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20-28
(1983), cited in MANN, supra note 321, at 188.
422. MANN, supra note 321, at 189.
423. Film Transcript, supra note 301, at 14.
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Had it been a brutal murder of course these fellas would be in jail
by now. 4
Judge Kaufman's sentence is considered more curious in light
of his departure from the pre-sentence report, which recommended
incarceration for Ebens and Nitz. In Who Killed Vincent Chin?, Helen
Zia of ACJ states:
The only thing that really bugs me is that the response especially
from people in the legal community has been that these things
happen all the time. Sure, police detectives don't even bother to
ask people at the scene of the crime ... anything. I did have an
opportunity to read the presentence report, the psychiatric
evaluation and so forth. And one thing I don't understand about
that was that words like . . . Ronald Ebens is a bigot, an ex-
tremely hostile person. He has a long history of alcoholism and
alcohol related problems and it recommended in addition to in-
carceration that he receive detoxification and counseling for his
alcoholism."
Judge Kaufman's explanation inevitably prompts the questions:
what constitutes a "brutal murder" and what is the appropriate level
of punishment where the underlying facts suggest such brutality,
even upon acceptance of defendant's plea of guilty. Responses to
these questions, as seen previously, are informed by social context as
well as social construction. Why, for example, when descriptions of
the attack on Vincent Chin suggest a normative concept of
brutality4 6 was the killing of Vincent Chin not deemed to be such?
At the time of the sentencing, Judge Kaufman reasoned that Vincent
Chin had thrown the first punch, that the defendants were employed
and had no criminal records, and that Ebens and Nitz "weren't the
kind of people you send to jail."4 Thus, it is probable that Judge
Kaufman lacked the "empathetic understanding"4 necessary to
424. Id. at 13.
425. Id. at 14; see also PErERSILIA, supra note 421, at ix (presenting previous finding
that judges followed the pre-sentence report's recommendation in 80% of cases
studied); ACJ Report on the Vincent Chin Case, supra note 300, at 5-6.
426. The two off-duty police officers who witnessed the attack at the McDonald's
"observed numerous double-handed swings to Vincent Chin's body, and then four
fatal blows to his head." ACJ Report on the Vincent Chin Case, supra note 300, at 3-4.
427. Thornton, supra note 11, at A4 (quoting Judge Charles Kaufman); see also Ste-
phen Franklin, A Victim's Relatives Hope for Justice on Third Try, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19,
1987, at 5.
428. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Nar-
rative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989).
Professor Lynne Henderson also speaks to the value of empathy in legal deci-
sion making, stating that:
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view the attack on Vincent Chin from a different perspective, one
that would not rely on a social construction of Ebens and Nitz as
"noncriminal" and Vincent Chin as less valuable. Were it so, the
brutality of Ebens' act unmistakably would be revealed.
Along these lines, in a study to measure the perceptions of ap-
propriate punishments for offenders convicted of various felonies,
researchers found that the relationship between the criminal perpe-
trator and the victim, and between the offender's social status and
the victim's social status, influenced attitudes of appropriate sanc-
tions .2 Further, the study concluded that socio-demographic
characteristics such as race, gender, and education, influenced re-
spondents' judgments about what constitutes suitable criminal
sanctions. In other words, the researchers determined that perspec-
tivity and context determined the perception of fairness in
sentencing: "We quite clearly see that thoughts of justice are filtered
through the social context in which behavior occurs. Our research
implies that perceptions of justice, inferred from evaluations of fel-
ony sanctions, reflect discretionary judgments and considerations of
structural aspects of society."' 30 The researchers underscore their
conclusions by quoting Roscoe Pound on the administration of jus-
tice:
[I]n no legal system, however minute and detailed its body
of rules, is justice administered wholly by rule and without
any recourse to the will of the judge and his personal sense
of what should be done to achieve a just result in the case
[E]mpathy is a form of understanding, a phenomenon that encompasses af-
fect as well as cognition in determining meanings; it is a rich source of
knowledge and approaches to legal problems-which are, ultimately, human
problems. Properly understood, empathy is not a "weird" or "mystical" phe-
nomenon, nor is it "intuition." Rather, it is a way of knowing that can explode
received knowledge of legal problems and structures, that reveals moral
problems previously sublimated by pretensions to reductionist rationality,
and that provides a bridge to normatively better legal outcomes.
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1576 (1987)
(footnote omitted). Having stated the importance of empathy, it is important to un-
derstand its fullest expression, which is not further self-absorption. Rather, as
Professor Kenneth Karst states, "[m]ore than an intellectual predisposition, or belief,
it is a readiness to be engaged in the experiences of others." Karst, supra note 415, at
1966. The empathy ideal, then, is firmly rooted in recognition and respect for the
lived experiences and perspectives of others.
429. Joann L. Miller et al., Felony Punishments: A Factorial Survey of Perceived Justice
in Criminal Sentencing, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 396 (1991).
430. Id. at 414.
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before him. Both elements are to be found in all admini-
stration of justice.4"
Judge Kaufman's sentencing decision and his proffered ration-
ales raise additional questions about the expectations of judges. On
this point, Professor Judith Resnik observes, "[T]he heretofore male
law of judges has made impossible demands. Impartiality and dis-
engagement can never be achieved, hence all judgment is (sub rosa)
suspect, hence we are always living in a second best world in which
we cover our tracks with doctrines of insulation .... "3 Professor
Lynne Henderson adds, "[E]mpathy aids both processes of discov-
ery-the procedure by which a judge or other legal decision maker
reaches a conclusion-and processes of justification-the procedure
used by a judge or other decision maker to justify the conclusion-in
a way that disembodied reason simply cannot." ' However, while
supporting the move away from Cartesian duality-that is, "to cease
to be in order to hear another's claims, or to be, and then to be im-
permissibly interested"O-Professor Patricia Cain correctly observes
that 'bias' ... can be both good and bad."' In this regard, the Vin-
cent Chin case did not evince a complete lack of empathy; instead,
under the rubric of individualized sentencing, Judge Kaufman ap-
parently empathized with Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz rather
than with Vincent and Lily Chin.
"Looking from the bottom,"'' Judge Kaufman could have con-
sidered the context in which Ronald Ebens killed Vincent Chin: the
derision of Asian Americans during the Detroit area's economic
decline and the incitement of violence against Asian Americans
431. 2 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 355 (1959), quoted in Miller et al., supra note
429, at 415.
432. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsideration of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1943 (1988).
433. Henderson, supra note 428, at 1576 (footnote omitted). But see Toni M. Mas-
saro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87
MICi. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (expressing doubts and hopes about the "call to context,"
which is complex and often contradictory); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 277, at 146-
65 (recognizing that formal legal rules and procedures often provide more protection
to subordinated groups in a society built upon racial hierarchy).
434. Resnik, supra note 432, at 1944 (interpreting the views of Judge Learned Hand
on the role of judges, and citing LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 309-10 (Irving
Dillard ed., 1958).
435. Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1946 (1988); see also Massaro, supra note 433, at 2110 ("The
significant modem questions . . . are not whether judges and "law" should
"empathize," or whether stories are exceptional windows to experience, but with
whom should we empathize-why, when, and according to what procedures?").
436. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.Rt-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
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through public displays and political rhetoric,47 which, according to
Ebens' admissions, fueled his anger toward Vincent Chin.3 He also
would have been knowledgeable about the historical nativistic racist
scapegoating of Asian Americans for economic woes in the United
States. Considering these contextual aspects of the killing, Judge
Kaufman may have been more informed, and thus more inclined, to
see the brutality of the killing as something beyond routinized vio-
lence. Equipped with this knowledge, he could have understood the
significance of Vincent Chin's throwing the first punch upon being
called a "Chink" and "Nip" and the grave disproportion of Ebens'
response. This would not have required abandonment of normative
concepts justifying punishment; rather, these concepts would have
reached their full potential.49 Instead, his ruling applied a "blame
the victim" rationale which was disconnected from the reality,
events and motivations generated by the era. Rendered ahistorically,
the ruling ignored the past and present contexts in which
"[c]ountless [Asian Americans] have been brutalized by vicious
physical assaults by whites who resent their ,resence, competition,
real or imagined, and their accomplishments."
The difficulties, then, involve distinguishing good bias from
bad, and maintaining the good bias (good connection) in the process
of judging. 1 Professor Cain asks, "If we are willing to admit that our
judges naturally bring a point of view with them into the courtroom,
then what sort of language should we use to talk about judicial
bias?""2 She offers this valuable prescription:
When you listen as a judge, you must transcend your sense
of self, so that you can really listen. Listen to the story that
is being told. Do not prejudge it. Do not say this is not part
of my experience. But listen in such a way as to make it
part of your experience. Find some small part of your own
437. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 343 (statements by former Congress-
man Tip O'Neill); supra p. 437 (noting the frequent car bashings of Japanese imports
with sledgehammers).
438. See supra text accompanying note 341 (statements by Ronald Ebens while
fighting with Vincent Chin).
439. As Professor Phyllis Goldfarb states, "[C]ontextual reasoning merely suggests
that decision makers view the scope of legal relevance quite broadly and remain
open to persuasion about the relevance of novel facts and the insights they can
spawn. Decision makers need not ignore the prevailing rules potentially applicable
to the case." Goldfarb, supra note 252, at 1640 (footnote omitted).
440. JAMES E. BLACKWELL, THE BLACK COMMUNITY: DIvERsrrY AND UNrTY 66-67
(1991), quoted in Robinson, supra note 4, at 85 (discussing the stereotypes that often
belie the manufactured stereotypes of Asian Americans).
441. Cain, supra note 435, at 1946.
442. Id. at 1948.
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self that is like the Other's story. Identify with the Other.
Do not contrast. Only when ou have really listened, and
only then, should you judge.
Following Professor Cain's prescription would have resulted in
less polarized perceptions as to whether Judge Kaufman's sentenc-
ing of Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz constituted just punishment
or impunity.
D. Student Responses to Who Killed Vincent Chin?
In the foregoing sections I have endeavored to disclose the ways
in which ahistorical and noncontextual allegiance to formalistic legal
principles can render reprehensible results in criminal proceedings.
Understanding how societal structures, individual and group iden-
tity, and social constructions influence legal doctrine and processes
requires critical appraisal of various intersections between race,
gender, class, sexual orientation, and physical capabilities, in Ameri-
can society. Upon focusing on the experiences of Asian Americans, I
have applied critical analysis of these dynamics in explaining my
alternative views on the Vincent Chin case. As I have sought to dem-
onstrate, even a professedly formalistic approach could have
produced a different, more commensurate result in this case, al-
though it would seem more unlikely to do so.
At this point, it is important to add that in discussing the film
and its subjects with students, my views are not the only ones to be
heard. Indeed, as a teaching tool, the purpose of watching the film is
to encourage students to articulate their own views and analyses of
the same events, while simultaneously encouraging them to enlarge
their worldview by "pivoting the center. " 4 As historian Elsa Barkley
Brown states the objective, speaking in terms of African American
women's experiences:
[T]he most important and most difficult questions in
African-American women's history ask how to center the
experiences of African-American women and how to foster
in our students the ability to center those experiences. How
do our students overcome years of notions of what is
443. Id. at 1955 (providing an alternative feminist interpretation of Judge Learned
Hand's conception of judging).
444. In the words of historian Bettina Aptheker, this phrase entails the ability to
center in another's experience. BMINA APTHEKER, TAPESTRIEs OF LIFE: WOMEN'S
WORK, WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE MEANING OF DAILY LIFE (1989), cited in
Elsa Barkley Brown, African-American Women's Quilting: A Framework for Conceptual-
izing and Teaching African-American Women's History, in 14 SIGNS 921,921 n.1 (1989).
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normative? While trying to think about these issues in my
teaching, I have come to understand that this is not merely
an intellectual process. It is not merely a question of
whether people are able to intellectualize about a variety of
experiences. It is also about coming to believe in the
possibility of a variety of experiences, a variety of ways of
understanding the world, a variety of frameworks of
operation, without imposing consciously or unconsciously
a notion of the norm .... 44
In each setting where I have used the film,' students have
shown great interest and have brought impressive insights to the
exercise. In the substantive courses, students generally welcomed
the opportunity to get out of the casebook and to relate those prin-
ciples to issues having social significance;" 7 and in the clinical
courses, the students eagerly and more readily identified the com-
peting interests, demands of professionalism, and the operation of
the criminal justice system."8
Several student exercises help to facilitate class discussion of the
film. Used alternately and not mutually exclusively, these exercises
have included questionnaires and reaction papers about the film. In
questionnaires or reaction papers, students are given broad areas in
which to discuss the issues they believe to be important to the case
and the film. For example, they are asked whether the film adds any
value to their understanding of criminal law doctrine and/or the
445. Brown, supra note 444, at 921; see also Matsuda, supra note 272, at 9 ("The
multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to attain is not a random ability to see all
points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the
oppressed.").
446. I have shown Who Killed Vincent Chin? in several of my substantive criminal
law and clinical education courses at Northern Illinois University College of Law and
Syracuse University College of Law. I also conducted a class with first year criminal
law students at Dickinson Law School at the invitation of Professors Peter Alexander
and Jane Rigler. I want to thank the students at all of these institutions for their par-
ticipation and insights.
447. In my substantive criminal law classes, I have typically shown the film after
completion of the homicide materials in the casebook. I believed that in this way
students would have the necessary analytical foundations to discuss the distinctions
between categories and degrees of criminal homicide. I am grateful to Professor Ma-
rina Angel, however, for suggesting that I show the film prior to "filling their heads
with all of that" to see whether and how the students might independently devise
distinctions within criminal law homicide doctrine. I can now express satisfaction
with showing the film either before or after the introduction of classical criminal
homicide doctrine; in both instances, the students have been astute and insightful.
Society of American Law Teachers Teaching Conference/Criminal Law Section Up-
date, July 22, 1993, at 5 (on file with author).
448. In the clinical courses, I typically show the film early because of the impor-
tant insights regarding case theory, fact investigation, and counseling to be gained.
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operation of the criminal justice system; what factors they believe
impacted the proceedings and outcome of the case and at what
stages; whether the issues raised in the film are appropriately ad-
dressed in the law school curriculum; and whether the film will have
any value for them during their coursework, clinical work, and be-
yond law school.
In role-playing assignments, we concentrate on the local crimi-
nal case and proceed as though no plea bargain had been reached.
Also, to examine whether the analyses or outcomes would differ
across doctrinal variations, students are assigned to use common
law and the Model Penal Code" 9 as the applicable criminal law. Stu-
dents assume the roles of prosecuting attorney, defense attorney,
judge, eyewitnesses, ACJ activists, Vincent Chin, Lily Chin, and
friends of Ebens and Nitz."° While students are free to enter into
449. MODEL PENAL CODE (1985).
450. Several issues of ethics and professionalism frequently arise and are particu-
larly highlighted during the role-playing exercises. For example, students question
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in "overcharging" and "undercharging" for
various reasons, including race-based influences, and trial ethics, including locating
the line between witness preparation and improper witness coaching, as was alleged
against an ACJ attorney and witnesses favorable to the government. See United States
v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1430-32 & app. A (6th Cir. 1986). Another issue relates to the
duty to provide legal representation, with regard to the expressed reluctance to rep-
resent Ronald Ebens. For an excellent treatment of this subject, see Abbe Smith, When
Ideology and Duty Conflict, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECrION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER, 18-29 (Rodney J. Uphoff
ed., 1995); see also id. ("A lawyer is under no obligation to act as advisor for advocate
to every person who may wish to become his client . .. ") (citing MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26); id. ("A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to
accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant.") (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 6.2, Comment); id. ("A lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.") (citing MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 15
(1908) (The lawyer has an obligation to give "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertions of
[the lawyer's] utmost learning and ability.").
In addition to the issues of empathy, race and gender, exploring the role of
Lily Chin permits greater understanding of the role of the victim or surviving family
and friends in criminal cases. In an adversary legal system such as that of the United
States, victims typically have no formally recognized role in the trial of their offend-
ers and no mechanism for expressing their concerns about the offender, the crime,
and its impact on them. As one researcher notes, adherence to the public prosecution
system means that "victims have no power to compel prosecutions nor 'standing' to
contest decisions to dismiss or reduce charges, to plea bargain... or to challenge the
sentence imposed on their offenders." See Edna Erez & Ewa Bienkowska, Victim Par-
ticipation in Proceedings and Satisfaction with Justice in the Continental Systems: The Case
of Poland, 21 J. CRim. JUST. 47, 48-49 (1993). In contrast, crime victims in many Euro-
pean or continental criminal justice systems have more extensive rights to
involvement in the process. Poland provides such an example:
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plea negotiations, they must explain any decisions in this regard as
well as any departures from events or decisions depicted in the film
or recorded in the appellate case in their "revised" handling of the
case. In this way, everyone must articulate sound and persuasive
reasons for their respective positions and decisions to other mem-
bers of the class, who in turn question them about their positions
and decisions. This requires critical thinking and participation by all
members of the class.
Irrespective of the particular assignment, however, students in-
variably raise the following topics as relevant for discussion: race,
gender roles, and class distinctions; the role of police, prosecutors,
judges, witnesses and jurors; ethical and professional responsibility
of attorneys and judges; the impact of criminal litigation on crime
victims, defendants, and their families and friends; perspectivity;
economics; sentencing policies; political empowerment; media influ-
ence; justifications for punishment; intoxication; the connection
between fact investigation, material facts, doctrinal law and case
theory; double jeopardy; and the relationship between state and fed-
eral criminal proceedings. Thus, because the students view these
Victims have the right to become a supporting or subsidiary prosecutor in
public prosecutions and thus suggest witnesses or evidence or present ques-
tions to witnesses. They also have a right to be represented by a lawyer in the
criminal proceedings against their offenders. If the public prosecutor refuses
to file charges and initiate criminal proceedings, victims have the right to be-
come private prosecutors and pursue the case on their own. Victims in
Poland also can file adhesive suits (become civil plaintiffs in the criminal
trial) and thus recover their costs resulting from the crime during the criminal
proceedings, while leaving the burden and costs of prosecution to the public
prosecutor. As private prosecutors or as subsidiary prosecutors, they have the
right to make statements concerning the offender or propose a sentence. Vic-
tims also have the right in every stage of the Polish criminal justice process to
be informed by the relevant agency about their privileges or obligations con-
cerning the proceedings.
Id. at 48; see also Joachim Herrmann, The German Prosecutor, in DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 16 (Kenneth Culp Davis ed., 1976) (discussing limited discretion
of German prosecutors and right of victims to compel prosecution). In the United
States, the "victim's rights movement" has gained speed, although it remains contro-
versial within the adversary system, particularly in capital sentencing cases. For
discussion of the issues, see, for example, Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim 's
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985) (arguing that laws passed in the crime victim's
name may have worsened conditions for victims where the victim's experience re-
mains largely ignored, mischaracterized and misappropriated). In the capital
sentencing context, discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee,
which upheld the use of victim impact statements in capital jury sentencing proceed-
ings, see Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument After
Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1993); Jose Felipe Anderson, Will the
Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial Disclosure, and the Uncharted Future of
Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
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issues as germane and interrelated, our treatment of the case and the
movie plumbs greater depths than solely an elemental analysis of
homicide law. Below are samples of students' expressions about Who
Killed Vincent Chin?
451
The majority of students are unnerved by the apparent lack of
remorse demonstrated by Ronald Ebens:
The film has enhanced my appreciation of the retribution func-
tion of punishment and especially the rehabilitation aspect since
the two attackers have not expressed the slightest remorse over
the death.
He [Ron Ebens] continued to work and play on his company
baseball team. In fact, he played baseball on the day of Vincent
Chin's death, just four days after the initial incident.
I was especially surprised at the complete lack of remorse Mr.
Ebens displayed. He seemed very indignant and defensive. Not
once did he ever mention feeling regretful towards his actions.
This disturbed me. I understand his feeling that he did not intend
to kill Mr. Chin, but no recognition of his actions seemed strange
to me.
Most disturbing was Mr. Ebens' lack of remorse. When asked to
explain what happened, Mr. Ebens claims he does not know what
happened. When asked if his conduct was wrong, he claimed he
did nothing on purpose. He seems to think his act is not analo-
gous to pointing a gun at Mr. Chin and shooting him. No, he did
not point a loaded gun, but Mr. Ebens was loaded with anger
and bigotry. . . . At the very least, Mr. Ebens should feel some
sense of shame, embarrassment or sadness for his part in the
death of Mr. Chin.
Not once did [the Ebenses] attempt to empathize with Vincent or
his family. She [Nita Ebens, Ronald Ebens' wife] just assumed
that these things happened and the whole event was being prolif-
erated through a myriad of television and media sensationalism.
451. These are excerpts from student reaction papers and responses to question-
naires about the film (on file with the author). In order to encourage complete
candor, students had the option of identifying themselves on their papers.
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The fact that all she did was make reference to how her and her
husband's life had been very tumultuous during Ronald's five
year trial period indicated to me that she felt the death of Vincent
was simply a burden.
Ebens still feels the incident was just "preordained" to happen.
He feels no remorse for what he did. Nothing illustrates this more
clearly than the manner in which he spoke about being in jail for
Fathers' Day. He truly seemed more upset about that than any-
thing he had done to Vincent Chin. He said he did not want to be
away from his children on that day. At least he got to see his chil-
dren again. Mrs. Chin is not so fortunate.
Upon discussing whether or not to explicitly address issues of
race, ethnicity, gender, and other issues of diversity and context in
the law school curriculum, some students found their idealism di-
minished, others had their cynicism confirmed, while others' faith in
color-blind justice remained unshaken:
I don't think first year is the time for a film like this. However, I
may be wrong. In the first year, students are concentrating on
the basics, and they may consider issues like this collateral and
not as important.
[Wie need to understand that these principles [of law] do not op-
erate in isolation .... We can forget that the realities of class,
bias, race, politics, and an overwhelmed court system operate to
form a different reality. Hearing that from a professor or reading
it on the page does not have the same impact as a visual medium.
There are valid concerns and fears on both sides of the
race/ethnicity question which are at the boiling point and if not
dealt with will infect and cause some great racial conflict (i.e.,
violence).
I found it beneficial because I realize that I had an idealistic view
about the system, or maybe my standards are higher. It was in-
teresting to see how a group of people were able to get the federal
court to look into the issues of the case .... Realistically, these is-
sues should affect every attorney.
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As a former newspaper reporter who spent many years covering
the courts, I was not surprised by the Vincent Chin film. It
points to many of the areas of the criminal justice system that are
ripe for abuse, most notably in the areas of plea bargaining, and
judicial and prosecutorial discretion.
[Liaw students have already formed their values about these is-
sues. So, please. Just teach us the law, and let us graduate, leave
this rat hole, and pursue our careers .... Call me naive, but I
truly believe that justice is blind.
Discussion about diversity in the law school curriculum is neces-
sary but often falls on deaf ears. Every year some issue regarding
race surfaces [at this institution]. And every year, those indi-
viduals who need to be a part of the discourse so that a better
understanding between all students can be achieved, do not par-
ticipate. The frustration is felt by all, at both the faculty and
student levels. I do not think that the issue should be eliminated,
in fact I think the issue should be discussed more often and
openly. When that happens, maybe [we] may become a little more
receptive to other points of view.
Students offered the following opinions about the factors that
impacted the Chin case. Few believed that the case would have been
handled the same or that the outcome would have been the same
had the roles and identities of Ronald Ebens and Vincent Chin been
reversed:
If the Asian community had not organized, the Chin case would
have quietly disappeared. The publicity was certainly responsible
for the Federal indictment .... The media also played a crucial
role in the Chin case. When you have witnesses talking on the
evening news or cops saying this was wrong the pressure builds.
This case does demonstrate the power of the people, for it was
only after marching in the streets did a second trial come
about.... The Asian American community was not the only one
to find no peace in the sentence Mr. Ebens received, his sentence
did violence to what we have come to define as justice.
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I don't think necessarily that the killing was the result of race, in-
sofar as the men appeared to be just as likely to kill another white
in the same situation. I think that the economy and the geography
played a more substantial role. Major cities to some extent have
become immune to the violence and in many instances so have
the citizens. I think the race implications were taken by the media
and blown out of proportion.
I believe that race, ethnicity, and the media were influential to all
stages of the incident starting at the topless bar. We must re-
member that this event took place in Detroit, "The Motor City."
Having been from there, I am very aware of the tension which
exists between the American auto industry workers and the
Asian population in general. My best friend from home is Korean
and happens to drive a Toyota. She lived out in Ypsilanti where
one of the auto factories is located and one which was a target fac-
tory for closure two years ago. My friend applied for a teaching
position at an elementary school located near the factory. She was
terrified to go to her interview at the school, and subsequently
when offered the job, declined acceptance because of her race and
the fact that she drove a Japanese car. The fear in Asians is real.
This is no different than any of the fears experienced by other
people of color.
The larger issue here is not whether Ebens was a racist in the
murder of Vincent Chin, but whether the criminal justice system
was. The answer is a resounding "yes." The criminal justice sys-
tem turned this murder into a racially motivated crime by not
affording it the proper due diligence to begin with-no matter
what the docket looks like or the case load!
A psychiatrist's professional evaluation concluded that Mr.
Ebens ought to be incarcerated, and was in need of reform.
Friends admitted that he was argumentative, violent, had a
drinking problem, and that behind closed doors, he was a bigot.
The preferential treatment given to Mr. Ebens was no doubt due
to the fact that he was an upstanding citizen, not because he
obeyed the law per se, but because his profile; white, from a small
town, a father and family man, fit the preferred societal norm. It
would seem that the trial judge did not want to punish Mr.
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Ebens based on his profile, rather than the justification for pun-
ishment.
In many respects this case was not about one man taking some-
one else's life. This case was about the hate and racism that
persists in this country. If Mr. Chin had not been Asian-
American would Mr. Ebens still have felt the need to chase him
down? . . . Mr. Ebens mistakenly believes that this whole thing
started with a sucker punch. No, it started when white Ameri-
cans assumed they were the superior race. It started when Mr.
Ebens did not teach his stepson to respect diversity.
Media influences and shapes our images, thoughts and beliefs.
Some say the media in this case orchestrated a racially charged
case, while others say the media fulfilled its role to uncover un-
truths. Mr. Ebens' trial received media coverage, surely society is
not so uncompassionate that the beating of a man to death, ap-
parently motivated by hatred, goes unnoticed. Yes, people cared
about what happened to Mr. Chin. He died not because of any-
thing he did, but because of who he was.
This film helped to further my understanding that the system
works different ways for different people. If Ebens had been a per-
son of color, there would be little doubt of his guilt. However,
caught up in legal definitions and defining what Ebens did, there
was a loss of justice for the victim that the system was supposed
to protect.
While most students found value in the film's depiction of the
comprehensive nature and interests in criminal proceedings, for oth-
ers the non-linear approach was viewed as disjointed and confusing.
Other students found that the film did not effectively impart lessons
about criminal law doctrine and procedure. And for some, the film-
makers' biases were disturbing, noting, for example, that all voices
were not heard, particularly state and federal prosecutors, appellate
judges, and jurors:
The film Who Killed Vincent Chin? enhanced my knowledge of
substantive criminal law because it reinforced what we've
learned this semester. This film helped show the importance of the
definitions of crimes and the need for the proscribed punishment
to concur with the offense. It further demonstrated the need for
the correct form and degree of punishment in order for the aim or
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goals of criminal law to be met. Moreover, this film was helpful in
showing how the morality of society and the morality of the
judges plays a part in the criminal law system.
The plea bargain was fair. It would probably have been difficult to
prove that the defendants intentionally or purposefully killed
Vincent Chin; however, their actions were certainly done with
reckless disregard to human life .... Manslaughter was a fair
charge both to society and to the defendants. Society, or more ap-
propriately the Asian American community did not seem to find
fault with the level of crime that was pled to. The defendants real-
ized that their actions were criminal, pled guilty and expected to
be punished by going to jail.
This was a great example of the risks of plea bargains. It was good
to see the complexity of provocation, self-defense, and premedita-
tion in a real world situation. Seeing the process and its
manipulation on all sides was enlightening.
In terms of being an effective means to understand substantive
criminal law, the film was generally ineffective. The facts given
seemed inadequate and were presented in a confusing manner,
both of which prevented a thorough substantive analysis. My
understanding of criminal law would be more greatly enhanced
by a detailed problem or hypothetical.
I liked the completeness of this film. They were, in my mind, very
successful in providing a comprehensive view of the legal process.
The fact finding and question section that took up the majority of
the first half and intermittently throughout the entire film, was a
tremendous benefit. It brought together personal questions re-
lated to how one goes about the discovery process. Not only did
they extensively question Mr. Ebens and his wife, Mr. Nitz and
Mrs. Chin, but they questioned Mr. Chin's friends, the factory
workers, police, and the dancers at the club, and witnesses on the
street.
Growing up in a small, blue-collar town myself, I am all too
aware of the racial discrimination which still exists towards mi-
nority groups. One aspect of the film which did disturb me,
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however, was the fact that the producers of this documentary
were Asian. Their point of view was clearly in favor of Chin (and
rightfully so). Their bias, although understandable, may have
slanted their editing process against the defendants .... For ex-
ample, at one point during the film jurors of the first Detroit
federal trial were interviewed. These jurors were convinced that
the attack was racially motivated. However, on retrial a second
jury found no underlying racism in the attack. The producers
failed to interview jurors from the second trial, and instead place
blame on the result on the change of venue [from Detroit to Cin-
cinnati] .... Overall, I do not think this valuable message was
greatly tarnished by potential bias.
[Niothing indicates that the media, race, or the location of the
trial influenced the outcome of the case. First, the media did not
likely influence the outcome of the [federal civil rights] case. In-
deed, notwithstanding their sensationalist portrayal of the crime,
the jury acquitted the defendant. Second, race did not apparently
influence the outcome of the case. Although someone noted that
there were no Chinese jurors, nothing indicates that the chosen
jurors were prejudiced. Third, the location of the civil rights trial
did not likely influence the outcome of the case: A reporter stated
that he expected the jury to acquit the defendant, because the trial
was held in a "conservative city." There are two problems with
this comment, however: (a) it implies that the jury was conser-
vative (nothing indicates that it was), and more disturbingly, (b)
it implies that conservatives are insensitive to racial issues
(which is emphatically untrue).
I must question if Ebens is really as awful as he appeared in the
film because it is very likely that only those images portraying
him in the worst light were included. Particularly persuasive was
the film's contrasting the various lifestyles of the two groups: the
autoworkers were always presented in the worst possible light
(i.e., closed-minded and immoral), while the Asian culture was
seen as emphasizing strong family values and all the traditional
American dreams.
Responding to whether or not the issues raised in the film
would impact them beyond law school, students offered the follow-
ing views:
In terms of criminal law, considering issues of diversity is essen-
tial .... In terms of my own career as an attorney, I try to treat
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people consistently and fairly, regardless of their diversity. When
dealing with others, I prefer not to address people differently be-
cause they may be of a different race or ethnicity than me.
Continuously addressing issues of diversity may only serve the
purpose of emphasizing differences, and promoting disparate
treatment of those who are different, instead of encouraging peo-
ple to respect others for those differences.
This film was excellent because it served so many different pur-
poses. It highlighted the fact that many different things influence
the criminal justice system such as the political and economical
viewpoints of the judges. In addition, it prompted me to reflect
upon today's criminal justice system and to highlight some of the
current problems. It also prompted me to think about what my
role will be in this process once I become a practicing attorney.
Change will only happen if people do not lose touch with their
value judgments in determining what is right and what is
wrong. As law students, we must keep in mind that we are not
here to serve some theoretical, abstract idea of the law, rather we
are here to serve human kind. How then, can we keep at least a
portion of our idealism intact?
We will picture Ebens beating Vincent Chin with a baseball bat
as if swinging for a home run.
The students' own comments convinced me of the pedagogic
value of Who Killed Vincent Chin? The variety of their opinions and
debates regarding content, form and perspective in the case and the
film, reinforced the value of presenting challenging situations to
students so that they can grapple with the complexity and inconsis-
tency of criminal law doctrine and its applications. Who Killed
Vincent Chin? required students to "pivot the center" of Asian
Americans' lives, and to consider the violent expressions of their his-
torical and contemporary devaluation in the United States. The
students were able to do so with impressive results. The accompany-
ing exercises provided opportunities for students' personal
reflections, as well as opportunities for experiential learning in
which they worked collaboratively to advocate a variety of posi-
tions, with consideration for law, context, and socially constructedidentity.4"
452. For a nonexhaustive list of descriptions of similar pedagogical efforts by
other law professors, see, for example, Beverly Balos, Learning to Teach Gender, Race,
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1H. THE SEQUEL: THE EMERGENCE OF "HATE CRIME" LEGISLATION
The Vincent Chin litigation has been called a "landmark for
Asian Americans. 4u The case is invariably cited as epitomizing anti-
Asian violence in American society.4- His death occurred in 1982, a
century after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, accompanied by the
unchanged violent rhetoric from a century ago-the seemingly in-
delible construction of Asian Americans as alien, economic enemies.
In June 1992, memorials marking the tenth anniversary of Vincent
Chin's death were held in several U.S. cities.55 According to Ronald
Wakabayashi, former national director of the Japanese American
Citizens League, the ongoing litigation and subsequent community
action were in response to the perception amongst many Asian
Americans that "their lives [were] not worth much.'
In the decade since Vincent Chin's death there has been a re-
surgence in bias-motivated violence.45 Asian Americans are among
the most frequent victims of bias-motivated offenses; the U.S.
Class, and Heterosexism: Challenge in the Classroom and Clinic, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 161
(1992); Caplow, supra note 259; Christine Alice Corcos, supra note 284; Jay M. Fein-
man et al., Symposium, Five Approaches to Legal Reasoning Within the Classroom:
Contrasting Perspectives on O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 57 MO. L. REV. 347 (1992)
(discussing the teaching of a torts case from the perspectives of critical legal studies,
feminist jurisprudence, law and economics, critical race theory, and traditional legal
education); Phyllis Goldfarb et al., Symposium: Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of
Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992); Jane Schukoske, Teaching
Law Reform in the 1990s, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 177 (1992).
453. Franklin, supra note 427, at 5 (quoting Ronald Wakabayashi, former national
director of the Japanese American Citizens League).
454. A WESTLAW search revealed that Vincent Chin's death had been mentioned in
thirty-one law review articles, as evidence of anti-Asian violence in America.
455. See Vincent Chin's Grim Anniversary-Racial Killing in '82 Spurs Seattle Rally,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 1992, at B2; McMillan, supra note 13, at B3.
456. Franklin, supra note 427, at 5 (quoting Ronald Wakabayashi).
457. In 1991, the FBI's first national report on bias crimes found that 4558 hate
crime incidents were reported n 1991. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JuSTICE, HATE CRIME STATISTICS (1993) [hereinafter FBI REPORT]. The report was
compiled pursuant to the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 140, and the general crime statistics provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
534 (1988). Racial bias was the reported motivation in six out of ten offenses, relig-
ious bias accounted for two out of ten, and ethnic and sexual-orientation bias
accounted for one out of ten reported offenses. Thirty-two states participated in the
study. Although only 3000 of the 16,000 law enforcement agencies chose to partici-
pate in the FBI's data collection, the report confirmed what several researchers
surmised to be "a steady increase in hate crimes in the last year or two." Goleman,
supra note 4, at C1 (quoting Howard Ehrlich); see also Stephen Labaton, Poor Coopera-
tion Deflates F.B.I. Report on Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at A10. The FBI
reported a record number of cases handled by its civil rights division in 1989, the
year before the report. See Goleman, supra note 4, at Cl.
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Commission on Civil Rights reported that violence against Asian
Americans had doubled since 1980.4"
In Dr. Jack McDevitt's study on hate crime, most of the perpe-
trators of racist incidents were young White men, just under two-
thirds, while one-third of the perpetrators were Black. Dr. McDevitt
further noted that while most of the crimes by Blacks were against
Whites, he found that "whites attack everybody: Blacks, Hispanics,
gays, Asians." In Boston, the study revealed, bias crimes committed
by Asian Americans and Latinos were rare, although Vietnamese




One of the most significant developments in the criminal law
since Vincent Chin's death has been the emergence of "hate crime"
legislation. Such legislation has been controversial and has been se-
verely criticized for potential infringements on constitutionally
protected speech and expressive conduct,' as well as for the efficacy
of its treatment within criminal law doctrine." The effectiveness of
458. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171. According to Professor
Jack McDevitt, sociologist at Northeastern University, typical bias offenses involve
"turf' battles such as that experienced by an Asian family that moved into an all-
White neighborhood in Boston. On the first night someone broke several windows
with rocks, and on the second night someone spray-painted the walls with racist
slurs. On the third night the family moved back to its old neighborhood, leaving an
older son to guard their possessions. A mob of 20 youths taunted the son until he
came out, then beat him. See Goleman, supra note 4, at C1 (discussing McDevitt's
research).
. 459. Goleman, supra note 4; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171;
ORGANIZATION FOR CHINESE AMERICANS IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 2 (1992) ("Today,
Asians rank fourth on the list of victims of hate crimes, behind African Americans,
people of the Jewish faith, and homosexual men."); Amici Curiae Brief of the Na-
tional Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium at 3, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476 (1993), cited in Kang, supra note 178, at 1926 n.3 ("Incidents of violence against
Asians have risen at a rate faster than for any other ethnic group.").
460. See, e.g., Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws,
39 UCLA L. REV. 33 (1991).
461. The primary objection of traditional criminal law theory to hate crimes is use
of the actor's "motive" in defining the offense or the penalty enhancement. This is
based on the belief that motive ought not be relevant to criminal liability. Therefore,
hate crimes violate this rule by taking account of the actor's motive-his or her anti-
race, anti-religion, anti-sexual orientation, or other anti-group motive.
However, there is recognition that motive may be consistent with traditional
criminal law theory. As Professor Paul Robinson observes: "[Motive-the cause of
an action-frequently is an element of liability and grading, and no apparent reason
exists why it should not be that way. It should alter liability if and only if it alters an
actor's blameworthiness for the prohibited act." Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes:
Crimes of Motive, Character, or Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605, 608;
see also Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Win-
ter/Spring 1989, at 3; Jonathan David Selbin, Note, Bashers Beware: The Continuing
Constitutionality of Hate Crimes Statutes After R.A.V., 72 OR. L. REV. 157, 192 (1993)
(noting that "[c]oncepts of motive, purpose and intent are intertwined, and the rele-
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hate crimes legislation to address hate-motivated offenses against
Asian Americans is questionable, however, absent a deeper com-
mitment to condemn such practices throughout criminal justice
system jurisdictions.
As previously discussed, hate-motivated violence has been a
long-standing aspect of social, political, and legal control in the lives
of many racially identified groups in the United States."2 In modem
times, in response to increased evidence and perceptions that hate
crimes were increasing, the federal government and many states
deemed the problem sufficiently serious to warrant statutory regu-
lation.' Currently, forty-seven states have enacted legislation to
address bias motivated crime.4" Bias-motivated statutes generally
take three forms: penalty enhancement statutes, when existing
criminal conduct (e.g., assault) is motivated by the victim's status;
"ethnic intimidation" or "interference with enjoyment" laws; and
harassment and intimidation laws that make it a separate and dis-
tinct crime to harass or intimidate any person because of the victim's
status. Penalty enhancement statutes are the most common manner
of addressing bias-motivated crimes, and this category can be fur-
ther divided into four groupings of penalty enhancement legislation.
First are what have been called "pure" penalty enhancers,
which provide for extra punishment if the defendant commits any
vancy of motive in substantive law turns on how broadly or narrowly it is defined")
(citing LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 351, at 227). But see Abby Mueller, Can Motive
Matter? A Constitutional and Criminal Law Analysis of Motive in Hate Crime Legislation,
61 UMKC L. REV. 619, 626-27 (1993) (noting the important distinctions between the
related concepts of "motive," "purpose," and "intent").
462. See supra Part I.B.2.b. Early legal efforts to address the unique harms of hate
crimes originated during the Reconstruction era. Following the emancipation of for-
merly enslaved persons of African descent, rampant violence permeated their lives
due to unrelenting Ku Klux Klan terrorism. See Wayne R. Allen, Note, Klan, Cloth and
Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819 (1991); Ed-
ward F. Malone, Comment, Legacy of the Reconstruction: The Vagueness of the Criminal
Civil Rights Statutes, 38 UCLA L. REV. 163 (1990). The federal government was
prompted to enact legislation designed to stem the onslaught of racially motivated
violence against Blacks in the South. The 1870 statute, also known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act, criminalized interference with the enjoyment of federally protected rights.
The act was originally entitled "an Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United
States to Vote in the Several States of this Union, and for Other Purposes." Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. The Act is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1988).
463. The federal statute requires the Attorney General to report on the incidence of
crimes motivated by bias based on race, religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation.
The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports Division has the responsibility for gathering such
data. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988); see also FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES 1
(1993).
464. See Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred: The Constitutionality and Impact of Hate
Crime Legislation in the United States, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 29, 37 & app. A
(1995) (survey of federal and state legislation).
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crime in whole or in part because the victim belongs to an
enumerated group. Pure penalty enhancement schemes can further
be classified according to those that require or permit incarceration
or monetary fines to be added to the penalty for the underlying
offenses,4" and those that provide for the degree of the underlying
offense to be increased in severity.4"
The second class of penalty enhancement statutes are triggered
by fewer underlying offenses. That is, these statutes provide the
same stiffer penalties or increases in degree of the underlying offense
as "pure" enhancers, but they are not triggered by all crimes, but are
often limited to any one or more of the offenses of assault, battery, or
damage to real or personal property.'
The third class of statutes are characterized by prosecutorial
discretion.4" Lastly, there are statutes that list bias against certain
groups as an aggravating factor to be considered in sentencing.
4 9
Within this category, penalty enhancement occurs by pushing a sen-
tence toward the upper statutory limit, rather than by enhancing
punishment by adding to the penalty authorized by statute.
Michigan has joined the vast majority of states that have en-
acted hate crimes legislation. Its legislation is within the category of
penalty enhancement statutes, which provide stiffer penalties for
465. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455
(1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
466. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 755.085 (West 1992).
467. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (Law. Co-op. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 422.7, 422.75 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4001, 22-4003
(1992); MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 470A (1992); MiNN. STAT. § 609.2231 (1992);
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 574.090, 574.093 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Banks-
Baldwin 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2710 (1993). New Jersey enhances the penalty
only for simple assault if it is committed based on bias. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:12-1
(1992).
468. Under the Connecticut statute, for example, the state may charge a defendant
with intimidation based on bigotry or bias if "with specific intent to intimidate or
harass another person because of such other person's race, religion, ethnicity or sex-
ual orientation . .. [he] [clauses physical contact with such other person." CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-181b (1992); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (1993); IDAHO
CODE § 18-7902 (1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West 1993), as amended by 1993
Ill. Laws 259; IOWA CODE § 729.5 (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West
1991 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30
(Consol. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04
(1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.155, 166.165 (1991), as
amended by 1993 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. Nos. 18, 332; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080
(1991). While the offense of intimidation, a felony, requires only physical contact,
assault in the third degree, a misdemeanor, requires physical injury. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-61 (1992).
469. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.75
(West 1988 & Supp. 1993); 730 ILL. COMEP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.2 (West 1993), as amended by
1993 Ill. Laws 215; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4 (1992); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-6-21
(1992).
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crimes motivated in whole or in part by the victim's race, religion,
national origin, or sexual orientation.4  It is unlikely that the Michi-
gan hate crime legislation will face a successful constitutional
challenge in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.47'
In view of the increases in hate-motivated crime in recent years,
the need for specific legislation appears to be clear. Although early
anti-bias statutes originated on the federal level, modem offenses
often fall outside the purview of such enactments. The federal
"Enforcement Statutes" of 1870 and 1871, for example, were directed
against organized hate-motivated violence. However, the incidence
of hate-motivated offenses is not necessarily characterized by organ-
ized group conduct; it is more pervasive and diffuse than that, as
Vincent Chin's killing illustrates.
Even as crime has become a national issue politically, the states
remain primarily responsible for most matters of crime and
punishment.4 7 Thus, where existing federal legislation is perceived
to be inadequate to address the pervasive and often spontaneous
nature of hate crime, it is imperative that states take the initiative to
enact legislation that responds to the particular harms of hate-
motivated offenses, as many have done. While federal statutes can
operate as a backup for state failures to address such harms, a more
effective ap9roach would be for states to enforce the laws on the
state level. State governments have an important interest in
penalizing bias-motivated violence. Severe injury often results from
470. MicH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 750.62 (West 1991) ("Crimes Motivated by Preju-
dice or Bias; Race, Ethnic Origin, Religion, Gender, or Sexual Orientation"); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 1991) ("Ethnic Intimidation"); MCH. COM.
LAWS ANN. § 752.525 (West 1991) ("Religious Meetings, Disturbance, Carrying on
Certain Businesses Within Two Miles"); MCH. CoM. LAWS ANN. § 750.169 (West
1991) ("Disturbance of Religious Meetings"); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.396
(West 1991) ("Wearing Masks or Face Coverings in Public"); MICH. COM. LAWS
ANN. § 750.528a (West 1991) ("Training in Weapons").
In 1992, Michigan reported 165 bias-motivated offenses; in 1993, 239 such inci-
dents were reported, revealing an increase of 74 hate-motivated offenses between
1992 and 1993. See Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred, supra note 464, at 76.
471. 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (holding that the Wisconsin statute was not unconstitu-
tionally overbroad, nor violative of the First Amendment. Affirmed the sentence
enhancement aspect of the statute for "criminal conduct [that is] more heavily pun-
ished if the victim is selected because of [the victim's] protected status than if no
such motive obtains.").
472. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 357, at 262 (noting that most of the basic crimes-
murder, armed robbery, theft, rape, larceny, arson-are exclusively state crimes).
473. See Comment, Racially Motivated Violence and Intimidation: Inadequate State
Enforcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIIUNOLOGY 103, 116
(1984).
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bias crimes;47' victims reporting hate crimes experience numerous
related attacks, while a significant number also report isolated
incidents. Furthermore, the impact of hate crimes transcends the
physical harm to the individual. Other members of the Asian
American community perceived their lives to be equally endangered
and devalued after Vincent Chin's death, for example.' In addition,
the harm to the individual and to her or his family or friends can
have lasting traumatic effects.476
However, even as the need for state-level hate crime legislation
is recognized, there are two principal problems that must be ac-
knowledged with respect to any existing or proposed statutory
schemes. First is the conflicting message of such legislation, which
suggests that there is something extraordinary about hate-motivated
crime simply because it is characterized as such, rather than recog-
nizing the pervasive impact of bias in the commission of offense
against people of color and others who are injured by bias crimes
throughout American society. Second, even where specific hate
crime legislation exists, discretionary decision making-particularly
in the form of prosecutorial discretion-may render its effectiveness
meaningless.
As examined earlier, the experiences of Asian Americans fre-
quently are omitted from the discourse on racism. This oversight
occurs, according to Professor Rita Chaudhry Sethi, because "Whites
... deny us our right to speak out against prejudice, partially be-
cause it tarnishes their image of Asians as 'model' minorities; [and]
other people of color... deny us the same because of monopolistic
sentiments that they alone endure real racism." A Wall Street Jour-
nal/NBC News poll revealed that most American voters thought
that Asian Americans did not suffer discrimination "but rather re-
ceived too many 'special advantages.' ,478
474. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. AGAINST PREJUDICE AND VIOLENCE, The Ethnoviolence
Project Pilot Study, INST. REP. No. 1, at 5 (1986).
475. As one Asian American man states in Who Killed Vincent Chin?:
I got involved because actually in looking at it, here are two complete strangers who
... they can do something like that and get away with it on probation when just the
other day ... a man on a negligent homicide or manslaughter got 15 years. Being
able to see the possible manifestations with my own children I thought we ought to
do something to send a message out.
Film Transcript, supra note 301, at 15.
476. See Selbin, supra note 461, at 178-81, and sources cited therein.
477. Rita Chaudhry Sethi, Smells like Racism: A Plan for Mobilizing Against Anti-
Asian Bias, in THE STATE OF ASIAN AMERICA, supra note 14, at 235, 236.
478. Polner, supra note 195, at B1.
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The second point is that because of enduring social construc-
tions of Asian Americans-simultaneously raced and un-raced 4 '7 -
crimes motivated by anti-Asian animus are routinely diminished or
not recognized at all. In the years since Vincent Chin was killed, sev-
eral incidents illustrate this point. In what the author calls a
"macabre collage of violence" against Asian Americans, the follow-
ing incidents reveal the pervasiveness of such occurrences:
[A] police detective brutalized Long Guang Huang while
falsely arresting him in May 1985; youths fractured the
skull and legs of Sing Vang, a Vietnamese refugee, in Sep-
tember 1985; a gang called the "Dotbusters" beat to death
Navroze Mody, an Asian Indian American, in September
1987.[4'] In 1989, Jim Loo, a Chinese American, was mur-
dered in a pool room fight in which he was called "gook,"
"chink," and blamed for the death of American soldiers in
Vietnam. The same year, a gunman motivated by racial ha-
tred strafed a schoolyard with an automatic weapon,
killing five children of Southeast Asian descent. In 1990,
Hung Truong, a fifteen-year-old Vietnamese youth, was
killed by two men, said to be skinheads, shouting "white
power."['I While screaming "Karate! Karate!," skinheads
in Denver forced six Japanese students to stand in a line
and beat them with baseball bats.[4 12] In the summer of
1992, some of the rioters in Los Angeles deliberately tar-
geted Asian American businesses.[4] A nineteen-year-old
Vietnamese American, Luyen Phan Nguyen, was beaten to
death at a party while onlookers yelled "Viet Cong.
'
"
When crimes were committed against Asians in housing proj-
ects in San Francisco, the Housing Authority was reluctant to call the
crimes racially motivated. This reluctance was in spite of rampant
racial slurs, such as "Go home, Chinaman," and "accent harass-
ment."48 The Deputy Director of the Oakland Housing Authority
479. Kendall Thomas, Comments at Frontiers of Legal Thought, Duke Law School
(Jan. 26, 1990), quoted in Lawrence, supra note 362, at 61 (proposing the use of "race"
as a verb).
480. Kang, supra note 178, at 1927 n.11 (citing Anti-Asian Violence, supra note 178,
at 10).
481. Id. (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at 26-31).
482. Id. (citing Johnny Ng, Skinheads Accused of Attacking Japanese in Denver, ASIAN
WK., Nov. 30, 1990, at 18).
483. Id. (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 171, at 47).
484. Id. (citing Mike Clary, Rising Toll of Hate Crimes Cited in Student's Slaying, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1992, at Al) (citations omitted from quote).
485. Sethi, supra note 477, at 236 & n.5.
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minimized the existence of racial bias aimed at the Asian tenants by
responding: "There may be some issues of race in it, but it's largely
an issue of people who don't speak English feeling very isolated and
not having a support structure to deal with what's happening to
them."4' A bipolar vision of racism also may have contributed to the
reluctance to characterize the events as racist, as the perpetrators
were African Americans.47
The community of Asian Indians living in Jersey City, New Jer-
sey, were victimized by racist violence in 1986. Their homes and
businesses were "vandalized, and graffitied with racial slurs, women
had their saris pulled, Indians on the street were harassed and as-
saulted, and a 28-year old man was beaten into a coma."' A group
calling themselves "the Dotbusters" published a letter in the Jersey
Journal, stating that "We will go to any extreme to get Indians to
move out.... If I'm walking down the street and I see a Hindu and
the setting is right, I will just hit him or her. We plan some of our
more extreme attacks .... We use the phone book and look up the
name Patel."'89 The writers threatened all Asian Indians in Jersey
City, and promised to drive them out of Jersey City. Teenagers in
Dickinson High School were found with Dotbuster IDs.4&° In spite of
the explicit threat to the safety of the Asian Indian community, the
police failed to respond, telling the Asian Indian community that
they should not be concerned. 49
Later in the same month that the Dotbusters' letter was pub-
lished in the Jersey Journal, the horrific bludgeoning to death of
Navroze Mody occurred. Navroze was beaten to death with bricks
by a group of eleven young Latinos. Even after he had lost con-
sciousness, his assailants repeatedly propped him up and continued
to beat him. His White companion was not attacked. 492 Four of
Mody's attackers were indicted for manslaughter; two of the in-
dicted were also accused of assaulting two Indian students two
weeks before killing Navroze.49'
Despite the obvious brutality involved, there was scant public
outrage surrounding Mody's killing. Moreover, the Hudson County
Prosecutor refused to pursue criminal charges for racial bias, even
486. Steven A. Chin, Asians Terrorized in Housing Projects, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 17,
1993, at B1; see also Sethi, supra note 477, at 236-37.
487. See supra Part I.A.2.
488. Sethi, supra note 477, at 244-45.
489. TAKAKI, supra note 63, at 481; see also Sethi, supra note 477, at 245.
490. "Dotbusters" refers to the cosmetic dot, called bindi, that is worn by many
Indian Asian women to symbolize marital fidelity.
491. See Sethi, supra note 477, at 245.
492. See id.; see also Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1254.
493. See Sethi, supra note 477, at 245.
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though the prosecuting attorney stated that "[tihere was no apparent
motive for the assault other than the fact that the victim was an
Asian American. '"4 Of the eleven attackers in the Mody case, three
were convicted of aggravated assault, and one of simple assault. As
Professor Sethi opines, "[P]erhaps it was because Asian Indians did
not know how to employ the political system that the verdicts re-
turned did not fit the crimes committed. Perhaps it was because the
attackers were also minorities. But the main reason why justice was
not served was because the racism that Indians were enduring did
not fit the neat, American paradigm for racial violence. '95
In 1989, Patrick Edward Purdy fired an AK-47 assault rifle in
the schoolyard at Cleveland Elementary School in Stockton, Cali-
fornia, killing five Indochinese children and wounding thirty
others. 9' This tragedy was belatedly recognized for the presence of
racial motivation in the killings. According to California Attorney
General John Van de Kamp: "It appears highly probable that Purdy
deliberately chose Cleveland Elementary School as the location for
his murderous assault in substantial part because it was heavily
populated by Southeast Asian children. His frequent resentful com-
ments about Southeast Asians indicate a particular animosity against
them. ,
, 9
As Professor Pat Chew discusses, the killing of Yoshihiro Hat-
tori, a sixteen-year-old Japanese exchange student in Louisiana, is
also illustrative.49 Hattori and his American host Webb Haymaker
mistook Rodney and Bonnie Peairs' house as the location of a Hal-
loween Party. When Bonnie Peairs answered the door, Haymaker
said, "We're looking for the party." 99 Hattori was quickly approach-
ing the door. Frightened, Mrs. Peairs called for her husband to get
494. Statement by Hudson County Prosecutor Paul DePascale, quoted in Sethi,
supra note 477, at 245 (citing Raul Vicente, Jr., Cops Arrest Two as Dotbusters, GOLD
COAST, Mar. 24-31, 1988, at 4); see Vivienne Walt, A New Racism Gets Violent in New
Jersey, NEWSDAY, Apr. 6, 1988, at 5.
495. Sethi, supra note 477, at 247.
496. See Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra note 14, at 1314 n.377.
497. NELSON KEMPSKY, CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
A REPORT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP ON PATRICK EDWARD
PURDY AND THE CLEVELAND SCHOOL KILLINGS 12 (Oct. 1989), quoted in U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL, supra note 171, at 31; see also Chang, Asian American Legal Scholarship, supra
note 14, at 1314 & n.377.
498. See Chew, supra note 4, at 58 (citing Acquittal in Doorstep Killing of Japanese
Student, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Doorstep Killing]; David E.
Sanger, After Gunman's Acquittal, Japan Struggles to Understand America, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1993, at Al).
499. Id. (citing Doorstep Killing, supra note 498).
500. Id.
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his sun.S' Rodney Peairs immediately retrieved his .44 caliber pis-
tol. Coming to the door, Mr. Peairs pointed the gun and shouted,
"Freeze!"' 3 Apparently not understandin0the order, Hattori contin-
ued toward the door and was fatally shot.
"Three days of testimony made it clear that the teenager had
been killed almost by reflex. Little more than a minute passed be-
tween the time Mr. Hattori rang the Peairs' doorbell and the time
Mr. Peairs shot him."' ' Taking just over three hours to deliberate,
the jury acquitted Mr. Peairs of manslaughter, concluding that he
acted reasonably as a frightened homeowner using permissible
"deadly force to protect himself from an intruder."
Hattori's killing did not initially receive widespread coverage
in the American press. "Only after the incident became highly pub-
licized in the Japanese press as an example of the harm caused by
the lack of gun control in the United States," Professor Chew ex-
plains, "did the American press begin to report it."'  Moreover, as
Professor Chew notes, "[N]either the American journalists nor the
lawyers, including those for the prosecution, explored the role that
race might have played in the incident or in the jury's decision.5 For
instance, the Peairs agreed that Mrs. Peairs' fear precipitated the
shooting, but neither would explain what caused that fear." °9 Fur-
thermore, the Peairses could not explain why they shouted to a
neighbor to "go away" when the neighbor wanted to help the dying
Mr. Hattori lying in the Peairs' carport"O
The answer to Mrs. Peairs' inexplicable fear very likely lies
within the social construction of Asian "otherness" which dictated
her reaction and her husband's violent response to Hattori, and not
to Haymaker. With only an instant to form the judgment of reason-






506. Id. at 58-59 (citing Sanger, supra note 498).
507. Id. at 59 (citing interview with Hiroko Otani, Visiting Teacher from Tokyo,
Japan, at the Carnegie Mellon Child Care Center in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Nov. 15,1992)).
508. Id. at 59. "In contrast," Professor Chew notes, "the Japanese press did suggest
that race conflict was a cause of the shooting." Id. at 59 n.260. One major Japanese
newspaper, the Mainichi Shimbun, described Louisiana's "shoot the burglar law" as
a "manifestation of the discrimination that exists in the community where burglary
charges are made predominantly against blacks." Id. (citing Sanger, supra note 498, at
A7).
509. Chew, supra note 4, at 59 (citing Doorstep Killing, supra note 498, at All).
510. Id.
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shoot at Haymaker? In other words, was it more likely that Hattori
was shot and Peairs was acquitted because Hattori was Asian?" '
The American public's reaction to the killing and Peairs' subse-
quent acquittal was very revealing. Instead of expressing outrage,
the public and press were "intrigued by how the American and
Japanese 'cultures' viewed the gun control issues differently." '
"Rather than condemnation or even critical scrutiny of the Peairs'
conduct," Professor Chew concludes, "there was apparent commu-
nity support. 1
As Professor Bill Ong Hing states, "Hate crimes statutes are in-
tended not only to protect potential victims, but also to change the
way society thinks about race relations. 51 4 This article does not
question the need for hate crime legislation. Yet, the examination of
the Vincent Chin case and the Hattori case reveals the shortcomings of
such an approach. These cases indicate how the embedded stereo-
types about Asian Americans operate to disadvantage Asian
Americans in criminal justice schemes where overt indicia of racial
animus may (Vincent Chin) or may not (Hattori) be present, particu-
larly where law enforcement and the public do not view such
incidents against Asian Americans as being motivated by hate.5
Within the discipline of antidiscrimination law, Professor Alan
Freeman provides a useful explanation as to how traditional antidis-
crimination law deliberately approaches racial discrimination from
the "perpetrator" rather than from the "victim" perspective:
The perpetrator perspective presupposes a world com-
posed of atomistic individuals whose actions are outside of
and apart from the social fabric and without historical
continuity. From this perspective, the law views racial dis-
crimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the
misguided conduct of particular actors. It is a world where,
but for the conduct of misguided ones, the system of
equality of opportunity would work to provide a distribu-
tion of the good things in life without racial disparities and
where deprivations that did correlate with race would be
511. Id.; see also id. at 59 n.263 (considering the possibility that bipolar analysis
contributed to the lack of attention to the racial dimensions in the Hattori killing).
512. Chew, supra note 4, at 60 (citing Sanger, supra note 498, at A17).
513. Id. (citing Peter Applebome, Verdict in Death of Student Reverberates across
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A14; Doorstep Killing, supra note 498, at All).
514. Hing, supra note 210, at 950.
515. See Tanya Kateri Herndndez, Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the
Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence, " 99 YALE L.J. 845, 850-55 (1990) ("Existing
state statutes are deficient because they do not address the real problem with bias
statutes-the lack of enforcement.").
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"deserved" by those deprived on grounds of insufficient
"merit." It is a world where such things as "vested rights,"
"objective selection programs," and "adventitious deci-
sions" (all of which serve to prevent victims from
experiencing any change in conditions) are matters of fate,
having nothing to do with the problem of racial discrimi-
nation."'
Thus, while hate crime legislation fills a necessary gap in the
strategies against bias-motivated offenses, limiting the treatment of
cases such as Vincent Chin to the domain of criminal civil rights or
hate crime legislation permits the legal system and the rest of society
to ignore the institutionalized nature of racial bias. As such, while
certain offenses that are perpetrated against persons of color will be
deemed to warrant "hate crime" status, the remaining myriad of in-
stances in which crimes are perpetrated against persons of color will
continue to be minimized in grade of offense and degree of punish-
ment for perpetrators. For those who would examine this situation
critically, it would suggest an otherwise fairly operating system."'
Hate-motivated offenses share with other anti-discrimination laws
the premise that by punishing the individual wrongdoer, the harm
has been addressed and redressed. However, the basic flaw in this
reasoning is that the individual wrongdoer rarely acts out of the con-
text of a preexisting norm-a preexisting racist norm-which is
socially constructed and societally embedded. This is an untenable
state of affairs even for criminal law doctrine, where individual
516. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054
(1978) (footnotes omitted).
517. See Selbin, supra note 461, at 160 (discussing the practical implications of
determining whether a particular crime or class of crimes qualifies as a hate crime).
Important to this consideration is that despite evidence that most violent crime is
intraracial, in a study of 1031 incidents involving Asian homicide victims and
offenders of a known race over the 1976-1984 period, of the Asian victims killed by
non-Asians, about two-thirds (66.5%) were killed by Whites, and about one-third
(31.4%) were killed by Blacks. Sung Joon Jang et al., Predictors of Interracial Homicide
Victimization for Asian Americans: A Macrostructural Opportunity Perspective, 34 Soc.
PERSP. 1, 11 (1991). Thus, the authors conclude that the research reveals that "[A]sian
Americans are at least three times more likely to have been killed by a member of
another race than are whites, and about five times more than blacks. This indicates
that although the overall risk of homicide victimization is relatively low for Asians,
this type of victimization is more distinctly interracial when it does occur than is the
case for the majority population and the larger minority population." Id. at 14-15.
Significantly, the researchers found the victim's gender to be a significant predictor
of whether a victim was killed by a White or by an Asian. In the study's subsample,
Asian women were found to be significantly less likely than men to be killed by a
White than by an Asian. Id. at 14.
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blameworthiness establishes the culpability that justifies state pun-
ishment.
A far more powerful legal message for law and society would
be for the lives of crime victims of color to be considered as valuable
as other members of society in every facet of criminal law doctrine,
decision making, and adjudication. As Professor Stephen Carter
reminds us, "[Mlillions of tiny, racialist decisions are made each day,
and are justified, in the minds of most decision makers, not on the
ground that they oppress, but on the ground that they are ra-
tional." 1 Articulating this message does not suggest a "color-blind"
approach to criminal adjudications, however."' To the contrary, it
calls for taking into account the particular ways in which racial ani-
mus fuels criminal reactions against persons of color and to treat
such offenses as serious crimes because of these constructions and
contexts. As the Vincent Chin proceedings illustrate, this often does
not occur, thereby compounding the injury or loss, and perpetuating
the structure of racial superiority by devaluing the lives of victims of
color within ostensibly neutral principles of law and legal admini-
stration.
CONCLUSION--CHALLENGES FOR CRIMINAL LAW,
LEGAL EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY
When those who have the power to name and to socially con-
struct reality choose not to see you or hear you, whether you are
dark-skinned, old, disabled, female, or speak with a different ac-
cent or dialect than theirs, when someone with the authority of a
teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is
518. Carter, supra note 412, at 434.
519. As Professor Charles Lawrence states:
Faith in the colorblind cure contains an implicit acceptance of significant cost.
The admitted injury imposed by the still virulent and demeaning social con-
struction of race continues while we wait for the 'lust-don't-say-it" approach
to work. But this cost includes more than what can be measured by a reckon-
ing of those cases where racial discrimination is real in fact but not in law.
The narrow doctrinal view of what counts as racism helps spread the epi-
demic of denial....
Lawrence, supra note 225, at 837.
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a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror
and saw nothing.52
-Adrienne Rich
Because of the harmfulness of racist discourse and conduct,
which often results in great psychic and physical injury, the moral
weight of the criminal justice system must activate to publicly sanc-
tion such wrongdoing against society. 2' Hate crime legislation is an
important effort toward the public approbation of bias-motivated
injuries, provided the necessary willingness by law enforcement
agencies is forthcoming. However, any law enforcement efforts to-
ward addressing bias-motivated offenses will be ineffective unless
those entities imbued with discretionary power begin to view mem-
bers of the diverse communities within this country as having equal
worth.
In this regard, perhaps the most telling conclusion of the FBI
bias crimes survey identifies the need for local law enforcement
agencies to develop greater sensitivity toward bias offenses."' Pro-
fessor Kenneth Culp Davis recognized that "[tihe strongest need and
the greatest promise for improving the quality of justice to individ-
ual parties in the entire legal and governmental system are in the
areas where decisions necessarily depend more upon discretion than
upon rules and principles and where formal hearings and judicial
review are mostly irrelevant." This means that police, prosecutors,
and judges must recognize structural and personal biases which may
lead them to use their discretion in ways that devalue the lives of
people of color. Laxity in homicide investigations, plea bargained
agreements, and sentencing dispositions are behaviors which indi-
cate indifference, at best, or racism, at worst, toward diverse
520. FRANCES A. MAHER & MARY KAY THOMPSON TETREAULT, THE FEMINIST
CLASSROOM: AN INSIDE LOOK AT How PROFESSORS AND STUDENTS ARE TRANS-
FORMING HIGHER EDUCATION FOR A DIVERSE SocIErY 1 (1994) (quoting Adrienne
Rich). For example, over the last decade, the number of Asian American law students
has grown from 1.7% to 5.5%, and continues to grow; the majority of these students
are Chinese, Korean or Japanese Americans. L. Ling-Chi Wang, Trends in Admissions
for Asian Americans in Colleges and Universities: Higher Education Policy, in THE STATE
OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA, supra note 175, at 49, 55.
521. On the particular harms of hate crimes, see supra Part Im1; see also Hate Crimes
Statistics Act of 1988: Hearings on S. 702, S. 797, S. 2000 Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 240 (1988) (statement by
Leonard D. Goodstein, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, American Psychological As-
sociation); Goleman, supra note 4, at C1.
522. FBI REPORT, supra note 457; see also Hatred Turns Out Not to Be Color-Blind,
TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 22.
523. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 3
(1976).
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communities. The commitment to end such glib practices must be
prioritized. Moreover, it is clear that legal and social constructions of
identity operate symbiotically to create climates where racial hostil-
ity will result in racial violence. There is an imperative, then, to
address the broader problems of stereotyping which infect the op-
erative views throughout the criminal justice system and throughout
society.
Legal education has an important role to play toward rectifying
this situation and achieving these goals because of the unique roles
that lawyers play in developing legal doctrine and social policy. 2 If
we acknowledge the centrality of race in the development and inter-
pretation of legal doctrine, we must equip our students to
understand the contexts and manifestations of racism(s) in our soci-
ety, legal rules, and legal systems. Moreover, as Professor Patricia
Williams reminds us:
We, as law teachers, create miniworlds of reality, by the
faith that students put in our tutelage of the rules of reality.
We define the boundaries of the legitimate and the ille-
gitimate, in a more ultimately powerful way than almost
anyone else in the world. It is enormously important there-
fore to consider the process by which we include, as well as
the process by which we exclude5 2'
Similarly, Bell Hooks states that:
If the effort to respect and honor the social reality and ex-
periences of groups in this society who are nonwhite is to
be reflected in a pedagogical process, then as teachers-on
all levels, from elementary to university settings-we must
acknowledge that our styles of teaching must change...
Most of us were taught in classrooms where styles of
teachings reflected the notion of a single norm of thought
and experience, which we were encouraged to believe was
universal. This has been just as true for nonwhite teachers
as for white teachers.... As a consequence, many teachers
are disturbed by the political implications of a multicul-
tural education because they fear losing control in a
524. See Hing, supra note 210, at 930-31 (noting that lawyers have central roles in
the resolution of cases involving race relations, and that lawyers have heightened
access to the power structure, including the power to shape both policy and law). In
this regard, it is significant to note that in 1987, American Citizens for Justice, estab-
lished two $500 Vincent Chin scholarships for Asian Pacific American students who
are entering law school. The scholarships were established from a trust fund for Mrs.
Lily Chin. N.Y. NICHIBEI, Dec. 14,1989.
525. WILLIAMS, supra note 277, at 88.
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classroom where there is no one way to approach a sub-
ject-only multiple ways and multiple references."6
This article represents an effort toward the recognition of this
responsibility, as well as a suggested creative approach to this im-
perative. We can overcome the apparent reticence to address such
issues in the curriculum by seeking and sharing creative teaching
ideas that will break the silence on issues of race and diversity in
legal education.5 When difference and diversity are genuinely re-
garded as national strengths, we will journey toward the kind of
pluralistic democracy so often imagined, though as yet unrealized.
Traveling along this path, we must commit ourselves to teach "laws
with flaws."' 2' Accepting this challenge, "[Olur goal in legal educa-
526. BELL HOoKs, TEACHING TO TRANsGREss: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF
FREEDOM 35-36 (1994).
527. It also should be acknowledged that the commitment to engaging in multiple
perspective pedagogy is not necessarily without some pain and discomfort to the
instructor and the students. Bell Hooks speaks honestly about this dynamic:
When I first entered the multicultural, multiethnic classroom setting I was
unprepared. I did not know how to cope effectively with so much
"difference." Despite progressive politics, and my deep engagement with the
feminist movement, I had never before been compelled to work within a truly
diverse setting and lacked the necessary skills.... Just as it may be difficult
for professors to shift their paradigms, it is equally difficult for students. I
have always believed that students should enjoy learning. Yet I found that
there was much more tension in the diverse classroom setting where the phi-
losophy of teaching is rooted in critical pedagogy and (in my case) in feminist
critical pedagogy. The presence of tension-and at times even conflict-often
meant that students did not enjoy my classes or love me, their professor, as I
secretly wanted them to do. Teaching in a traditional discipline from the per-
spective of critical pedagogy means that I often encounter students who make
complaints like, "I thought this was supposed to be an English class, why are
we talking so much about feminism?" (Or, they might add, race or class.)...
And I saw for the first time that there can be, and usually is, some degree of
pain involved in giving up old ways of thinking and knowing and learning
new approaches. I respect that pain. And I include recognition of it now
when I teach, that is to say, I teach about shifting paradigms and talk about
the discomfort it can cause.
Id. at 41-43; see also Beverly Daniel Tatum, Talking About Race, Learning About Racism:
The Application of Racial Identity Development Theory in the Classroom, 62 HARV. EDUC.
REv. 1, 5 (1992) (identifying three primary areas of student resistance to talking and
learning about race and racism: (1) race is considered a taboo topic for discussion,
especially in racially mixed settings; (2) many students, regardless of racial-group
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528. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Teaching Law with Flaws: Adopting a Pluralistic Ap-
proach to Torts, 57 Mo. L. REV. 443, 454 (1992); see also Burnele V. Powell, Somewhere
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tion should be to learn from these past mistakes and teach our stu-
dents how to make laws work for all segments of society."'52 This is
the lesson of Who Killed Vincent Chin? Vincent Chin's legacy deserves
no less.
Farther Down the Line: MacCrate on Multiculturalism and the Information Age, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 637 (1994).
529. See Banks, supra note 528, at 454.
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